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THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION 
The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909 
BY ALLAN R. MILLETT 
In September, 1906, President Theodore 
Roosevelt sent 5,000 American troops to Cuba 
to put an end to insurrection and assumed 
direct control of the Cuban government. 
The United States Army occupied the 
island almost three years in an attempt to 
restore the status quo ante bellum—to re­
store, that is, that measure of stability that 
had been Cuba's following the Spanish-
American War. The occupation was based on 
the assumption that insuring the peace of 
an area was the purpose of intervention and 
that stability was the necessary outgrowth of 
any public order that was established. 
Although the Army was in Cuba to serve 
as the instrument of American policy, its 
officers often favored alternative goals to 
those prescribed by official policy. Some be­
lieved that American interests would best 
be served if fundamental changes in Cuban 
domestic institutions were encouraged; and 
although they agreed that supervised elec­
tions were essential to a graceful withdrawal 
on the part of the United States, they main­
tained that elections were not the same as 
the reforms that they saw as the key to the 
stability that it was their obligation to assure. 
Mr. Millett's investigation of the Cuban 
intervention does much to reveal the larger 
dimensions of an issue that continues to exer­
cise our government today. For the question 
of whether temporary stability brought about 
by force but unaccompanied by reform can 
result in lasting peace is one that continues 
to confront those who formulate our present 
policy in Latin America and, perhaps, in all 
other parts of the world as well. 
Allan R. Millett is assistant professor of his­
tory at the University of Missouri, Columbia. 
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Preface

IN THE YEARS immediately following the Spanish-American War, the realities of Cuban 
independence weighed heavily on the United States. In Sep­
tember, 1906, as the result of an insurrection in Cuba, Theodore 
Roosevelt, citing his responsibilities to Cuba under the Platt 
Amendment, intervened to end the war and reluctantly as­
sumed direct control of the Cuban government. Five thousand 
American troops occupied the island. Until the occupation 
ended in 1909, the American government attempted to restore 
the pre-revolt political alignment, although the intervention 
and occupation had made such a restoration impossible. This 
policy was determined by some factors that had little relation 
to Cuban political life: recent civil and military experiences 
in the Philippines and the public reaction to them, the Ameri­
can presumption that the occupation was temporary, American 
assumptions about the efficacy of political parties as a mode 
of political expression, and the Roosevelt administration's con­
clusion that popular elections were essential to stable and 
legitimate government. 
Political and economic influence in one form or another 
was the historic state of relations between the United States 
and Cuba. Constitutionalized as the right of intervention after 
1898, this relationship became the promise of active political 
and administrative control of Cuba by the United States under 
certain conditions which might threaten Cuba's independence. 
It was assumed that the United States would be the initiator 
of such action. The possibility of intervention, however, as 
pledged in the organic law of both countries was a constant 
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factor in the plans, fears, and aspirations of Cuba's political 
leaders as they sought to turn American policy to their 
personal advantage. 
Yet United States policy-makers were only half-aware of 
the implications of their relationship with Cuba. They assumed 
that the orderly transfer of power in a system of government 
was the irreducible condition of stability, in American usage, 
for it represented the violence-free accommodation of com­
peting interest groups within the body politic. In terms of 
day-to-day conditions, the absence of politically significant 
violence was the gauge by which stability was measured. In 
all, stability was a rather mysterious but prized condition. 
When applied to Cuba, this definition was a narrow measure 
of that nation's capacity for peaceful internal change. But 
in American diplomatic usage, the maintenance of peace 
rather than the substance of internal change was the criterion 
for non-intervention. 
Although this book is a political history, it stresses the use 
of American armed forces in the Cuban crisis of 1906 and 
the occupation that followed. It emphasizes the role of officers 
of the United States Army in the policy-making process and 
their relations with their civil superiors in determining both 
the character of the Cuban intervention and the programs of 
the occupation. 
In terms of policy the Army officers serving in Cuba during 
the Second Intervention (as differentiated from the one of 
1898) influenced the decisions made within the Provisional 
Government. More importantly, they favored alternatives to 
American policy, which were rejected. They differed with 
the United States political leaders by believing American 
policy would be best served if basic changes were encouraged 
in Cuba's domestic institutions. Unenthusiastic about dealing 
with Cuba's professional politicians and placing little faith in 
the reforming potential of Cuba's political parties, the officers 
realized that supervised elections were essential to the grace­
ful liquidation of the occupation, but doubted the wisdom of 
both elections and withdrawal. They believed that continued, 
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reformist American occupation would best serve the Cuban 
people and the interests of the United States. 
In addition to describing American civil-military relations 
in the Cuban occupation, this study is a history of the use 
of American forces as an instrument of national policy and the 
political implications of their use in a specific historic situation. 
Essentially it deals with the constraints upon the Roosevelt 
administration as it worked to resolve the Cuban crisis without 
using force. It examines why Roosevelt tried to avoid employ­
ing troops and why the decision to occupy Cuba was taken 
largely from his hands by events over which he had little 
control, but for which he bore some responsibility. 
Although the Second Intervention in Cuba involved two 
sovereign states, it was, militarily, a problem in applying the 
political, economic, psychological techniques of maintaining 
internal security. The management of internal security affairs 
in Cuba was an Army function, performed by the officers in 
the Provisional Government of Charles E. Magoon, the advisers 
to Cuba's constabulary, and the Army of Cuban Pacification. 
As an internal security operation, the occupation had its ante­
cedents in the Army's experiences in Cuba after the Spanish-
American War and in the Philippine Insurrection. Because 
of the domestic political reaction to these earlier military 
occupations, the Army's activities from 1906 to 1909 were 
restricted to the minimum tasks required to establish public 
order. As this study demonstrates, the Army was the guarantor 
of stability, and its officers were the major architects and 
critics of the work of the Provisional Government. 
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THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE

BURDENS OF WORLD POWER

iN THE YEARS BETWEEN 1898 and 1917 the .United States Army assumed the military 
responsibilities of a major world power with overseas posses­
sions. By 1906 the Army was settled in its role as colonial 
administrator and defender with some fifteen thousand soldiers 
serving in the insular possessions. The Army was twice as 
large as it had been before 1898: 58,368 officers and men. 
Still it was four thousand men short of its authorized strength, 
Army life being underpaid and unattractive in comparison 
with civilian life. 
If better-managed and supplied, the "semicloistered" Army 
remained outside the main stream of civil Me.1 Its expanded 
officer corps, becoming more specialized, suffered from branch 
parochialism. Service overseas was commonplace and came 
too often to suit the family men. Privates, who enlisted for a 
minimum of five years, received $15 monthly. Most of the 
soldiers were disenfranchised, there being no provisions for 
absentee voting. Businesses displayed signs reading "No Uni­
forms Wanted." Rank very much had its privileges as well as 
its responsibilities; the line between officers and men was 
clearly drawn. It was an Army unwavering in its views on 
discipline, spit-and-polish, minute accounting procedures, 
small unit tactics, individual marksmanship, and the superi­
ority of its value system over that of American civil society. 
The expansion of the Army during the war with Spain and 
the fortunes of active service catapulted new men into the 
Army's highest ranks. In 1906 only one of the thirty-four 
general officers on active service had worn stars before 1898, 
and the hardships of tropical service and a presidential 
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decision to give some preference to ability over seniority 
brought officers of most unconventional accomplishments to 
important commands. 
Perhaps the most stunning military career after 1898 was 
that of Leonard Wood. Born in 1860 of an old New England 
family of slight means and stern convictions, Wood took a 
medical degree at Harvard and, in 1885, joined the Army 
as a contract surgeon.2 Commissioned and later awarded the 
Medal of Honor for his endurance in the pursuit of Geronimo, 
Wood became family physician to Presidents Cleveland and 
McKinley. During his years in Washington, he won highly 
placed friends, including Theodore Roosevelt. At the outbreak 
of the war with Spain, Colonel Wood and Lieutenant Colonel 
Roosevelt raised the First Volunteer Cavalary and campaigned 
gloriously in Cuba. Roosevelt, admirer and patron of the 
ambitious doctor-soldier, wrote of Wood in 1899: 
He combined, in a very high degree, the qualities of entire manliness 
with entire uprightness and cleanliness of character. It was a pleasure 
to deal with a man of high ideals, who scorned everything mean and 
base, and who also possessed those robust and hardy qualities of body 
and mind, for which no merely negative virtue can ever atone. He was 
by nature a soldier of the highest type.3 
Wood had his enemies in the Army and in Washington, for 
he was outspoken, incorruptible, politically astute, a born 
publicist, and endlessly confident in his principles and abilities. 
He had risen quickly past more senior and (in their view) 
deserving officers, and his critics never missed a chance to 
attack him. He was a commander who often won unswerving 
loyalty from his subordinates. In all, Leonard Wood was 
one of America's greatest and most controversial soldier-
administrators. 
Roosevelt considered Brigadier General James Franklin Bell 
to be as able a soldier as Leonard Wood.4 After his graduation 
from West Point in 1878, Bell served a long apprenticeship 
on the plains. In 1899 he was still just another graying captain 
of cavalry. As the colonel of a volunteer regiment, however, 
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he won a Medal of Honor in 1899 in the Philippines. He then 
served as a provost marshal and district commander on Luzon 
from 1900 to 1903. In 1901, he became a brigadier general in 
the Regular Army, an advancement of four grades. Promoted 
by McKinley and admired by Roosevelt, Bell was appointed 
Chief of Staff in 1906 at the age of fifty. 
Another of the new brigadiers, Thomas H. Barry, was a 
contemporary of Bell's at West Point. He joined the Seventh 
Cavalry on the frontier in 1877 (the Sioux and Nez Perces 
had created some openings) and built a reputation as a blunt, 
hard-working, and particularly effective staff officer. He was 
"fair and square . . . the best known Catholic officer in the 
service." As an assistant adjutant-general, Barry served in the 
Philippines and China from 1898 to 1901. Returning to the 
United States, he joined the new General Staff and, in the 
summer of 1906, was touring Europe to observe maneuvers. 
Barry appears in news photos as a stiff, white-haired, dark­
browed model of a modern brigadier; the panoply of epau­
lettes, aiguellettes, sash, medals, and braid draw attention 
from his oversize ears. 
However rapid the advancement of Wood, Bell, and Barry 
after 1898, the career of Brigadier General Frederick Funston 
was by comparison meteoric and far more controversial. He 
was incomparably the most colorful of the new generals, 
enjoyed wide public recognition, and was strictly not Old 
Army. The son of a Kansas congressman, Funston attended 
the University of Kansas for two years (1886-88). A fraternity 
brother, editor William Allen White, described his friend: 
Fred Funston was . .  . at that time . .  . a pudgy, applecheeked 
young fellow, just under five feet five, who seemed to have decided 
in his cradle to overcome his runty size by laughing at himself. . . . 
He walked swiftly but not too steadily, indulged in no athletic sports 
whatever, was a good rifle shot, had absolutely no sense of fear, physical 
or spiritual, was a poor but passable student, read widely, had vast 
areas of curious information, loved good clothes which he could not 
afford to buy, was methodical and rather meticulous in his habits, 
affectionate by nature: everyone . . . loved him. . . .5 
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Quitting Kansas for more adventurous frontiers, Funston 
explored Alaska and Death Valley as a Department of Agri­
culture botanist. Returning to New York in 1896 from an un­
successful business venture in Central America, he joined the 
Cuban insurgent army out of curiosity. After running the 
blockade, he subsequently commanded Maximo Gomez' artil­
lery (three guns) in two years of fighting. In 1898, sick, 
wounded, and exhausted, Funston reached the American 
legation in Havana and returned to Kansas before the out­
break of war. On the strength of his Cuban service he became 
colonel of the Twentieth Kansas and led his regiment in 
thirty-five engagements against the Filipinos. For swimming 
the Rio Grande under fire at Calumpit, Luzon, and organizing 
a bridgehead which flanked the insurgents in a bitter skirmish, 
he won the Medal of Honor and promotion to Brigadier 
General, Volunteers. In 1901, as a district commander on 
Luzon, Funston engineered the most daring coup of the 
insurrection. Using loyal Macabebe scouts as a screen, he and 
a handful of Americans, posing as captives, bluffed their way 
to Aguinaldo's heavily-guarded headquarters and seized the 
general-president. Elihu Root in his report for 1901 called the 
feat "the most important single military event of the year." 
In April, 1901, Funston, at the age of thirty-six and without 
a day's service as a Regular, became a Brigadier General, 
United States Army. His unorthodox career and sudden pro­
motion led Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin to comment: 
"I am making lieutenants of better stuff than Funston every 
day. Funston is a boss-scout—that's all!"6 In 1906, Funston 
again made headlines when an earthquake devastated San 
Francisco. As the senior officer present in the Bay area, he 
directed the soldiers who fought fires, rescued survivors, halted 
epidemics, stopped looting, treated the injured, and recap­
tured zoo animals. Yet these heroics did not obscure the fact 
that Frederick Funston knew Cubans and he knew guerrilla 
warfare, and in 1906 these were qualities the Army could 
ill-afford to ignore. 
Whatever the accomplishments of individual officers, the 
Army by 1906 was no longer a haven for sword-waving 
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romantics. From the end of the Civil War, the major trend in 
the Army's officer corps had been professionalization: the 
systematic study of war and the creation of organizational 
forms and attitudes best suited for the scientific conduct of 
war.7 The Army's concerted effort to systematize itself for 
the most effective application of force contributed to its isola­
tion from civil society. While the intellectual, political, and 
social elite of late nineteenth century America saw war 
as a moral evil, materially wasteful, and an unnatural dis­
ruption of human progress, the Army officers viewed it as a 
historical fact and a timeless expression of man's nature. To 
civilians, the military virtues were anachronistic, military 
society authoritarian, and the Army an economic burden. To 
soldiers, American society, dominated by materialism, self-
indulgence, and license, was distasteful. Politicians who pan­
dered to these values to gain personal power were morally 
suspect. The officer corps, due largely to its indoctrination, 
defined its major problem to be reconciling the United States 
military policy to the whims of the nation's foreign policy-
makers and to the niggardliness of Congress.8 
Years of Trial and Experience 
Looking back to the halcyon days in the summer of 1898 
when the United States was saving people it barely knew 
from Spanish oppression, General Hugh L. Scott remembered 
the war as the first time since 1865 that Americans discovered 
they had a regular army. He and his fellow officers knew 
"our army was organized for peace and not war," but the 
Army's low status in the United States was too great to over­
come. Instead, inflamed by the news from Cuba, "the people 
. . . took the bit in their teeth and ran away." Although 
soldiers were blamed for inciting wars for their own ends, 
Scott believed the United States had gone to war with Spain 
"without the soldiers exerting the slightest influence toward 
that end. It is the people and the politician that make war 
and the soldier who makes peace."9 
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In 1898, when forced by "the People" to fight its first 
foreign war in fifty years, the Army, a meager twenty-eight 
thousand, found the task beyond its resources. There were too 
few hands and too little experience to draw upon, from the 
Secretary of War down to the newest lieutenant. At Las 
Guasimas, General Joe Wheeler may have thought the Span­
iards were Yankees; the rest of the Army conducted the war 
as if it were fighting the Sioux. 
Soon enough the Army and the American public were made 
aware by foreign military observers, a legion of correspondents, 
and the Dodge Commission that little was right with the 
American military system. Even so, Elihu Root, upon becom­
ing Secretary of War in July, 1899, found it difficult to make 
the reforms to correct the moribund organization of 1898. 
Nonetheless, the Root reforms did begin to reorient the Army 
to the demands of the twentieth century. By 1903 legislation 
had created an embryonic General Staff with planning and 
supervisory responsibilities over the Army bureaus, replaced 
the commanding general with a chief of staff of limited tenure, 
established the Army War College, and reorganized the 
National Guard. For the first time the United States Army 
was placed on an organizational par with European armies. 
The reforms had little immediate applicability to the Army's 
most pressing problem, that of pacifying and administering 
America's new colonial possessions. The only change that 
helped was the enlargement of the Army. Whether Root was 
most influenced by the new problems of world politics or by 
the belief that his reforms had universal appropriateness in 
terms of managerial efficiency, he directed American military 
thinking toward the problems of defending the United States 
from the organized armed forces of other industrialized 
nations. This is not to say that Root slighted colonial prob­
lems. Much of his work as Secretary of War (indeed the 
rationale for his appointment) was to administer the insular 
possessions.10 Although he might have chosen to thrash out 
publicly the policy with which the United States should 
govern culturally and racially different peoples, he did not. 
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The determining factor was the quick cooling of the evange­
listic fervor that had helped sweep Americans into war in 1898. 
Although the war with Spain reshaped the United States 
Army, it was the Philippine Insurrection that was the Army's 
major experience between the Indian wars and World War I. 
In crushing Philippine resistance to American tutelage, the 
Army lost ten times as many battlefield casualties as it suffered 
in Cuba. The insurrection was a costly, unpopular war, long 
on hardship and short on measurable victory. It was fought, in 
the view of many educated Americans, in a distasteful manner 
for confused goals. The Philippine Insurrection brought public 
censure to the Army, and it also put the Army into the business 
of colonial government, for which its frontier service provided 
only partial education.11 
Because the Army had to draw upon its own resources 
and experiences in pacifying the Philippines and because 
its past was most closely linked with its constabulary service 
on the Great Plains, the Army was guided by some definite 
assumptions about controlling rebellious subject peoples. The 
Army, dealing with the Plains Indians, had used a simple code 
of justice: good behavior was rewarded and breaches of the 
peace were punished as quickly as possible. There was little 
room for negotiation and compromise. There was, however, 
some humane concern for the Indians, but the Army's approach 
was distinctly paternalistic. In all, the Army found force or the 
threat of force the best method of subduing the Indians, and 
it received little meaningful education in governing complex 
and alien societies. An interesting insight into the residual 
effects of this experience is the respect the American officers 
felt for the Moros, a savage, primitive Moslem people who 
inhabited the southernmost Philippines. American officers, on 
the other hand, could scarcely hide their distaste for the 
Hispanized, Christian Filipinos of Luzon. 
The outbreak of the Philippine Insurrection in 1899 pro­
duced shock in the United States. Even so, there was little 
criticism of the subsequent Luzon campaigns, which shattered 
conventional resistance by the end of that year. But the 
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fighting continued, despite staggering losses to the insurgents. 
The Army's problems were not easily solved. In the Philippines 
the Army faced millions of inhabitants, urban and rural, living 
in both complex and simple societies. It was confronted with 
ancient social, tribal, religious, and economic rivalries and 
a subwar between the Filipinos themselves. It was matched 
against political organization and nationalism. 
In 1899 the Army needed sixty thousand men just to hold 
the major towns and break up the organized insurgent army. 
In the meantime, the rebel shadow government continued to 
function; taxes were collected for the rebels even inside 
occupied Manila. The population supplied the insurgents with 
arms, food, recruits, and information. Native policemen, local 
officials, and American sympathizers were kidnaped, tortured, 
and murdered. Nationalist propaganda, much of it publicizing 
American anti-imperialist sentiment, reached many barrios. 
The strength of the resistance, built on a foundation of popular 
support, was admitted by Major General Arthur MacArthur— 
in 1900 the senior Army commander in the islands: " . .  . the 
real effective opposition to pacification comes from towns. The 
'skulking bands of Guerrilla' . .  . are mere expressions of the 
loyalty of the towns. They could not exist for a month without 
urban support."12 
The American response was to increase the number of 
occupying troops to seventy-three thousand in 1900 and to 
step up its efforts to control the population. Appalled by the 
cruelty of the insurgents to their own countrymen and out­
raged by what it considered to be guerrilla treachery and 
brutality, the Army showed little sympathy for suspected 
insurgents. Although policy until 1900 had been to leave 
civilian sympathizers alone, this act of generosity, according 
to Secretary Root, was interpreted as a sign of weakness. A 
Filipino officer-historian writes, however, that "the violent 
repressive measures adopted by the Americans in subduing 
the guerrillas proved ineffective because, instead of winning 
the sympathy of the Filipino civilians, they brought about 
more indignation and defiance against the Americans."13 
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Even the effectiveness of the American soldiers in skirmishes 
with guerrilla bands turned against them. By virtue of better 
marksmanship, leadership, and tactics, the Americans killed 
twenty-five insurgents for every soldier lost. This kill ratio and 
the relatively few numbers of wounded captured seemed im­
plicit proof of wanton slaughter, despite General MacArthur's 
patient explanations to Congressional investigators.14 In any 
event, General MacArthur, according to an Army historian, 
"saw the profitlessness of treating captured insurgents with 
consideration. They always responded with cruelty and 
treachery. Leniency seemed merely to cause more blood to 
be spilled."15 
The American public, on the other hand, saw its soldiers 
behaving in what some considered a dishonorable, unchristian, 
and inhumane manner. As one journal put it: "There have 
been more wicked wars than this on the liberties of the 
Filipinos, but never a more shabby war." While Funston was 
praised by many for his capture of Aguinaldo, he was also 
memorialized in a ditty of the day: 
Sing a song of Funston 
How his treachery 
Captured Aguinaldo; 
Macabaeus by. 
Forgery and lying 
That's the modern thing. . . ,16 
Funston also won the attention of Mark Twain's North 
American Review. A staunch anti-imperialist, Twain con­
demned Funston for using a ruse to enter Aguinaldo's camp. 
Funston had defiled the "holy custom" of respecting the safety 
of these who fed the distressed. By feigning hunger, Funston, 
instead, had captured his host. Funston, in Twain's eyes, 
represented a new man, an amoral agent of imperialism, the 
irresponsible hero of a nation run amok.17 
One especially controversial tactic was the resettlement of 
rural noncombatants and the destruction of their property: 
reconcentration. For the American newspaper reader in 1900, 
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reconcentration conjured up all manner of horrors: "Butcher" 
Weyler herding Cuban men, women, and children into crum­
bling towns to die by the thousands of typhoid and starvation. 
Across the Atlantic, so the papers said, the British Army was 
penning thousands of suffering Boers behind barbed wire. 
This was the kind of military barbarism Americans had gone 
to war to end in 1898. Yet suddenly from the Philippines 
came news that reconcentration was part of the price of 
bringing freedom to the Filipinos. This revelation was a 
shock, and provided an explosive political issue. 
The Army officers in the Philippines knew the necessity 
of reconcentration in ending the insurrection, but the short­
age of troops and logistical support, plus their awareness of 
the probable American reaction, restrained them. In Decem­
ber, 1900, however, continued resistance in the provinces of 
Batangas and Tayabas, Luzon, forced General J. Franklin 
Bell, the local commander, to round up the rural population 
and resettle them in closely guarded camps. An estimated 
ten thousand active supporters of the revolt were thus segre­
gated from the insurgents.18 On Samar in 1901, as Brigadier 
General Robert P. Hughes testified in Senate hearings, some 
one hundred and fifty thousand natives were forcibly re­
settled.19 In both instances the Army made an effort to keep 
individual deprivation to a minimum, but there were the 
inevitable deaths from disease. The Army indeed provided 
security for the Filipinos, but reconcentration was not the 
kind of freedom Americans understood. 
With the political stakes high and a sincere desire to 
provide the Filipinos something more than war, and with 
the Army apparently unable to make headway in pacification, 
President McKinley sent the Second Philippine Commission 
in 1900 to begin the political and economic development of 
the islands.20 The Commission's president, William Howard 
Taft, became the civil governor with complete authority over 
the pacified third of the Philippine provinces; and Taft, as 
his control gradually replaced Army rule throughout the 
islands, did much to conciliate the Filipinos. He worked hard 
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to introduce education and health programs, to stimulate the 
economy, revise the legal system and provide local law and 
order. Throughout his governorship the genial, sympathetic 
former Federal Judge from Ohio sought to cultivate the friend­
ship and loyalty of the Filipinos, particularly those "as ortho­
dox in matters of [economic and legal] importance as we 
are."21 Still the Army had to take to the bush after the 
remaining insurgents, and its general attitude toward the Civil 
Governor is preserved in a popular marching song: 
I'm only a common soldier man in the blasted Philippines.

They say I've got Brown Brothers here, but I dunno what it means.

I like the word Fraternity, but I still draw the line.

He may be a brother of Big Bill Taft, but he ain't no brother of mine.

Damn, damn, damn the insurrecto

Pock marked, khakiac ladrone.

Underneath the starry flag

Civilize 'em with a Krag

And return us to our own beloved homes.

The administration, sensitive to the criticism of American 
policy articulated as condemnation of the Army, attempted to 
scotch the atrocity charges and vindicate the policy. In public 
speeches and in his annual reports, Elihu Root repeated his 
message: the American soldiers were as innocent and humane 
as one could expect under the circumstances, and, in any 
case, America's civilizing mission was noble enough to push 
forward at the going cost.22 
All this verbiage may have been a tonic for the Army's 
nerves, but its officers did not forget that they would have to 
answer for what were portrayed to American readers as 
atrocities. In February, 1906, at Bud Dajo, Sulu, a punitive 
column of soldiers, sailors, and Philippine constabulary at­
tacked and killed six hundred renegade Moros, men, women, 
and children. The Moros would not surrender; the women 
fought along side the warriors, and both used children for 
shields. Ninety-four of the assaulting force of four hundred 
were casualties. Yet in the United States the Washington Post 
and the New York World described the fight as a massacre 
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and compared Leonard Wood, the local commander, with 
Cortez and Pizarro. On the floor of the House, John Sharp 
Williams recited a parody to the vast amusement of the 
Democratic members: 
Chased them from everywhere

Chased them all onward





"Forward, the Wood Brigade!

Spare not a one," he said.

"Shoot all six hundred."23

Although the administration quieted the clamor by publishing 
the after-action reports of the Bud Dajo fight, Secretary of 
War Taft felt the need to caution Wood against the wanton 
killing of women and children.24 When it came to putting 
down insurrections, the officers of the United States Army 
could see that pacification was not a popular instrument of 
public policy. 
Military Pacification 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, the U.S. Army 
mastered a difficult kind of warfare: the military pacification 
of a rebellious civil population by military, psychological, and 
economic methods. Its leaders knew that pacification was full 
of political and social impications at home and abroad that 
could threaten the Army's reputation and its ability to defend 
the nation. Its officers did not always agree on the Army's 
tactics in pacification operations or to what extent it should 
function in areas reserved to civil government in the United 
States. Yet, the Army was well aware that America's ex­
panding interest in the Caribbean, as well as the Pacific, 
could once more put it in the business of administering a 
foreign land. 
The United States Army's approach to colonial policy was 
in step with its own institutional history and its view of 
human behavior.25 Basically, the Army's philosophy of human 
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nature was based on its nineteenth century experiences: the 
policing of the frontier, the absorption of immigrants into its 
own ranks, and, as in the Civil War and in 1898, the necessity 
of disciplining and organizing mass armies of civilians. Man, 
in the Army's view, was by nature undisciplined, emotional, 
and potentially violent, but he was also weak-willed, mal­
leable, and always yearning for a secure place in a human 
community more permanent than himself. 
In an institution like the Army, man's adjustment was 
accomplished by constant training in co-operative ventures 
and by imposed and self-discipline. Through the paternal 
guidance of one's superiors (those responsible for the adjust­
ment process), one learned to equate his personal well-being 
and goals with those of the institution. In the process of 
socialization, happiness (the sense of belonging) lay within 
every man's grasp, however limited his talents or humble his 
origin. Of course, the practical purpose of this process was 
to produce men who were willing to follow orders and die 
in combat rather than disgrace themselves, their comrades, 
and the honor of the regiment. In personal terms, the Army's 
view of human nature put a high premium on such qualities 
as honor, truthfulness, obedience, self-sacrifice, justice, and 
loyalty, all qualities which could be inculcated in time. In 
social terms, the Army emphasized order through social har­
mony, co-operation, and education. 
The Army's view of human adjustment became doctrine 
when it was applied to the peoples of the Philippine and 
Caribbean. Paternalistic guidance and long tutelage were the 
Army's cures for the anarchy, corruption, and exaggerated 
individuality which, as the Army saw it, were the inherited 
ills of Spain's former colonies. The Army's colonial policy, by 
both circumstance and conviction, was to substitute a benefi­
cent military government for the exploitative, chaotic govern­
ments of Spain or the indigenous political elite. The goal of 
Army policy was to inculcate a sense of community and 
order in the governed. 
In the Army's colonial policy there was some appreciation 
of the effects of poverty on human behavior and the im­
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portance of economic development on internal peace, but the 
officers of that era accepted the dogma of industrial capitalism 
without serious question. They may have suspected the per­
sonal values of the business world, but they deferred to the 
businessmen's expertise in economic matters. Consequently, 
the Army assumed that government did not bear the major 
responsibility for the economic well-being of the dependencies. 
In the area of political organization the Army was less com­
mitted to spreading democratic institutions than America's 
political leaders. The road to democracy meant encouraging 
political parties and holding elections in backward societies, 
and the Army saw such activities as a source of violence 
and injustice. 
The Army's Philippine experience, shared by most of the 
officers of the combat arms, produced a group of military 
measures for the response to a popular uprising which had 
unquestionable political implications. A lucid commentary on 
the tactics of pacification may be found in Captain John W-
Furlong's "Notes on Field Service in Cuba."26 Furlong, basing 
his analysis on Spanish military operations and his own four 
years of service in the Philippines and Cuba, stressed that the 
three major tasks in operations against insurgents were identi­
fying them, depriving them of popular support, and eliminat­
ing them by aggressive, continuous operations. To identify 
the insurgents, intelligence must be fresh and voluminous, 
which meant lavish expenditures for information; Furlong 
recommended that all field commanders have secret service 
funds available. In questioning suspects, Furlong continued, 
the goal of interrogation was complete personal data on every 
rebel, and no suspect should be allowed to sleep until thor­
oughly quizzed. To streamline the intelligence-security organ­
ization, a single officer should hold, concurrently, the posts 
of intelligence officer, provost marshal, and provost judge in 
each military district. 
Furlong believed that food control was the most effective 
means to sever the people from the insurgents. This meant 
destroying the food supply in the countryside and rounding 
up the rural population, operations which would both starve 
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and demoralize the rebels. Towns and reconcentration camps 
must then be securely guarded to prohibit traffic in food from 
urban areas. In assessing Spanish measures in Cuba, Furlong 
concluded that "the policy of reconcentration became abso­
lutely necessary." 
Furlong stated that active military operations against guer­
rillas should be handled by columns of two hundred men, 
armed and supplied for maximum speed. Pursuit must be 
relentless, and no surrenders should be accepted unless the 
guerrilla brought in his weapon. 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bullard brought wider vision 
and as much study to his thinking on the problems of pacifi­
cation. With Philippine service that ranged from field opera­
tions as a regimental commander to a provincial governorship, 
Bullard, an introspective West Pointer, stressed that political 
persuasion rather than military force was the heart of pacifi­
cation.27 Pacification, he wrote, "is no more than dealing with 
a people, handling and governing them according to their 
genius and character." This required a policy "composed of 
force and persuasion." Patience on the part of the military 
was absolutely necessary, but Bullard noted that there was 
a tendency to under-react when force was needed, which 
often caused greater destruction and bloodshed later. Recon­
centration, however necessary in extreme cases of revolt, must 
be humane and well planned or its effects would be disastrous. 
Bullard conceded that force alone could not win the final 
objective, the consent of the governed. Rather, he pointed out, 
the habits and thinking of the people must be gradually 
changed; he stressed religious education, the wide application 
of medical knowledge, and indoctrination of the young native 
political leaders and the children, and, in all matters, respect 
for the individual dignity of the people. 
Furlong's and Bullard's writings on pacification are signifi­
cant, for they represent the more thoughtful views of the 
officer corps. Furlong was detailed to the Military Information 
Division of the General Staff, and both officers held important 
posts in Cuba during the Second Intervention. There were 
other lessons, however, to be learned in the practical study 
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of pacification not included in their writings. For all the study 
and all the techniques learned in the Philippines, the officers 
of the United States Army knew that colonial service was 
full of unforeseen hazards. As one general later phrased 
the dilemma: 
Time and again since the nation assumed the role of World Power 
there have been thrust upon junior subalterns the determination of 
grave questions involving diplomacy, commerce, and the law, inter­
national, civil and criminal. A correct decision, with prompt and force­
ful action, may tide over a grave emergency, whilst an honest error 
may live to mar a record through a lifetime of loyal service.28 
Yet the risks to reputation and career often only reinforced 
some officers' compulsions to "civilize" an occupied people, 
and this was equally true for Cuba as it was for the United 
States possessions. 
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CHAPTER ONE

CUBA, THE FRAGILE REPUBLIC

is CLEAR in retrospect that the Cubans 
.who planned and fought the thirty years' war 
against Spain chose an unpropitious time to launch their 
Republic. For Cuba, the coming of the twentieth century 
brought not only national independence but also the condi­
tions that perpetuated colonial society, bound the country to 
the world market in raw materials, and bared it to the stra­
tegic and economic aspirations of the United States. Because 
of the heritage of Spanish rule, the social and economic trans­
formations of three decades of civil war, and the impact of 
American economic expansionism and occupation, Cuba be­
came a grotesque mutation of the Cuban patriots' Utopian 
republic. Whatever the combination of causes, the patriots 
themselves personified the inability of Cuban society to 
develop political institutions and popular leaders through 
which differing values and aspirations could be accommo­
dated without violence and exploitation. The roots of this 
pattern of political behavior lay deep in Cuba's past.1 
Cuba: Troubled Isle 
Nature divided Cuba into distinct regions, which as late as 
1900 were only loosely linked by railways, unpaved cart roads, 
and coastal steamers. The island itself was 730 miles long and 
varied from 22 to 160 miles in width. The rivers were short 
and seldom navigable inland. Cuba began and ended in 
mountains. At the western end of the island, the Cordillera 
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de los Organos reached twenty-five hundred feet, but the 
land dropped off to the rolling plains and shallow valleys 
which characterized two-thirds of the island. As one traveled 
eastward, the land changed from the red clay highlands of 
tobacco-raising Pinar del Rio to the rich plains of Havana 
and Matazanas provinces. Then the island widened where 
the grasslands of Santa Clara and Camaguey supported sugar 
and cattle. Further eastward the hills blended into the rugged 
Sierra Maestre of Oriente, with peaks up to eight thousand 
feet. The mountains separated the jagged shoreline and pla­
teaus from Cape Cruz to Cape Maisi from the fertile Cauto 
plain to the north. 
Along Cuba's broken, island-bordered coast, tidal basins 
and sheer bluffs shared the shore with swamps choked by 
mangroves and lignum vitae. Inland the soil nourished over 
three thousand species of flora, ranging from royal palms and 
white pines to the flowering tangles of a rain forest. In 1907, 
after three hundred years of cultivation, 13 million acres of 
Cuba's 44,000 square miles were still primeval forest. 
The climate was benign, but humid. The mean temperature 
was 77°. The seasons were determined by the rainfall, wet 
(May to October) and dry (November to April). 
On this beautiful and productive land the Spanish planted 
a colony in 1512 and brought to it the institutions of Old 
Spain. By the nineteenth century Cuba had developed a 
national life that was typically Hispanic. Because of the con­
tinued domination by Spain, Cuba became even more colonial 
after the rest of Latin America won its freedom. The last half 
of the century, however, was an era of economic, social and 
political upheaval for Cuba, a period of change perhaps accel­
erated by the war for independence. Before the economic 
realities of the industrial revolution and the ideological spread 
of liberalism, the Hispanic institutions began to crack from 
political rigidity, and in the eyes of educated Cubans, Spanish 
rule was at best capricious and wasteful and lagged behind 
the realities of the nation's economic and intellectual growth. 
In the late nineteenth century the mechanization of the 
sugar industry (a necessity for world competition) brought 
more land into the orbits of the sugar mills. The mills them­
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selves changed from ingenios (the grinding equipment of a 
single plantation) to centrales, the depersonalized rural indus­
trial complexes of mills, railroads, barracks, stores, and offices, 
fed sugar by satellite growers (colonos), either small owners 
or renters. Under the pressure to grow more and more sugar, 
the institution of Negro slavery became an anachronism, 
then disappeared altogether in the 1880's during the war 
for independence. At the same time, small farmers, tobacco 
planters, and cattlemen ceased to dominate the country's 
agricultural life. 
The thirty years' war for independence, fought in the name 
of the most idealistic human goals, contributed to Cuba's 
institutional disintegration. It was a war not only for political 
freedom but also for racial emancipation, and also a civil 
war, waged between Cubans without quarter. Sustained by 
revolutionary ardor, it was never completely revolutionary 
in terms of institutional change.2 As a war for independence, 
it was exploited by yet another foreign power, the United 
States. The war which won independence also mortgaged 
Cuba's future because it perpetuated the Spanish influence 
on Cuban afiFairs, accelerated American interest in Cuba's 
economic and political life, and created a class of insurgent 
leaders ill-prepared for the tasks of nation-building. This new 
political elite, sired by the insurrection, was a class unto 
itself, the politicos. The politicos embodied the socio-psycho­
logical heritage of the war: xenophobia and personalismo. 
Under their leadership, Cuba was a state built on the social 
norms of guerrilla warfare. 
In 1868 the independence movement had been the child of 
a politically dissatisfied Cuban planter elite. During the next 
ten years, death and exile gradually changed the leadership 
and character of the movement until it became an uneasy 
alliance of rural and urban workers, student radicals, Negro 
leaders, and exiled liberals, often intellectuals or professional 
men. The movement's component parts in 1895 were charac­
terized by the democratic idealism of Jose Marti, the racial 
and economic reformism of Antonio Maceo, the non-revolu­
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tionary liberalism of Tomas Estrada Palma and Gonzalo de 
Quesada, and the military realism of Maximo Gomez. As a 
result of the war Cuban political behavior took a different 
shape; added to the traditional Spanish desires for power, 
prestige, and gold in government was an addiction to con­
spiracy and valorous patriotism. Cuba, with independence, 
remained the insurgent state, the political property of its 
generales y doctores.3 
Postindependence Cuban society was in some respects static, 
in others dynamic. Judged by class attitudes and values, it 
remained traditional, divided into an upper class (those who 
hired labor) and lower class (those who worked with their 
hands).4 Sixty per cent of the people were illiterate. In terms 
of raw population, Cuba had a net growth from 1899 to 1907 
of 476,000 people or an increase of 39 per cent.5 The birth 
rate, the single greatest growth factor, jumped from 9.6 per 
thousand (1901) to 19.8 (1905). Yet national, racial, and 
occupational divisions remained relatively fixed. With the end 
of the war, enough Spanish nationals flocked to Cuba to keep 
the island's aliens (80 per cent Spanish) at 11 per cent of 
the total population. In 1901 alone, 22,000 Spaniards, mostly 
unmarried men and boys bound for urban trades or commerce, 
entered Cuba. Much of the population which might have 
passed economically for a middle class was Spanish. Thus 
there remained a Spanish Cuba and a Cuban Cuba, the first 
largely urban, commercial-industrial, and economically im­
portant. The latter was both urban and rural and politically 
dominant. The antipathy of Cuban to Spaniard, exacerbated 
by war, continued into the new century. 
In occupational terms about half of Cuba's work force (in 
1907 some 770,000 in a population of two million) earned its 
living from the land. These campesinos (country-people) 
were not the typical Indio-Hispanic peasants of Latin America 
bound to a paternalistic hacienda or subsistence farm. They 
were, rather, predominately a Negro and white rural prole­
tariat, earning wages as cane-cutters, tobaccomen, mill hands, 
and miners. Though some Cubans remained cattlemen and 
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farmers, most of the workers were tied to sugar and tobacco. 
These two crops were rapidly converting Cuban agriculture 
to a cash-crop production and latifundia. The next largest 
group of Cubans were employed as domestic servants or in 
transportation. Matters of social position rather than income 
still influenced Cubans in selecting careers: in 1907 Cuba had 
more doctors than butchers, more lawyers than civil engineers. 
The relatively stable distribution of people in occupations 
does not reflect, however, the changes in rural and urban life 
Cuba experienced from 1868 to 1898. The economic destruc­
tiveness of the guerrilla warfare, the abolition of slavery, and 
the transformation of the sugar business reduced the number 
of farm owners and produced a new urban class of chronically 
unemployed former slaves and small landholders living in the 
towns. This sector, often in competition with the Spanish for 
jobs, became a source of unrest, often demanding government 
jobs. The desire for official posts was national; one typical 
town of five hundred had a mayor, a secretary, a town doctor, 
and four policemen, drawing salaries from $35 to $75 a month 
for little work. 
Racially, Cuba was a white country (70 per cent) with an 
easy attitude about admission to whiteness. The country, how­
ever Hispanic culturally, had its own racial tensions. Cuban 
history throughout the nineteenth century left a legacy of 
fear among the whites of race war and Africanization. In 
reality, by 1900 the white population, already the majority, 
was increasing more rapidly than the Negro. Slavery, how­
ever, left a tradition of social and economic inferiority that 
the Cuban Negro found difficult to reconcile with his im­
portant role as a soldier in the Army of Liberation. Among 
the upper class, such phrases as "they've a touch of the tar 
brush" or "his hair is not so nice" reflected a blurred but real 
color line. Even within the lower class, mulattos did not 
associate freely with Negroes. White and black Cubans lived 
"together, but not mixed."6 
By 1900 the economic structure of Cuba had begun to 
take the form it retained for the next sixty years.7 The major 
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factor in the change was the influx of foreign capital to 
finance Cuba's postwar reconstruction and the expansion of 
the sugar industry. In terms of national wealth, sugar (domi­
nated by alien entrepreneurs and foreign capital) was king. 
The cycle of the sugar business was tied to the season. The 
cane grew in the wet season, was harvested in the dry. The 
Cubans named these two periods for their impact on the 
nation's life. The growing season was el tiempo muerto, the 
time of unemployment and apathy. Harvest was la zafra, the 
vibrant months of work, of wages, of buying, of merry-making. 
The country lay at the feet of the sugar cycle: "We cannot 
live without la zafra; its power is total and its tyranny intol­
erable."8 Since sugar was subject to violent price fluctuations 
in the world market, the tyranny was double. 
Foreign capital and entrepreneurship also dominated the 
next largest crop, tobacco, at least in its marketing phase. 
Aliens also financed and developed the railways, steamship 
lines, manufacturing, banking, and commerce. The predomi­
nant stake was, in 1906, Spanish, with American and British 
investments close behind. American investment was variously 
estimated between $100 and $160 million. The striking thing 
about the alien business elite was its fear of competition and 
financial insecurity and its sense of desperate risk as it tried 
to capitalize on Cuba's wealth. The businessmen's special 
fears were as great as those of the Cubans.9 
The institutions which might have eased the insecurity of 
Cuba's economic life had been weakened in the nineteenth 
century. The colonial government, for all its abuses, with the 
Catholic Church, had been the strongest national unifying 
force. Politically it was replaced by local and regional jefes. 
The legal system the Spanish left behind was as dehumanized 
and ambiguous in practice as ever. The rapacity of judges 
and advocates provoked a wry joke: "No one can afford either 
to win or to lose a lawsuit for the lawyers will take all you 
have in either case."10 The Church had been loyal to the 
Crown during the insurrection; controlled by Spanish and 
Italian clerics, it was suspect and impotent after independence. 
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It depended on American sympathy to regain even a part of 
its limited financial wealth. Freemasonry and rationalism were 
in vogue.11 The Church's philanthropic services lagged, and 
the people, particularly the Spanish, turned to their private 
clubs for succor. Other forms of association further divided 
the people, for whether university, secondary school, club, 
labor union, or intellectual circle, all were characteristically 
exclusive. The nation's press was generally irresponsible and 
biased by class, political, or national affiliation to the point 
of becoming a destructive rather than constructive force 
in politics. 
One Spanish legacy, the tax system, was particularly burden­
some, for import duties had been the colonial government's 
chief source of revenue. Heavy duties were levied on clothes, 
food, and other necessities of daily life. Land taxes, too, 
on developed property discouraged native investment. One 
observer estimated that in 1905 the per capita tax burden in 
Cuba was $12, in the United States, $3.55.12 
Throughout the colonial period, the government of Cuba 
was intimately involved with the island's economy through 
land grants, subventions, taxation, and trade restrictions. For 
the individual Spaniard a colonial office provided a financial 
sinecure. To the Cubans, the government, which they did not 
share, was an economic institution for individual gain. View­
ing the world's wealth in fixed terms rather than as a growing 
expression of human productivity, they equated holding office 
with individual economic activity. Political power was an 
accepted way of gaining wealth and status. Although the 
psychological need for public recognition made office-holding 
attractive, the economic motive was foremost in the drive for 
position. The concept of public service or public interest was 
alien. Appointment to office was preferable to election because 
in the first instance the officeholder had only to be loyal to 
the patron, whereas in the second he was at the mercy of 
an electorate which could strip him of his livelihood. Con­
versely, each citizen, after independence and the adoption of 
virtually free suffrage, received one valuable vote to sell. 
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If, however, a Cuban became wealthy through business, he 
usually disassociated himself from partisan politics because, 
having achieved riches and security, he no longer needed 
political activity as an entree to material well-being. The 
withdrawal from partisan politics was a proclamation of eco­
nomic success and high social status. Whatever protection he 
now wished from the government could be cultivated through 
individual contacts and largesse to bureaucrats, a return to 
the court politics of the colonial era. The wealthy Cuban did 
not demean himself by associating with co-operative organi­
zations like political parties. 
The exception to this behavior in Cuban society came from 
the former officers of the Army of Liberation. As a group they 
dominated Cuban politics for thirty years. Some were inde­
pendently wealthy, others were not. By and large they saw 
themselves as the embodiment of Cuban sovereignty, charac­
teristically feeling that a man who risks his life in battle for 
la patria should have the first option in deciding its future.13 
Many of these men grew up as guerrillas, and they loved 
rank, martial appearances, stirring declarations, and the ado­
ration of their men. As a body the Cuban veterans, men 
schooled in the overthrow of government, were the most 
representative and popular political leaders in their society. 
Cuba's democratic form of government after independence 
enabled them to keep their battalions intact as voters. 
Cuba, as many Americans saw it, was a bounteous land 
with an impossible people. First, there had been the Cuba 
of the glorious fighters for independence, who upon closer 
examination in 1898 turned out to be very human, often 
Negroid, and irresponsible and irrational.14 The gallant heroes 
introduced to American readers by the revolutionary junta 
and the yellow press looked increasingly like those described 
by Edward F. Atkins, the most influential American sugar 
planter in Cuba: "The insurgents are . . . held together . . . 
by hopes of trouble between Spain and the United States, as 
well as by fear of being shot or hanged by their people. This 
is what is called 'esprit de corps'."15 
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Behind the American army in 1898 came a new generation 
of carpetbaggers to risk all in land development schemes, 
fruit farms, mines, and agricultural colonies. Though not 
numerous, these Americans saw themselves as the advance 
agents of civilization and prosperity. Yet they did little to 
help Cuban-American relations. As Havana resident Irene 
Wright observed: 
There is no person so perfectly calculated to "rub" a Latin "the 
wrong way" as the self-seeking, aggressive, unmannerly scouts we send 
to Cuba, among other frontiers, of whose faults, peculiarly enough, our 
national virtues and especially our strength are constituted.16 
American relations with Cuba also had one myopic trait: 
Americans looked at Cuba and saw Havana. The nation's 
capital in government and vice, largest city, commercial and 
financial center, and port to the outside world, Havana had 
a hypnotic impact on foreign statesmen and capitalists. They 
gauged affairs in Cuba by events in Havana or at least the 
flow of news from the capital. Sometimes Havana was the 
only source of information, but the troubled rumors in Havana 
also distorted the outsider's understanding of the island's woes. 
Who was the political Cuban? Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. 
Bullard thought he knew, and his description, whatever its 
flaws, has a timeless North American quality to it: 
The Cuban is intolerant of tyranny, but let him once obtain power 
and authority, and he is autocratic, dictatorial, inconsiderate, and with­
out any quality of toleration or compromise. . . . Every Cuban under­
stands these qualities have been the cause of official failure and down­
fall, yet when his term of power comes he seems unable to resist the 
temptation to become a despot. 
In all politics and public affairs he is a child. He is always able to 
satisfactorily excuse himself from all blame by shifting it to some one 
else. If not given his own way he will 'pick up his dolls' and refuse to 
play longer. The principle of the 'greatest good to the greatest number' 
means nothing to him and he views a majority vote against him with 
a deep sense of personal injustice . . . 
The Cuban puts dependence upon a strong central government. . . . 
He looks upon a strong central government to right all his wrongs, no 
matter how trivial. . . . 
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By reason of his inherited traditions from strong governments of 
Rome, Spain and the Catholic Church, the Cuban has a feeling of legal 
helplessness under superior orders however unjust, illegal and oppressive 
they may be and has a settled conviction that the only way to resist 
is to organize armed revolution.17 
In light of its history and culture, independent Cuba was 
so socially, politically, and economically divided that it is 
debatable whether it was a nation in any but the territorial 
sense. It is little wonder that it appeared ungovernable to 
many Cubans and Americans. Yet the McKinley administra­
tion gave the United States Army a try from 1898 to 1902, and 
in its own way the Army attempted to create a Cuban nation. 
The Military Government of Cuba, 1898-1902 
With the end of the war in Cuba and the termination of 
Spanish sovereignty on January 1, 1899, the United States 
assumed responsibility for the island's government. The an­
nounced American goal was to pacify Cuba and then turn 
over the government to the Cuban people, at some indefinite 
date. McKinley's appointee for the military governorship was 
Major General John R. Brooke, a cautious, apolitical, sixty-
year-old cavalryman. A Civil War veteran with thirty-eight 
years of continuous service, Brooke's personal qualities proved 
his undoing. Tempered in the ways of the Old Army, he 
loyally sought direction from Washington in managing Cuban 
affairs. Unable to fathom the McKinley administration's desires 
for Cuba in 1899, he shied away from dictating reform on his 
own initiative. His chief subordinates felt no such compunc­
tion to await direction, and several of them already had civil 
programs underway in areas occupied by the Army in 1898. 
A military government was formed to administer Cuba, 
placing command of the American army of occupation and 
supervision of the civil administration in the hands of a mili­
tary governor and four major subordinates. Cuba was divided 
into four departments, the City of Havana (General William 
Ludlow), and three two-province departments. General Fitz­
30 T H E P O L I T I C S OF I N T E R V E N T I O N 
hugh Lee, the former consul-general of Havana, commanded 
Pinar del Rio—Havana; General James H. Wilson was in 
charge in Mantazas—Santa Clara; and General Leonard 
Wood in Santiago—Puerto Principe. At the national level 
Brooke created four civil departments and various fiscal agen­
cies, the first staffed with Cuban secretaries, the latter with 
Army officers. The provincial and municipal governments 
were continued in the Spanish pattern, the offices filled by 
Cubans appointed by the Military Governor and supervised 
by the department commanders.18 
More importantly, Brooke and his associates, backed by 
the American army, were relatively free of internal political 
pressure in Cuba. There was no organized resistance to their 
rule, and many Cubans actively co-operated with them. Both 
the form and style of the Military Government in 1899 were 
near copies of the Spanish regime; the prewar pattern of 
arbitrary rule, however concilatory and paternal, continued. 
That there was no sharp break with the Spanish colonial 
system can be explained in several ways. First, the major 
task of the Military Government in its first year was to restore 
public order, fight disease and starvation, and provide other 
humanitarian services. These chores were accomplished pri­
marily by the American army. In addition, Brooke received 
no orders from Washington for governmental reform. Presi­
dent McKinley was still methodically plumbing American 
opinion to help determine what to do about Cuba. His public 
statements on Cuban policy in 1899 were models of ambiva­
lence. At the War Department, the discredited Russell A. 
Alger lingered on as Secretary, and the head of the newly 
created Division of Customs and Insular Affairs did not fill 
the leadership vacuum. Thus, the initiative for Cuban reform 
lay with the Military Government and those Cubans who 
could gain the sympathetic ear of an American general. 
Faced with massive problems of national reconstruction, 
Brooke found much in the Hispanic system of centralized 
military-civil administration to recommend itself for his use. 
He believed that Spanish law in most cases would adequately 
protect both individual rights and property. Implicit in his 
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assumptions was the belief that law in Cuba was intrinsically 
a part of the country's social structure and reflected at least 
the tacit consent of the Cubans themselves. He realized, im­
perfectly, that Spanish law had some relation to the economic 
and social exploitation of the colonial government, but he 
believed that cultural-traditional factors worked against hasty 
reform.19 Brooke had greater faith in government-by-law than 
did the Cubans, who were well aware of the inadequacies of 
Spanish rule and who had made civil disobedience a national 
way of life. 
The immediate tasks of reconstruction, however, seemed 
to demand an authoritarian government, under whatever stat­
utes. Reflecting on American rule in Cuba in 1899, one of 
Brooke's officers in Havana, Hugh L. Scott, believed conditions 
called for centralized power: 
A military government is the only kind fit to cope with such con­
ditions [as existed in Cuba]. . .  . as soon as a military intervention 
is proclaimed with force to back it, everything falls immediately into 
place. Foreigners and natives alike learn at once their status, and there 
is a legal basis of government. The will of the commanding general is 
supreme. 
The Cubans themselves were no help in suggesting policy, 
Scott stated, for "they will usually tell you that they are 
partida de la reforma, blinking at you like an owl, but of 
what sort of reform they have not the vaguest conception."20 
Throughout 1899, Brooke commanded a conservative, care­
taker government designed primarily to maintain public 
order. He did little to institute domestic reform. He gave 
little attention to Cuba's ultimate well-being or its relation­
ship to the United States, believing these questions beyond 
the scope of his duty. Brooke's values in government were 
efficiency and economy for their own sake; his major admin­
istrative accomplishments were to discharge flagrantly corrupt 
employees and to collect customs revenues honestly. Although 
these measures were improvements on Spanish rule, they 
were hardly calculated to produce long-term reforms. Yet 
they were legal, and Brooke valued legitimacy rather than 
innovation. 
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While Brooke wrestled with such sticky problems as paying 
off the Cuban insurgent army and discovering Washington's 
aims in Cuba, two of his subordinates were planning and 
working on a Cuban policy of their own. Generals Wilson 
and Wood were applying their considerable ability and po­
litical power to rehabilitate Cuba in such a way that the 
Cubans themselves would seek annexation to the United 
States. Though voluntary annexation was the goal of both 
men, their prescriptions for internal reform differed. 
Major General James Harrison Wilson, commander of the 
department of Matanzas-Santa Clara, advocated a national 
program of economic reform sponsored by the Military Gov­
ernment.21 Wilson, a West Point graduate and Civil War 
veteran, had left the service in 1870 for a career as a railroad 
executive. A successful businessman, he was also a former 
national committeeman of the Republican party. Like most 
of the industrialists of his day, Wilson was a firm believer in 
progress through economic growth. The efficiency and sta­
bility of any future Cuban government depended, Wilson 
stated, on the health of the island's economy, for wealth (or 
lack of it) dictated Cuban political behavior. Prosperity and 
social stability were possible in Cuba because the white race 
was in the majority, and their behavior, once they became 
affluent, would be conservative and responsible. In his experi­
ence, Wilson said, "the fortunate and prosperous are scarcely 
vicious."22 Therefore he urged the Military Government to 
sponsor agricultural reconstruction through liberal loans and 
gifts of animals and tools. The United States should encourage 
Cuban prosperity, moreover, by opening its markets to sugar 
and joining the two nations in a customs and postal union. 
If the two countries were joined economically, the political 
merger, sought by the Cubans themselves, would soon follow.23 
The beauty of Wilson's program was that it gave the Cubans 
the independence promised them in the Teller Amendment, 
the idealistic appendage to the war resolutions of 1898. One 
of its weaknesses was that it envisioned governmental activity 
beyond what Brooke and the War Department considered 
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proper. It also assumed a Congressional willingness to lower 
trade barriers. Wilson's program was politically handicapped, 
because he and his most ardent champion, Senator Joseph B. 
Foraker of Ohio, were not on intimate terms with the 
McKinley administration. With Leonard Wood's succession 
to the military governorship, Wilson's views were given short 
shrift in Havana and Washington. Nevertheless, the form (the 
indirect control of Cuba through economic ties) if not the 
substance of the Wilson program became the foundation of 
the United States Cuban policy. 
General Leonard Wood was Wilson's chief competitor for 
Brooke's job and Washington's ear. As military governor of 
the city of Santiago in 1898 and then of Cuba's two eastern­
most provinces, Wood attacked the problems of reconstruction 
with energy and self-assurance.24 In the course of his admin­
istration, a stunning success by humanitarian standards, he 
became Brooke's sharpest and most politically powerful critic. 
Unlike his superior, Wood firmly believed that drastic and 
far-reaching reforms were needed in Cuban society. As he 
wrote President McKinley in 1900: 
The great mass of public opinion is perfectly inert; especially is this 
true among the professional classes. The passive inactivity of one hundred 
and fifty years has settled over them and it is hard to get them out of 
old ruts and grooves. . . . We are dealing with a race that has been 
going down for a hundred years and into which we have got to infuse 
new Me, new principles and new methods of doing things.25 
Particularly frustrating for Wood was that "the better sort," 
the educated and wealthy people, were uninterested in public 
affairs. As Wood complained of the membership of the Cuban 
Constitutional Convention in 1901: 
The Convention represents at any rate the class to whom Cuba 
would be turned over in the case we withdraw, for the highly intelligent 
Cubans of the land-owning, industrial, and commercial classes are not 
in politics. The politicians are in a certain sense doctors without patients, 
lawyers without practice and demagogues living on the subscriptions 
of the people and their friends.26 
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Whatever the sorry condition of Cuban society, Wood be­
lieved Cuba should, after a long period of tutelage, be an­
nexed to the United States, hopefully by choice of the Cubans 
themselves. In order to prepare the Cubans, Wood advocated 
their Americanization through the agency of the Military Gov­
ernment. More immediately he used his own power and 
prestige to impress the Cubans with the advantages of moral­
ity and high-mindedness in public office. By precept, exhorta­
tion, and force if need be, Wood was prepared to drive the 
Cubans from their old ways.27 
In an article in the North American Review, Wood declared 
to his American audience that policy demanded a clean break 
with the past. Cuba needed "firm but liberal and just" gov­
ernment under American military commanders. The emphasis 
must be on developing citizenship and effective local govern­
ment; this he was doing and "the people are beginning to 
realize that there is a certain satisfaction and independence 
to be gained by paying their own way."28 
Wood was satisfied that the traditional principles of Ameri­
can citizenship were appropriate for Cuba, at least in the long 
run. While department commander he issued a paraphrase 
of the Bill of Rights to protect individual liberties. He waged 
a relentless campaign to eliminate crime, contamination, and 
corruption. To inculcate American values, he reformed the 
educational system under the supervision of an appointed 
board of three American officers and one Cuban. Instruction 
in English was to begin in kindergarten.29 
In view of the righteousness of Wood's crusade, it is not 
surprising that he ran afoul of Brooke's central government. 
In sharp contrast to Wood's autocracy in Santiago, Brooke 
felt his way through the maze of Cuban politics, seeking 
advice from his Cuban secretaries, advocating caution, care­
fully avoiding conflict with the politicos. Where Brooke tem­
porized, Wood brought dynamic leadership and militancy to 
the attack on Cuba's problems. 
Just at the time the Military Government was established, 
Wood was embarking on an expensive, ambitious sanita­
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tion and road-building program in Santiago. Brooke soon 
demanded that all customs revenues (Wood's source of 
funds) be collected and distributed by his headquarters. Dis­
gusted by this episode and others, Wood used his political 
contacts and a favorable press to discredit the Military Gov­
ernor. Moreover, Wood thought that Brooke's inability to 
escape the evils of Spanish colonial administration threatened 
voluntary annexation by placing the American government 
in a bad light.30 
Consistent with his view that clean government and new 
moral standards represented the best America could offer 
Cuba, Wood advocated that the Cuban economy be devel­
oped through private capital, especially American investment. 
Though he recognized that Cuban agriculture needed diversi­
fication and rehabilitation, he believed that this was not the 
business of the Military Government. Such paternalism would 
stifle individual responsibility, one of the new values he was 
inculcating. Rather than accept Wilson's loan program, Wood 
believed that private agricultural banks should make loans, 
"at good rates of interest," which could be as high as 10 per 
cent. In addition, as he pointed out in the section of his 1899 
report entitled "Opportunities for Investment," foreign capital 
was desperately needed, and Cuba was rich with opportuni­
ties for enterprising Americans. Such views represented the 
economic phase of Americanization. 
Before the end of 1899, events altered American policy 
toward domestic reform in Cuba. The first was the appoint­
ment of Elihu Root as Secretary of War. A distinguished 
lawyer and a philosophical skeptic, Root began a systematic 
analysis of America's colonial problems. In light of his subse­
quent influence on American policy, it is necessary to examine 
Root's views on Cuban society and the proper context for 
its reform. Root's assessment of the Cuban people did not 
differ from Wood's, but his concept of change varied. The 
Cubans, Root wrote President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard, 
"have no experience in anything except Spanish customs and 
Spanish methods which have grown up for centuries under 
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a system opposed to general education and self government." 
Yet to produce lasting change, the Cubans must change them­
selves; "it cannot be done by having outsiders preach at 
them."31 Although there were many traditional barriers to 
change, the United States could, by its example and a liberal 
economic policy, support those Cubans who would provide 
"conservative and thoughtful control of Cuba."32 Essentially 
Root believed in the efficacy of law and constitutionalism, but 
not in forced change or the radical transplantation of cultural 
values. He doubted that either the Cubans or Americans 
wanted annexation or that the two cultures could ever be 
compatible politically. 
During the fall of 1899, as a result of his own study of the 
Cuban problem, Root announced that the United States would 
grant Cuba independence as quickly as a Cuban government 
could be formed. This decision was implicit in Root's order 
to complete rapidly the Cuban census. Root then made a 
clear statement of American policy in his annual report, 
published December 1: 
Our temporary occupation of the island of Cuba involves a very 
simple plan of operation, with some difficulties in its application which 
are apt to be overlooked by those who are impatient for immediate 
results. The control which we are exercising in trust for the people of 
Cuba should not be, and of course will not be, continued any longer 
than is necessary to enable the people to establish a suitable govern­
ment. . . . Our present duty is limited to giving every assistance in 
our power to the establishment of such a government and to maintaining 
order and promoting the welfare of the people of Cuba during the 
period necessarily required for that process.33 
With popular sentiment for Cuba's annexation dwindling 
and the McKinley administration concerned with the Philip­
pine Insurrection and the political potency of anti-imperialism 
at home, Root had received a mandate to work for Cuban 
independence. Ironically, Root chose as his foremost instru­
ment of policy the champion of annexation, Leonard Wood. 
On December 20, 1899, Wood replaced General Brooke 
as military governor of Cuba.34 He immediately began to 
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apply the operating principles and methods he had found so 
successful as a department commander. With independence 
in the offing, Wood, turning away from developing local self-
government, concentrated on institutionalizing his public 
health program and educational reforms. He continued his 
drive for just, humane, efficient government. At the same time, 
Wood tried to delay independence as long as possible (though 
he was under severe pressure within Cuba and from Wash­
ington) in order to allow his reforms to take root. 
Wood began his administration with his usual self-confidence, 
telling a correspondent of the St. Louis Globe-Democrat that 
"success in Cuba is so easy that it would be a crime to fail." 
He described his own task as doing "all we can for them 
[the Cubans] and to get out of the island as soon as we 
can/'35 This, and other statements, soothed critics in the 
United States and Cuba, for it was wide-spread knowledge 
that Wood favored a long period of tutelage and ultimate 
annexation. 
With a deadline, however indefinite, hanging over the 
Military Government, Wood zealously attacked what he 
believed were Cuba's major problems. His purpose was to 
establish the standards of good government, by imposition if 
necessary. Major decisions on policy were his or Root's. 
Though 97 per cent of the government's employees were 
Cubans, none had a meaningful influence on matters of 
importance. Wood's Council of Notables, a group of dis­
tinguished Cubans, served more to check criticism than to 
give advice. In his first full year in office, Wood issued twice 
as many decrees as had Brooke, backed by an American army 
of occupation of eleven thousand men and the Rural Guard, 
a national constabulary of some one thousand Cuban veterans. 
Wood, apparently with forethought, reigned with the 
noblesse of a Latin American caudillo. He was intensely 
military in appearance and bearing, made frequent tours 
about the island, became a skilled jai-lai player, and rode 
rough shod over the sensibilities of his critics.36 In terms of 
material and humanitarian accomplishment, Wood's adminis­
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tration made significant advances in roadbuilding, harbor 
clearance, prison and judicial reform, the management of 
charities, sewerage system improvement, and in the repair 
and construction of public buildings. The outstanding achieve­
ment of the Military Government was, of course, the eradica­
tion of yellow fever, an epic of courage and perseverance. 
Within the government itself Wood weeded out grafters and 
incompetents. His most dramatic act was the removal of Estes 
G. Rathbone, Director-General of Posts and a crony of Senator 
Mark Hanna, for fraud. 
Wood's Americanization program proceeded in his reform 
of the public school system. After an enthusiastic if dis­
organized beginning under Brooke, educational reform, admin­
istered by Lieutenant Matthew E. Hanna under laws patterned 
after those of his native Ohio, received top priority from the 
Military Government. Enrolments soared from twenty-one 
thousand in 1899 to over one hundred thousand children by 
the end of 1900. The curriculum, which included instruction 
in English and local government in the lowest grades, was 
taught from translated American textbooks. In addition, 
Wood persuaded Harvard to train Cuban teachers during 
summer vacations, and more than a thousand eventually 
journeyed to the United States for advanced training. 
With all these successes, there were significant and dis­
heartening failures. Efforts to use the jury system in criminal 
and civil proceedings, to introduce habeas corpus into the 
judicial system, and to create elected local school boards 
proved unworkable. 
In all his enthusiasm for using the Military Government 
to engineer fundamental changes in Cuban life, Wood con­
tinued to hold his narrow view of the government's responsi­
bility for Cuban prosperity. Though he recognized that the 
sugar planters were operating at a loss because of overpro­
duction and high labor costs, he was unwilling to advocate 
more than tariff reduction by the United States.37 In light 
of Congressional resistance to tariff revision, even this stand 
was bold. Wood recognized that a loan program was popular 
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with Cuban farmers, but believed that the problem of agri­
cultural credit could be solved by a "liberal degree of reciproc­
ity." Working toward this goal, he urged Congress to reduce 
the sugar tariff 30 per cent and to abrogate the Foraker 
Amendment, thus opening Cuba to American investors under 
the sponsorship of the Military Government. 
The most notable example of Wood's faith in private 
capital was his relationship with the Cuba Company. From 
1900 to 1902 Wood assisted railroad entrepreneurs Sir William 
Van Home, of the Canadian Pacific, and General Grenville 
M. Dodge, builder of the Union Pacific, to charter and con­
struct a railway in eastern Cuba. In organizing the Cuba 
Company Van Home and Dodge side-stepped the Foraker 
Amendment, which prohibited the Military Government from 
granting franchises, by accepting revokable permits. Wood 
and Root cleared the way for them, convinced that improved 
transportation to eastern Cuba would stimulate its economy. 
Without a doubt it did, but it also indicated Wood's willing­
ness to use foreign investment to further the cause of 
annexation. 
In a sense the entire story of the adoption of the Cuban 
Constitution of 1901 and of the genesis of the Platt Amend­
ment may be read as a disavowal of the goals of Wood's 
reforms: Americanization and voluntary annexation. The 
Cuban Constitutional Convention, which began its deliber­
ations in November, 1900, was never free from Wood's 
influence, but its work was largely its own. 
The language of the Constitution of 1901 glowed with the 
idealism of nationalism, republicanism, and political liberalism. 
The Constitution provided for the personal freedoms denied 
Cubans during their war for independence. The form of 
government was unitary and presidential, but power was 
shared with a bicameral legislature and independent judiciary. 
The Constitution of 1901 worked no radical changes in the 
prevailing social and economic relationship of postwar Cuba. 
In the nation's political structure, specifically within the 
powers of the President, there were significant allowances for 
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authoritarian rule. The President could suspend certain per­
sonal rights in times of emergency, remove provincial and 
municipal officials, grant pardons and amnesties, and carry 
over the annual budget if Congress failed to approve a new 
one. Lip-service was paid to the Military Government's educa­
tional and public health programs, but no specific responsi­
bility was assumed to carry them through, much less continue 
them in the spirit in which they were begun.38 
The Military Government wielded little influence in consti­
tutionalizing Wood's reforms because its political energies 
were directed by Root to working out the future relationship 
of Cuba and the United States. The basic statement of Amer­
ican policy, later embodied as the Platt Amendment, is con­
tained in a letter from Secretary Root to General Wood on 
February 1, 1901. Though Root's specific proposals were re­
worded and added to, the basic premise of his letter remained: 
that Cuba could best develop as an independent nation, but 
that her strategic position in the Caribbean, her history and 
her economy placed her in a unique relationship with the 
United States which necessitated some American control. 
Therefore, the two nations must bear the duties and obliga­
tions of this relationship. On Cuba's part this meant that its 
government must assume the responsibilities toward its people 
and other nations taken by the United States in the Treaty 
of Paris. The United States would meet its responsibility by 
guaranteeing Cuban independence and a stable, solvent, 
republican government.39 
The final draft of Root's plan was written by the Senate 
committee of Orville H. Platt. An administration-sponsored 
measure, the Platt Amendment became law as part of the 
Army Appropriation Act of 1901. Debate was short, and the 
amendment passed by almost a straight party vote in both 
houses. Appended to the Cuban Constitution and later ratified 
as a treaty between the two nations, the Platt Amendment 
defined the relationship between the United States and Cuba 
for the next thirty-three years. As adopted it provided: 
I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or 
other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or 
The Fragile Republic 41 
tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize 
or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for 
military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgement in or control over any 
portion of said island. 
II. That said government shall not assume or contract any public debt, 
to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund 
provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of 
the island, after defraying the current expenses of government, shall be 
inadequate. 
III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may 
exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban indepen­
dence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of 
life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations 
with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, 
now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba. 
IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military 
occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights 
acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected. 
V- The government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary 
extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed 
upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a 
recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, there­
by assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as 
to the commerce of the southern ports of the United States and the 
people residing therein. 
VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitu­
tional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future adjust­
ment by treaty. 
VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of 
Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, 
the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands 
necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be 
agreed upon with the President of the United States. 
VIII. That by way of further assurances the government of Cuba will 
embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United 
States.40 
The Platt Amendment, far-reaching in its implications, was 
"a work of extraordinary sagacity, from the American point 
of view."41 The price of Cuban independence, it was accepted 
(with much unhappiness) as such by the Cuban Constitu­
tional Convention. It was viewed as a prelude to annexation 
and was shortly denounced by seven of the sixteen delegates 
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who voted for its acceptance. It also heartened the alien 
business community which had nearly despaired of American 
protection. The Platt Amendment also reflected a prevalent 
belief in Washington that further direct tutelage would be 
fruitless and might create violent resistance to the Military 
Government. It, too, articulated a national disillusionment with 
the burdens of colonial administration as well as the ful­
filment of a promise to Cuba. In the future the United States 
would not attempt to change Cuban behavior; it would, 
instead, deal with Cuba, government-to-government, as na­
tional interest (in terms of security and economic gain) 
dictated. The Platt Amendment was designed to give the 
United States a maximum influence on the Cuban govern­
ment with a minimum of responsibility for the character of 
Cuban life. 
In Cuba there was some protest against those articles (II, 
IV, and V) drafted to protect the work of the Military Govern­
ment, but the greatest outcry was against the amendment as a 
whole and Article III specifically. To allay Cuban fears, Elihu 
Root, during discussion with a Cuban delegation in Wash­
ington, stated that Article III did not sanction intervention 
in Cuban domestic affairs. It was simply an extension of the 
Monroe Doctrine by treaty. There would be no "intermeddling 
or intervention in any manner" in internal affairs. Root, how­
ever, added the proviso, which he repeated for Domingo 
Mendez Capote, that the United States might intervene "when 
there may exist a true state of anarchy within the Republic."42 
Senator Joseph B. Foraker's analysis of the effects of the 
Platt Amendment was more far-sighted. During the Senate 
debate, he predicted that Article III might bring about the 
intervention it was supposed to deter. America's pledge to 
guarantee Cuban peace would work to the advantage of 
the political "outs," for they might nullify any election by 
rising in rebellion and force the United States to intervene.43 
A similar view was held by the noted British political com­
mentator and statesman, James Bryce. He believed that any 
interpretation of Article III less strict than Roofs could lead 
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to intervention in the event of insurrection. "There may be," 
Bryce wrote, "civil strife, or disorders, which, though scarcely 
amounting to war, the Executive cannot suppress." Inter­
vention then would be necessary to maintain the guarantees 
of the Platt Amendment, and intervention would resurrect the 
question of annexation, a latent hope of many living in Cuba.44 
The formal withdrawal of the Military Government on May 
20, 1902, marked the end of Wood's reform program. The 
principle of leadership by example and government by 
morality disappeared with the United States Army. Wood was 
hailed as a great colonial governor by such knowledgeable 
judges as Lord Cromer and General H. H. Kitchener, who 
credited him with the regeneration of Cuba, "an accomplish­
ment unequaled by any race in any age."45 
Wood's rationale for change was based on an absolute 
moral code, free enterprise economics, the theory of the 
public interest, and a just social order through law, all alien 
concepts to the Cuban people. He realized that radical change 
was necessary in Cuba, but, however ambitious his Americani­
zation program, his reforms were half-measures. He missed 
the crux of General Wilson's argument: the economic con­
ditions in Cuba so prejudiced political stability that a radical 
and rapid change in the island's economic structure was 
mandatory. Private enterprise, particularly foreign invest­
ment, would simply deepen the woes of an already exploitative 
colonial economy. To keep the Cubans from turning to the 
government as a source of personal income, the government 
itself would have to act to provide other economic alternatives. 
It is true that Wood, much to his disappointment, did not 
win enough time to institutionalize his Puritan revolution. He 
was never able to find enough educated Cubans who were 
willing to compromise their personal prestige and their sense 
of nationality to serve in an American government. In the 
case of the conservative commercial and planter elite, Wood 
found it practically impossible to interest them in holding 
office. They were unwilling to surrender their social exclusive­
ness and international business connections, both of which 
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rested on their avoidance of Cuban politics. Ironically, the 
administration, which Wood hoped would show the Cubans 
the best of the American political tradition, was best remem­
bered for the efficiency of its highly personalist rule. Wood 
gave Cuba the "effective tyranny" that Spain had failed 
to provide. 
The Military Government left Cuba several legacies. In 
its three years of operation it gave many Cubans the vision 
of what American occupation meant: an end to violence, 
better health, justice, and economic growth, all at the price 
of Cuban political independence and Hispanic culture. It is 
no wonder that Cubans viewed the United States with a 
mixture of hope and fear. On the other hand, despite Wood's 
reforms, the American government no longer accepted re­
sponsibility for institutional changes within Cuba. To this 
degree Cuba was independent. The United States, however, 
placed restrictions upon the Cuban government that further 
weakened its limited ability and will to deal with Cuba's 
problems. All these factors contributed to the political develop­
ments that led to the Second Intervention. 
The Politics of Faction, 1900-1906 
While the Army administered Cuba, the leading figures of 
the independence movement formed political organizations to 
contend in the promised elections. These organizations were 
based on personal and regional loyalties.46 At the time of the 
municipal elections in June, 1900, three major factions ap­
peared. The two largest groups, the Nationalists and Federal 
Republicans, were dominated by Cuban veterans. The Nation­
alists were identified by their co-operation with the Military 
Government at the national level. They were men from 
Havana or the western provinces, supported by Maximo 
Gomez. They claimed to favor a strong central government. 
The Federal Republicans represented the interests of Santa 
Clara and its civil governor, a former insurgent general, Jose 
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Miguel Gomez, but it had strength in Matanzas and Oriente 
also. Both factions favored immediate independence. The 
Union Democratica, the third political group, was led by 
Havana conservatives, many of whom favored continued 
American tutelage. In the election itself, regional loyalties 
prevailed; the Federal Republicans elected all their candi­
dates in Santa Clara and Matanzas, the Nationalists theirs in 
Havana. The Uni6n Democratica, labeled the American party, 
collapsed from lack of support. 
In the elections for delegates to the Constitutional Conven­
tion in the fall of 1900, the same alignments held, despite 
Wood's restriction of the suffrage to literates, property owners, 
and veterans. Elected by province on the basis of population, 
the delegates, whether Nationalist or Federal Republican, 
were (with one exception) leaders of the independence 
movement and unfriendly to American control. Among the 
thirty-one men were "generals of the wars of independence, 
distinguished conspirators, patriots ennobled by emigration 
and banishment, noted specialists in Public Law."47 Among 
the more prominent members were Gonzalo de Quesada, 
member of the revolutionary junta and soon to be minister 
to the United States; General Juan Rius Rivera, former 
Secretary of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce and civil 
governor of Havana; General Emilio Nunez, governor of 
Havana; General Alejandro Rodriguez, former mayor of Ha­
vana and commander of the Rural Guard; Havana lawyer 
Alfredo Zayas; General Pedro Betancourt and Domingo 
Mendez Capote, political bosses from Matanzas; Salvador 
Cisneros Betancourt, planter from Camaguey, ex-president of 
the insurgent government and former Marquis of Santa Lucia; 
Juan Gualberto Gomez, Negro orator and editor from Oriente. 
The Santa Clara delegation included General Jose Miguel 
Gomez, General Jose de Jesus Monteagudo, General Jose B. 
Aleman, mulatto lawyer Martin Morua Delgado, General Jose 
Luis Robau and Colonel Enrique Villuendas, all in the ruling 
clique of the Federal Republicans. In all, the delegates were 
Cuba's political elite. 
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For the elections of 1901, the political factions realigned 
themselves over the issue of the presidential nomination. The 
Nationalists wanted to run Maximo Gomez, still a national 
hero despite his difference with the veterans over bonuses. 
He rejeoted the proposal, saying, "Men of war, for war, and 
those of peace, for peace."48 
The Nationalists then turned to Tomas Estrada Palma, 
former head of the revolutionary junta. Estrada Palma had 
been a major figure in the independence movement for thirty 
years. Born in Oriente in 1835, educated in Spain, he was 
chosen president of the revolutionary government in 1877. 
Captured and exiled the same year, he did not return to Cuba 
until his election as president. After the Peace of Zanjon 
(1878) he went to Honduras where he married the daughter 
of the President, served as postmaster-general, and saw his 
father-in-law assassinated. Emigrating to the United States, 
he founded a school for Cuban children at Central Valley, 
New York. A firm patriot and friend of Jose Marti, Estrada 
Palma became the central figure in the revolutionary junta 
when the insurrection began again in 1895. He raised funds, 
arms, munitions, and men for the Army of Liberation and 
served as the insurgent government's delegate in Washington. 
Undeniably, he played an important role in the movement, 
but, outside of the insurgent leadership, he was virtually 
unknown to Cubans. He was so closely identified with the 
United States that he seemed the American candidate. He 
was openly sympathetic to American democracy and to com­
mercial ties with the United States, and apparently never 
completely dismissed the possibility of union with the United 
States. His critics later interpreted his statements that political 
independence would not automatically serve the welfare 
of the Cuban people to mean that he was an agent of 
American expansionism. 
Estrada Palma's personal life was exemplary; he was honest, 
kindly, and modest. A slight, elderly man with a drooping 
white mustache and carefully combed hair, he looked the 
perfect grandfather. Age, however, had made him rigid in his 
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judgments on people and matters of loyalty, honor, duty, and 
patriotism. He was extremely sensitive to personal criticism. 
Although Estrada Palma valued democracy, he was a politi­
cal and economic conservative. He was an advocate of bal­
anced budgets, governmental austerity, and obedience to 
authority. He believed Cuba's future was democratic, but it 
would have to evolve from education and practice. As presi­
dent he commented on Cuba's insufficient preparation in self-
government, stating that 
. . . the efficacy of the democratic system resides precisely in this, 
in being open in everything, in criticizing and discussing everything. 
But from there (the ideal) to the highly personalized, angry attacks of 
present day politics, there is a great abyss. 
All defamatory statements deserve censure, but I have granted even 
the most misguided of those who try me, benevolency and inexhaustible 
leniency. 
Many confuse, unfortunately, liberty with license. I, on the other 
hand, have never used a single one of the thousand recourses power 
offers me in order officially to quiet the defamers. This is the reason that 
up to the gates of Havana, and even within the capital itself, the most 
extreme and rabid opponents enjoy true immunity. 
From such a chance I am demonstrating, religiously, respect for 
liberty: acquiescent, tolerating the exaggerated, and at times hurt, feel­
ing that the concept of liberty itself is attacked when my character is 
questioned. 
There are inevitable evils, and this is one of them. The great Wash­
ington was bitterly attacked, with notorious injustice, and he was 
Washington. 
In Cuba we have a Republic, but there are no citizens. They will be 
shaped as they become imbued with true democracy, which is sane 
and disciplined. . . . Until now, our status as colonials has not allowed 
us to educate ourselves politically. We must give ourselves a full trial.49 
A major factor in Estrada Palma's nomination was that his 
long exile had freed him to a large degree from the bitter 
factionalism within the revolutionary leadership in Cuba. 
On the other hand, he was well known to the American 
government and was highly regarded by the McKinley admin­
istration. The United States government knew he was a firm 
Cuban patriot, and a friend to private enterprise and the 
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rights of foreign citizens. It also approved of his belief that 
the Cubans should be led by a responsible, educated elite 
until the people learned orderliness and restraint in public 
affairs. In light of Estrada Palma's values and comparing 
his service to Cuba with that of Generals Maximo Gomez and 
Garcia, his elevation to the presidency was comparable to 
having Benjamin Franklin instead of George Washington as 
the United States first president. 
Estrada Palma's candidacy was supported by most of the 
prominent men associated with the Constitutional Convention, 
Nationalists and Federal Republicans alike. He was endorsed 
by such diverse types as Maximo Gomez, Mendez Capote, 
Emilio Nunez, Jose Miguel Gomez, Morua Delgado, and 
Gonzalo de Quesada. His campaign was based on promises 
of prosperity and national unity. General Bartolome Maso 
decided to run against him as an anti-Platt Amendment 
candidate, but withdrew from the race when Leonard Wood 
refused to place Maso partisans on the board supervising 
the elections. Duly elected under the supervision of the 
Military Government, Estrada Palma returned to his native 
land in May, 1902, to become president after twenty-five 
years in exile. 
Estrada Palma's first term was full of difficulty, but his 
administration had some major successes, primarily in its 
relations with the United States.50 Between 1902 and 1905, 
the Cuban government negotiated a Treaty of Reciprocity 
which widened Cuba's share of the American sugar market, 
reduced America's demand for naval bases to two sites, and 
firmly defended Cuba's claim to the Isle of Pines. Domestically, 
Estrada Palma, supported by a "non-partisan" cabinet of men 
known for their conservatism and administrative ability, 
worked to continue the programs in sanitation, education, and 
public works begun by the Military Government. Estrada 
Palma built the nation's credit by reducing the public debt 
and by cautious administration. In his budgets, receipts ex­
ceeded expenditures, and the Treasury developed a surplus 
estimated by the government's critics at $25 million by 1906. 
 49 The Fragile Republic
The Estrada Palma government, despite the American 
minister's complaints about its skilful defense of Cuba's 
interests, lived up to the expectations of the Roosevelt 
administration. 
Within Cuba, however, the political and economic situation 
was less than promising. The spirit of annexationism still lived 
in the aliens and in Cuban conservatives, and their hold 
on the island's wealth forced Estrada Palma to hear their 
views. As the adrenalin of independence drained away from 
the bureaucracy, inefficiency and corruption spread. To quiet 
the veterans and stimulate the economy, Estrada Palma negoti­
ated a $35 million loan with Speyer and Company, a New 
York banking house. With this loan, he paid part of a bonus 
voted the veterans by the Cuban congress. Although the 
sugar industry began to recover, its patterns of employment 
and the distribution of its profits still created unrest in the 
growing season, the tiempo muerto. In 1903 and 1904, there 
were strikes in the cities and banditry in the countryside. 
Spanish immigration, encouraged as a means of building a 
white yeoman class, instead increased the competition for 
urban jobs. Although Estrada Palma tried to offset unem­
ployment with public-works spending, he could not get the 
congress to vote the funds. His own fiscal policies kept the 
cost of living high.51 
Politically, Estrada Palma did not take a party label or 
try to exert party leadership. In the congress the Nationalists 
and Federal Republicans proved unwilling to implement the 
Constitution. They turned their energies, instead, to voting 
themselves immunity, passing veteran bonuses (one of which 
Estrada Palma vetoed), bickering over patronage. Personal 
ambitions and regional rivalries determined a politician's 
position on a given issue. The congress was most unified on 
one point, opposition to the United States and those whose 
interests its legation supported: sugar growers, the Catholic 
Church, investors, the alien business community, and annex­
ationists. The Estrada Palma government became the object 
of criticism from the politicians because it was blamed for 
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the economy's failure to meet expectations, for spending too 
much money for public works in Havana, for being too polite 
to Americans, for being too careful with its funds, and for 
being insensitive to the patriots in congress.52 
Although there were many issues, the congressional elections 
of 1904 were determined again by personality and region. The 
parties reformed accordingly. The Federal Republicans be­
came the Conservative Republicans, an alliance between the 
followers of Ricardo Dolz (a conservative) of Havana and 
the Miguelistas (followers of Jose Miguel Gomez, regarded 
as radicals) of Santa Clara. The Nationalists became the 
National Liberals, and ran with the blessing of Maximo 
Gomez and against the Platt Amendment. The elections were 
controlled by whichever faction held local power; fraud 
was common. 
The factions underwent even more radical shifts in 1905, 
a presidential election year.53 The Conservative Republicans 
split in an argument on party organization, but the issue was 
the candidacy. The Havana wing, under Dolz and Mendez 
Capote, favored provincial representation. The Miguelistas 
wanted the party controlled on the basis of the number of 
representatives the party eleoted to congress, which would 
have favored Jose Miguel's candidacy. Unable to reconcile 
their differences with the habaneros, the Miguelistas joined 
the National Liberals on the promise that Gomez would be 
nominated. The new alliance, called the Liberal party, named 
Gomez and Alfredo Zayas, the party president, as their slate. 
One National Liberal, General Emilio Nunez, governor of 
Havana, was unhappy with this move, as he too had presi­
dential ambitions. Taking the label Nationalist, Nunez hoped 
to win the election on the strength of his friendship with 
Maximo Gomez and his own Havana following. The old 
general's death in June, 1905, however, dimmed Nunez' 
chances. He then joined the new Moderate party, formerly 
the Conservative Republicans. 
Hoping to continue his administration and to block the 
Gomez-Zayas faction, which he considered unscrupulous and 
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radical, Estrada Palma reluctantly decided to run for re­
election at the head of the Moderate ticket. He also believed 
the Moderate leaders were more sympathetic to his legislative 
goals and economic policy than the Liberals. He was paired 
with Mendez Capote, the party president. Estrada Palma's 
decision, motivated by a sincere desire to continue the pro­
grams he believed best for Cuba's development, immediately 
cast the two political alliances as a government party and an 
opposition. 
Estrada Palma's first move which bound him to the 
Moderates was to reorganize his cabinet. The new secretaries, 
called the "Fighting Cabinet" for their war records and, said 
the Liberals, for their intention to use force to win the 
elections, were led by Generals Fernando Freyre de Andrade 
and Rafael Montalvo. The former, as Secretary of Govern­
ment, commanded the Rural Guard and the election machin­
ery. He immediately went to work to insure a Moderate 
victory by removing unfriendly provincial and municipal 
officials. Theoretically the Constitution protected these officials, 
but the congress had failed to pass a law providing for their 
election. In the absence of such a law the President had the 
power (under the Spanish codes) to remove appointees. The 
same situation held true for the judiciary. Since the Constitu­
tional provisions for bipartisan election boards had not been 
implemented either, the election could be controlled simply 
by changing the local officials. This was what Freyre de 
Andrade did, and he did so with enthusiasm. In the Liberal 
strongholds in Pinar del Rio, Havana and Santa Clara, the 
purge was widespread. The outraged Liberals replied with 
riots, counter-intimidation and arson, but much of the local 
protest was not party-inspired.54 
The government also increased its following by the liberal 
granting of pardons and by filling the bureaucracy with 
partisans. Policemen, teachers, and public health officers were 
among those replaced with Moderates. The degree of Estrada 
Palma's complicity in these acts is uncertain, but it is unlikely 
that he was simply the ignorant tool of his Moderate secre­
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taries. It is more likely that he believed his own re-election 
was crucial to Cuba's existence and he was willing to condone 
most, if not all, the measures necessary to insure his victory. 
Unrest increased during the tiempo muerto of 1905 as the 
fall elections approached. The Liberals charged that Estrada 
Palma was using political violence to bring on American 
intervention and annexation.55 One of his accusers, the popular 
Miguelista and secretary of the Constitutional Convention, 
Enrique Villuendas, was killed in a gun battle with police in 
Cienfuegos the day before the provincial-municipal elections. 
The Liberals added assassination to their charges. The follow-
day, September 23, 1905, the Moderates swept the elections, 
although the Liberals, through equally effective coercion, held 
on to some posts in Santa Clara and Pinar del Rio. Violence 
was used by both parties. After the election a Moderate 
newspaper admitted that 432,000 names were on the regis­
ters, although Cuba probably had no more than 300,000 
eligible voters.56 In the national elections which followed on 
December 1, the Moderates and Estrada Palma won their 
soiled mandate as the Liberals boycotted the polls. 
That the Liberals shortly began to plan a revolt seems 
certain, but the coming of la zafra deprived them of many 
potential rebels. There was, nonetheless, scattered violence. 
The most inauspicious incident was the attack on the Rural 
Guard post at Guanabacoa near Havana on February 24, 
1906. There a group of some thirty insurgents killed two 
Guards, wounded others, and captured guns and horses. On 
the diplomatic front, Jose Miguel Gomez went to New York 
in October to lecture the newspapers there on Moderate 
injustice. In one interview he blandly suggested that it was the 
United States duty to right the election wrongs in the name 
of constitutionalism and democracy.57 By the time of Estrada 
Palma's second inauguration (May 20, 1906), the Liberals 
had despaired of any peaceful settlement, and a revolt in 1906 
was only a matter of timing and organization. 
As the tiempo muerto of 1906 again brought Cuba to an 
economic standstill, the rumors of revolt grew along with the 
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scanty crops of sugar and tobacco.58 The Republic stood on the 
threshhold of a new experience, its first civil war as a sovereign 
nation. Behind it lay the long years of struggle against Spain. 
Yet little had changed. Life for the guajiro was still el tiempo 
muerto and la zafra. The American soldiers had come and 
gone. With Estrada Palma there had been peace for awhile, 
and life was a little easier; but now the men talked war and 
unearthed rifles and cartridges. What had become of the 
military heroes, the patriot statesmen of the war with Spain? 
The answer was that they were the same men they had 
always been, the products of a system of government that ex­
ploited the political ignorance of the people. They were the 
children of a society and an economy that had unevenly 
distributed its rewards for three hundred years and showed 
little evidence of changing. Without any experience in the 
peaceful accommodation of conflicting interests, seldom with­
out any motive other than self-satisfaction, Cuba's popular 
politicians moved their country toward civil war. Under the 
circumstances, it was unreasonable to hope that the United 
States would stand aloof. Just as surely as revolt was the 
product of Cuba's failure to develop responsible party govern­
ment, so too was American intervention a predictable product 
of general insurrection. The great imponderable was the 
character such intervention would take. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE AUGUST REVOLUTION 
DiLESPITE isolated outbreaks of violence and a 'host of conflicting rumors, in July, 1906, the 
the Estrada Palma government seemed firmly entrenched. The 
Liberal leaders, however, had not given up their plans for 
open revolt. Rather, they had decided to stage a golpe de 
estado by seizing the Havana police stations and capturing 
the President and his cabinet.1 They then planned, presuming 
that United States would have no cause to intervene, to have 
a rump Cuban congress (less the 1905 electees) establish a 
provisional government and hold new elections.2 The junta 
itself included the top leadership of the Liberal party: Jose 
Miguel Gomez, Alfredo Zayas, Jose de Jesus Monteagudo, 
Demetrio Castillo Duany, Justo and Carlos Garcia Velez, Juan 
Gualberto Gomez, and Manuel Lazo.3 The junta's plans were 
cafe-talk in Havana by August 1, and the government, unable 
to ignore the conspiracy, may have been about to act when 
the actual rebellion began. 
On August 16 in the westernmost province of Pinar del 
Rio, a former guerrilla colonel and Liberal congressman, 
Faustino (Pino) Guerra, called several hundred men to his 
colors (a Cuban flag trimmed with black crepe), and the 
revolt was underway.4 Guerra, apparently fearing that the 
government would smash the plot, took the field without 
orders from Manuel Lazo, the most influential Liberal in the 
province. Guerra himself was an engaging person, but hardly 
a Liberal strongman. He was best known as a gambler, horse­
man, accordian player, and bon vivant. Slim, ruggedly 
handsome, dark, mustachioed, and hook-nosed, Pino Guerra 
60 THE P O L I T I C S OF I N T E R V E N T I O N 
was a finished guerrilla chieftain, having served with 
Antonio Maceo. 
Guerra's call-to-arms shocked the government into action. 
Its first moves may have been its most disastrous, for Estrada 
Palma arrested the leading members of the revolutionary 
junta. Within a week he had Jose Miguel Gomez, Castillo 
Duany, Monteagudo, Garcia Velez, Juan Gualberto Gomez, 
and most of their fellow plotters safely behind bars.5 The 
remaining conspirators went into hiding, and in most cases 
did not get to the rebel armies during the next five weeks. 
The most important fugitive was Alfredo Zayas, president of 
the Liberal party. The arrests, however, had two important 
effects. The first was to put the revolt in the hands of a 
second rank of local military chieftains; the other was to 
make the rebels' recruiting easier and their antigovemment 
propaganda more credible.6 
Hard on the heels of the arrests, more rebel bands formed 
in Havana Province (under Enrique Loynaz del Castillo and 
Ernesto Asbert) and in Santa Clara, so that after one week 
the rebels had two thousand men on the loose. Mounted 
and armed with rifles and revolvers of varying serviceability, 
the scattered columns were commanded by self-appointed 
generals and colonels, who called their forces the Constitu­
tional Army. The privates of the officer-heavy Constitutional 
Army were, largely, unemployed rural workers, "illiterates 
without land, wanting adventure and novelty . .  . to them 
all causes were good if they offered an opportunity to do the 
August."7 "Doing the August," or "going to the woods" to 
improve one's lot, was an old Cuban custom, and as long as 
the insurgent officers kept up the picnic atmosphere there 
would be plenty of recruits. The revolt gave the Cuban 
campesino an incomparable opportunity for "saving the 
country and at the same time eating meat." 8 
The political goals of the Constitutional Army generals were 
no different from those of the Liberal party. As Pino Guerra 
led his swelling column of horsemen around Pinar del Rio, 
knocking aside or avoiding scattered detachments of the 
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Rural Guard, he took several opportunities to make his aims 
clear. To reporters (who found him most co-operative), 
Guerra explained that "our plans are to establish a reign of 
Law according to that prescribed in the Constitution, an­
nulling past elections, the product of assassination, fraud and 
violence; we want to bring to power legislators elected by 
the popular will."9 He complained about Moderate corrup­
tion and extravagance, but he continued to insist that election 
frauds were the cause of the revolt, and that the rebels simply 
wanted a return to the Constitution.10 
In Havana Province, Ernesto Asbert called for new elections, 
even if it meant American intervention: "We prefer a new 
American intervention that will guarantee future legal elec­
tions."11 If the American government does not intervene, he 
continued, "we will overthrow the Palma Administration or 
make everything in the island American. We would much 
rather trust Roosevelt than Palma."12 In New York City, 
Colonel Charles Aquirre opened an insurgent press office, and 
shortly news releases stressing the rebels' restraint and pure 
motives were common in the city's newspaper offices. 
The insurgent columns marched about their home provinces 
throughout the rest of August, avoiding pitched battles, col­
lecting men, horses, and supplies, and generally behaving 
themselves. Though the rebel generals collected "contribu­
tions" from fearful planters, there was little destruction and 
even less violence. Essentially the rebel strategy was to create 
an atmosphere of impending violence and thus intimidate 
the government. As Guerra told reporters, "we are holding 
back to give the government an opportunity to recognize its 
errors and restore peace to the people of Cuba without the 
necessity of bloodshed."13 
The rebels' principal tactic was to disrupt communications 
while at the same time threatening to burn out landholders. 
Trains and coastal steamers were robbed of official mail, and 
a couple of railway culverts destroyed. For every culvert 
dynamited or cane field endangered, reports of ten times as 
much destruction reached Havana. With the telegraph lines 
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down, the government could not verify the reports. In reality 
the rebels were taking horses, arms, and food by promissory 
note and respecting private property.14 In Santa Clara, where 
a rebel column of a thousand was parading under General 
Eduardo Guzman, the planters found Guzman's demands firm, 
but polite: 
The exegiencies [sic] of the war, every day more exacting, and the 
necessity of preparing for active military operations obliges me to exact 
a small obligatory war loan, which amount I divide amongst the rich 
landowners of this district. 
My interest is not to receive money, but ammunition, and to that 
effect I solicit from you the remittance of ten thousand rounds of 
cartridges either of Mausser [sic] or Remington style to my Headquar­
ters in the non-prorogable time of eight days. The security of your 
properties will be complete because I maintain the most absolute order 
with my forces and I will give you a receipt for the amount disbursed 
by you in the purchase of war materials, obliging myself to obtain this 
Division the payment of same in any case.15 
The insurgents, however, did not entirely avoid combat, for 
there were several clashes with the Rural Guard. Near Santi­
ago a Guard lieutenant died in ambush; on August 22, Guerra's 
column captured the detachment at San Luis (Pinar del Rio) 
and the next day "occupied" the town of San Juan y Martinez. 
In Havana Province a Guard patrol shot up an insurgent 
column, killing its leader, Quentin Randeras. On August 25, 
Guerra with two thousand horsemen rode into the city of 
Guines and routed the Guards there, killing three and wound­
ing six. In Santa Clara, the Guard dispersed one rebel band 
only to find that the officials of Las Cruces (alcalde, councilors, 
police, and Guards) declaring for the revolution. Riding about 
with impunity the rebels, by the end of August, numbered 
four thousand under Guerra, four thousand in Havana with 
Asbert and Loynaz del Castillo, and another six thousand 
scattered throughout the island.16 
Estrada Palma and the Moderates were surprised and con­
founded by the rapidity with which the insurrection grew, 
and their acts to crush the revolt were marked by confusion, 
hesitancy, and a notable lack of success. First, Estrada Palma 
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increased the Rural Guard by two thousand men, but, failing 
to find recruits, he then offered volunteers $2.50 a day to form 
a government militia. In addition, he created a Foreign Legion 
of Artillery of alien volunteers, commanded by an exotic group 
of Englishmen, Americans, and Germans, to handle the gov­
ernment's Colt machine guns. As the mobilization went on, 
the Cuban Secretary of State, Dr. Juan O'Farrill, assured the 
American charge, Jacob Sleeper, that the government would 
soon raise twenty thousand men and crush the revolt in two 
months' time.17 Despite the government's optimism, economic 
conditions in Cuba deteriorated rapidly as credit dried up, 
planters despaired of protection, and the rebels harassed 
communications.18 
Roosevelt Considers Intervention 
In the United States, the outbreak of the August Revolution 
found the Roosevelt administration and the American people 
with their minds far from Cuba. The summer of 1906 had 
already been exciting. On June 25, Harry K. Thaw had 
murdered architect Stanford White over his attentions to 
Harry's wife, Evelyn. Then in August, the President had 
dismissed two companies of Negro infantrymen for shooting 
up Rrownsville, Texas. On August 29, William Jennings Bryan 
returned from an eight month tour of "decadent" Europe and 
at a rally at Madison Square Garden stunned Tammany with 
a proposal to nationalize the railroads. The New York news­
papers were locked in mortal combat over William Randolph 
Hearst's candidacy for the state's governorship; Hearstism was 
synonomous with demagoguery—in Republican circles. The 
popular songs were "Waltz Me around Again, Willy" and 
"Why Did I Pick a Lemon in the Garden of Love." Serious 
readers were engrossed in H. G. Wells' The Future of America, 
Jack London's White Fang, and Upton Sinclair's The Jungle. 
The government had scattered from Washington to escape 
the discomforts of August along the Potomac. The Congress 
was home campaigning, and the leaders of the executive 
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branch had fled to their summer homes. Theodore Roosevelt 
was strenuously relaxing at Oyster Bay; Secretary of War 
William Howard Taft was fishing in Quebec; Assistant Secre­
tary of State Robert Bacon was vacationing in Maine; and 
Secretary of the Navy Charles J. Bonaparte was taking the 
breezes at Lenox, Massachusetts. Only Elihu Root, the Secre­
tary of State, was hard at work, speech-making and banqueting 
his way home from the Third Pan American Conference at 
Rio de Janiero. In Washington Alvey A. Adee was watching 
the cables at the State Department, and Generals Fred C. 
Ainsworth and J. Franklin Bell were moving the papers at 
the War Department. The legation in Havana was just as 
relaxed (until the revolt), for the minister, Edward V. Morgan, 
an able career diplomat, was vacationing in Europe. 
At the time of the Cuban insurrection, Roosevelt's Caribbean 
policy was in the delicate process of readjustment. After five 
years of tension and conflict, years that saw the Canal Zone 
seized, a customs receivership established in the Dominican 
Republic, Venezuela protected, and American diplomats and 
vessels involved in minor conflicts throughout Central America, 
Roosevelt and Root in 1906 embarked on a general reinterpre­
tation of the American presence in the Caribbean. Their 
principal aim was to reassure the Latin Americans that the 
Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt's Corollary did not make 
their countries protectorates of the United States.19 At the 
opening session of the Rio Conference on July 31, Root had 
stirred the audience with a firm statement of the United 
States friendship and respect for the Latin American republics: 
We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except 
our own; for no sovereignty except sovereignty over ourselves. We deem 
the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member 
of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the 
greatest empire; and we deem the observance of that respect the chief 
guaranty of the weak against oppression of the strong. We neither claim 
nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely con­
cede to every American republic. We wish to increase our prosperity, 
to expand our trade, to grow in wealth, in wisdom and in spirit; but 
our conception of the true way to accomplish this is not to pull down 
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others and profit by their ruin, but to help all friends to a common 
prosperity and a common growth, that we may all become greater and 
stronger together.20 
Although Root's speeches quieted some anti-American 
criticism, they did not signify any change in the United 
States power relationship with the Caribbean republics. The 
United States was intimately concerned with the affairs of 
these countries, Theodore Roosevelt wrote Henry Cabot 
Lodge, since their well-being affected the United States 
security (i.e., the Panama Canal) and foreign trade. Despite 
what Root said, the United States had not foresworn inter­
vention itself, only awkward, antagonizing intervention. In 
the future, Roosevelt confided, interference by the United 
States would be " . .  . to secure the well-being of the de­
pendencies, or quasi-dependencies, themselves; that there 
should be the minimum of such interference which will accom­
plish the result; and that it should where possible be veiled 
as to avoid hurting the feelings of those in whose behalf 
we are interfering."21 
The revolt in Cuba was a week underway before Roosevelt 
or Taft took interest in it, and their first concern was to assist 
the Estrada Palma government and survey the military aspects 
of possible intervention. Neither acted to change the United 
States diplomatic attitude toward the revolt: that the Cuban 
government must protect American lives and property and 
pay for damages.22 Roosevelt's first act in dealing with the 
Cuban crisis was to clear the way for Estrada Palma to 
purchase five million cartridges through the co-operation of 
the War Department on August 25.23 Taft on the same day 
ordered General Bell to report the General Staff's estimate 
on the troops available for Cuban service. 
General Bell's views on the revolt, sent directly to the 
President, were hardly encouraging.24 Although the General 
Staff had planned a force of fifteen thousand men in three 
expeditions, which Bell believed adequate, the Chief of Staff 
further outlined the probable character of operations against 
the insurgents. If the Army were to campaign for the Cuban 
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government, it was quite likely to run into the same problems 
it faced in the Philippines: 
It is one of the most difficult operations in the world, as military 
history abundantly shows, to completely disarm a hostile population 
as skillful in the arts of concealment and deception as is the Latin 
Race. . .  . In dealing with such people, Mr. President, it is not a 
question of military strength and fighting quality. The heart breaking 
feature of it all is that you organize an army and it goes forth with 
military ardor, with all the pomp and panoply of war, enthusiastically 
to meet and conquer the enemy, only to discover it can find nothing to 
fight. 
Instead, Bell continued, the guerrillas and terrorists hid among 
the sympathetic people who provided arms, food, recruits, 
and information, and a pacification program became essential. 
If the President was considering supporting Estrada Palma, 
Bell wrote, the Army should immediately send officers to 
Cuba to collect military intelligence: the insurgents' names, 
arms, suppliers, residence, and occupation. A widespread net­
work of spies would have to get the names of "every individual 
secretly connected with their supply, information and com­
munication service" if the rebellion was to be broken. 
Though Bell's experience with insurgents was limited to 
the Philippines, his analysis of the Cuban rebels' potential 
for guerrilla warfare coincided with Brigadier General Fred­
erick Funston's views. On August 28, Funston wrote Bell to 
give the Chief of Staff the essence of his two years of experi­
ence in the Army of Liberation.25 In 1898, Funston said, the 
United States Army had an erroneous impression of the 
Cuban insurgents because it saw the worst troops in the 
Army of Liberation. The Cuban insurgents were formidable 
guerrillas because of their mobility, scouting skills, and in­
telligence services. Although they were not good marksmen, 
they were experts in the ambush and were never ambushed 
themselves. Their cavalry was excellent. Funston believed that 
the Cubans had never lost the military initiative in 1895-98. 
The Spanish were defeated, Funston continued, because 
they could not match the speed of the rebel forces or the 
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insurgents' sources of information. If American soldiers were 
to be committed against the Constitutional Army, Funston 
suggested that the bulk of the troops be cavalry and mounted 
infantry organized in self-sustaining columns of five hundred 
to a thousand men. Because the Cubans' greatest weakness 
was their difficulty in feeding columns of more than four 
thousand, the Army could count on having to pursue the 
guerrilla bands as they foraged. Funston thought that the 
Americans could break up the Cuban columns initially against 
adverse odds of five-to-one, but that a guerrilla war would 
call for a larger troop commitment. 
Roosevelt, after studying Bell's letter and the General Staff's 
preliminary study, wrote the Chief of Staff that he agreed 
with his analysis and approved the dispatch of two Army 
officers to report on military conditions in Cuba, for Bell was 
not satisfied that the newspapers, his only source of informa­
tion, were reliable.26 The officers, Major Eugene F. Ladd and 
Captain Dwight E. Aultman, were both veterans of Wood's 
Military Government and experts in Cuban affairs. Ladd had 
been the island's auditor and treasurer, and Aultman, until 
1904, adviser to Cuba's Corps of Artillery. 
Upon learning of Bell's letter and Roosevelt's decision to 
send military observers to Cuba, Taft wrote the President 
and clearly stated the central consideration in the United 
States subsequent reaction to the deepening crisis in Cuba: 
"What Bell says is entirely true, that if we sent our men there 
to suppress disorder we would have a fight on our hands 
very much like we had in the Philippines. . . . "27 
At this point, Roosevelt was not yet ready to commit the 
United States to open support of Estrada Palma, but clearly 
he was willing to supply the Cuban government with muni­
tions and to investigate the possibility of action against the 
rebels. His military advisers had been frank and realistic, but 
they had not urged armed intervention. The President, who 
did not even mention the Cuban crisis in a September 4 
letter to Elihu Root, was waiting for a clearer picture of 
the insurrection.28 
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In Cuba the political and military initiative lay with the 
insurgents, and they did not surrender it. Part of the rebels' 
calculations was that the United States could be forced to 
intervene to their advantage if there was clear danger to 
foreign property and irrefutable proof of the government's 
corruption and weakness. As General Eduardo Guzman put it: 
We desire . . . peace because we desire the welfare of our country 
and because we are all patriots . .  . if the Government do [sic] not 
come around to concede what we ask, which is strictly just, I can 
assure you that the forces of Santa Clara . . . will commence their 
offensive work against the public forces and against the properties of 
foreigners, with the sole end that the Americans shall come as quickly 
as possible, as we prefer to live under the shelter of the justice of a 
foreign power than submit ourselves to tyranny under the flag which 
has cost us so much to acquire.29 
Already the pleas of American planters and British railway 
managers were flooding the legation. Certainly the Constitu­
tional Army had the ability to destroy foreign property, but 
its generals showed more interest in threats than arson. Still 
they made their point; as one American plantation manager 
wrote Jacob Sleeper: 
The Cuban professor, who teaches school here, made a visit to the 
headquarters of the rebels and the man in charge told him that if the 
Cuban Government succeeded in whipping them that they would 
destroy all the foreign property that they could find. Owing to the fact 
that the element that has enlisted with the rebels is the worst element on 
the Island, we do not feel safe in our present locality as there is not 
a rural guard or policeman in thirty miles of us and all kinds of trouble 
could be made as we have no protection whatever. There are about 
forty Americans in this locality and we hope that you will take this 
matter up with the Cuban Government at once and see that we have 
some protection.30 
Win or lose, the insurgents threatened to begin burning 
property on September 15, and kept up their cry for mass 
resignations in the government, peace, amnesty, and new 
elections, all under the United States supervision if need be.31 
From the viewpoint of the Estrada Palma government, the 
situation was growing increasingly desperate. From the out­
set, Estrada Palma and his closest advisers had counted on 
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American support, under the terms of Article III of the 
Platt Amendment, in the case of open rebellion against their 
regime.32 The government's reasoning probably followed that 
of an article written by Enrique Jose Varona on August 31. 
Cuba's foremost author and political philosopher believed the 
Platt Amendment promised support only to a de jure govern­
ment, " . .  . to aid, consequently, the present government. 
To proceed in another way would be to reopen the thorny 
Cuban problem; and that does not suit the administration in 
Washington, and enters now neither in the preoccupations, 
nor in the interests of the people of the United States."33 
Yet the United States appeared reluctant to offer aid, and 
the American charge, Jacob Sleeper, did little more than carp 
about the lack of protection for foreign property. 
The Cuban people themselves found the government's 
embarrassment amusing. In the countryside the campesinos 
were reveling in the anti-authoritarian spirit of the moment. 
The government's militiamen were enjoying their good wages 
and were reluctant to risk not being able to spend their dol­
lars. They suspected the Foreign Legion of Artillery with its 
machine guns was much too eager for combat. As for the 
habanero, he too feared a fight. A reporter asked one busi­
nessman why there was no cheering when the government 
forces shuffled unwillingly out of Havana. "Why should I 
cheer," the merchant replied. "They are getting two dollars 
a day, American, besides fifty cents for food. And when it 
is all over we pay, you and I. For my part, I don't see why 
there must be all this fighting. There will be more elections 
some day. And if they fight very long, business will be 
ruined."34 Yet the government recognized that an American 
intervention would be distasteful to many Cubans and po­
litically perilous for those who invited it, and if it could 
avoid at least the stigma of intervention that would be a 
major victory.35 
On September 1, the Cuban situation was tangled, but 
some important generalizations should be made at this point. 
First, the insurgents were out in large enough numbers to 
cause the havoc promised, but as yet they had destroyed 
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only a few bridges and culverts of the Western Railway, 
a British-owned line which had been carrying government 
troops to Pinar del Rio. There had been several inconsequen­
tial clashes with the Rural Guard with few casualties. The 
government's response, thus far, had been to raise several 
thousand useless militiamen and to offer a general amnesty 
to the rebels. Roosevelt had supported Estrada Palma with 
munitions, but, weighing the consequences of expanding that 
assistance to include troops, he had concluded that the po­
litical risks were too great. Until armed intervention became 
more clearly justifiable, the United States would insist only 
that foreign property be respected by both sides. Nonethe­
less, Cuba was faced with economic collapse if the insur­
rection could not be ended before la zafra, if the sugar 
and tobacco crops went up in flame, and if credit and the 
government's revenues continued their downward spiral. 
The Veterans, Steinhart, and the Failure of Compromise 
On September 1, a third party entered the Cuban civil 
war in an effort to end the crisis without the United States 
intervention.36 A committee of noted veterans of the Army 
of Liberation, led by Generals Agustin Cebreco and Mario 
Garcia Menocal, offered to mediate the differences between 
the government and the Liberals. The committee included 
veterans of all political affiliations.37 Menocal became the 
group's spokesman. He was forty, an engineering graduate 
of Cornell University, an able soldier, and, in 1906, manager 
of the Cuban-American Sugar Company's Chaparra estate, 
the world's largest sugar property. By September 8, the Vet­
erans believed that both the rebels and the government were 
ready for a truce and compromise settlement to void the 
1905 elections, to hold new elections on the basis of a re­
formed electoral law, to provide for municipal autonomy and 
an independent judiciary and civil service, and to have a 
general amnesty.38 
Estrada Palma was still hoping to entice the United States 
into the conflict on his side, but his government thus far 
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had been unable to get Sleeper even to recommend dispatch­
ing American troops to guard foreign property. Sleeper re­
ported that the revolt was growing and that American inter­
ests were endangered, but he had not asked for American 
forces.39 Militarily, the government hoped that one solid vic­
tory over Guerra would either dishearten the rebels or en­
courage Roosevelt to give further assistance. This was not 
to be. 
In Pinar del Rio, a government force of eight hundred 
under Colonel Avalos Acosta had been chasing Guerra for 
two weeks. To reinforce Avalos, an armored train guarded 
by two hundred militiamen and the Foreign Legion of Artil­
lery's machine guns was sent from Havana. Twice ambushed 
and once reinforced, the armored train was beseiged by the 
rebels near Consolation del Sur on September 8. "It was a 
lovely battle—unlimited ammunition to burn and nobody 
hurt," William Inglis, an American reporter, said. After a 
fierce exchange of fire for many hours, giving the encounter 
"all the elements of battle except casualties," both sides po­
litely exchanged and refused demands for surrender.40 Before 
either force suffered the embarrassment of running out of 
ammunition, Colonel Avalos' column hit Guerra's flank, held 
by six hundred men under the brothers Paez, at a cluster of 
farmhouses called Hato Nuevo. Exchanging a few harmless 
volleys, the government forces launched one of history's least 
damaging bayonet charges, driving the rebels off and losing 
only one man killed and twelve wounded. The Rural Guard 
claimed it buried eleven insurgents. Avalos' attack, nonethe­
less, got the train fight off dead center, and Guerra's force 
withdrew. Guerra marched unmolested to San Diego, a moun­
tain resort, where he took the waters, enjoyed first-class 
cuisine, and listened to the happy serenades of his warriors. 
The armored train, pocked with a few bullet holes, returned 
to Havana, and the rebels were as well armed and unchastened 
41 as ever.
At this crucial moment in the civil war, the Cuban govern­
ment turned for aid to Frank M. Steinhart, the United States 
consul-general in Havana. For several years before 1906 and 
72 THE P O L I T I C S OF I N T E R V E N T I O N 
for many years afterward, Steinhart was one of Cuba's most 
influential alien residents. Born in Bavaria and raised in 
Pennsylvania, he joined the United States Army as a young 
man. Through luck and pluck, he rose rapidly to sergeant in 
General Philip Sheridan's headquarters. At the same time he 
earned a law degree. As Leonard Wood's chief civilian clerk 
after 1899, he turned his acute, encyclopedic mind to handling 
the delicate political details Wood gave him.42 He stayed on 
in Havana after 1902 as an official of the Havana Electric 
Railway Company and an agent for Antonio San Miguel, a 
wealthy Spanish entrepreneur. In 1903, on the recommenda­
tion of his former generals and the Cuban business com­
munity, he was appointed consul-general on the basis of 
his "thorough knowledge of Cuban affairs, the People and 
language."43 
Without question, Estrada Palma was correct in believing 
that Steinhart would be unequivocal in urging American sup­
port for the Cuban government, and that Steinhart was com­
mitted to Wood's belief in a conservative, elitist control of 
Cuban affairs.44 In a letter dated September 5 to William 
Loeb, Roosevelt's private secretary, Steinhart asked for the 
President's views on intervention.45 He portrayed Estrada 
Palma as despondent and fearful, the armed forces as unable 
to halt the insurgents, Sleeper as "an ass," and Cuba's eco­
nomic condition as collapsing. Steinhart believed that the 
President might have a month to consider intervention, but 
if help should be requested, troops should be rapidly dis­
patched to prevent chaos. Three days later (September 8) 
Steinhart sent the simple cablegram that began to draw 
Roosevelt into the intervention he was so anxious to avoid: 
Absolutely Confidential. Secretary of State, Cuba, has requested me, 
in name of President Palma, to ask President Roosevelt send immediately 
two vessels—one to Habana, other to Cienfuegos. They must come at 
once. Government forces are unable to quell rebellion. The Government 
is unable to protect life and property. President Palma will convene 
Congress next Friday, and Congress will ask for our forcible interven­
tion. It must be kept secret and confidential that Palma asked for ves­
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sels. No one here except President, Secretary of State and myself knows 
it. Very anxiously awaiting reply. Send answer to 
STEINHART 
Consul General46 
Roosevelt's reaction to Steinhart's plea was immediate; he 
ordered Secretary of the Navy Charles J. Bonaparte to dis­
patch warships to Havana and Cienfuegos. There were, 
however, no detailed presidential instructions indicating the 
vessels' mission.47 Despite his dispatch of the two warships, 
Roosevelt still did not want to intercede on either side of 
the Cuban civil war and was even less enthusiastic about 
reopening the question of Cuban-American relations.48 Instead 
he cautioned Acting Secretary of State Bacon to warn Stein-
hart that, as distasteful as the rebels were, "immediate 
intervention" was out of the question and that Estrada Palma 
must use "all the resources at his command to quell the 
revolt. . . . "49 On September 10, Bacon cabled Steinhart 
that two ships were on the way, but Estrada Palma must 
either compromise with the Liberals or beat them in the 
field, and that "until such efforts are made we are not 
prepared to consider the question of intervention at all."50 
Steinhart acknowledged the dispatch of the ships, which, he 
said, coupled with the "victory" at Consolation del Sur, 
heartened the Cuban government. On the same day, the 
British minister in Havana wired his government that only 
American intervention, whether in support of Estrada Palma 
or not, could save Cuba from economic ruin.51 On September 
11, Bacon again cabled Steinhart that the President believed 
"actual, immediate intervention to be out of the question," 
that Estrada Palma must exhaust his own resources before 
Roosevelt would consider intervention.52 
If Roosevelt wanted Estrada Palma to work toward a com­
promise, the news that the United States Navy was on the 
way and that the United States expected the Cuban govern­
ment to save itself had just the opposite effect. On September 
10 and 11, the government suspended constitutional rights in 
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three provinces, arrested more Liberals, rescinded its amnesty 
order, renewed military operations, put Havana under a cur­
few, and rejected the veterans' peace plan.53 A representative 
of the veterans in the field, Colonel Gerardo Machado, re­
ported to Menocal that the Rural Guard and militia had just 
killed some prisoners; Machado and other veterans then 
joined the Constitutional Army.54 Menocal, who had believed 
that Estrada Palma had overcome the Moderates' objections 
to compromise, now found the President unwilling to negoti­
ate " . .  . though we were ignorant of the causes that could 
have brought about such a radical and unexpected change in 
the President's attitude." The veterans recognized that Estrada 
Palma's new militancy was an insurmountable obstacle to 
settlement and broke off negotiations.55 
The results of Estrada Palma's new interest in prosecuting 
the war were increased insurgent attacks, dynamitings of 
British railroad properties and rumors of sugar property 
burnings.56 Steinhart's cables showed how rapidly the situa­
tion deteriorated. In his first wire on September 12, he 
believed diplomatic pressure might end the rebellion; by 
that afternoon he was forwarding a request from Estrada 
Palma for two or three thousand troops to prevent a massacre 
in Havana.57 It was into this tense and unpredictable situa­
tion that Roosevelt's two warships sailed, without restrictive 
instructions, and it was at this moment that the President's 
hope for peace through persuasion was dashed completely 
through events in Cuba. 
The United States Navy Intervenes 
On the afternoon of September 12, the cruiser "Denver" 
steamed into Havana harbor and anchored off O'Reilly and 
Obispo streets with its guns cleared for action. The Americans 
in the watching crowd cheered, the Cubans were silent and 
scowling.58 The city itself, its low white buildings with red 
tile roofs stretching off in the smoke and haze of the Cuban 
afternoon, was peaceful. In the harbor the smells of tar, fish, 
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tobacco, and rotting fruit mixed with the cries of the bumboat 
merchants. Along the Malecon, strollers looked out curiously 
at the United States Navy. 
The day before the gunboat "Marietta," Commander William 
F. Fullam in command, arrived in Cienfuegos. The "Marietta" 
was fresh from Commodore W. H. H. Southerland's squadron 
in Dominican waters where it had been carrying government 
troops and showing the flag in threatened ports. By coinci­
dence, Commander Fullam was a leading advocate of using 
sailors as ships' landing parties and of abolishing the Marine 
Corps; there was a touch of eagerness in his reports to prove 
his sailors' fighting qualities. Immediately upon anchoring, 
Fullam was besieged by American planters begging protec­
tion. If the sailors did not come ashore, the planters told 
Fullam, the insurgents would put their centrales to the torch. 
Under the instructions wired him by Secretary Bonaparte on 
September 12, he could use his own discretion about landing 
sailors to protect American property.59 Assuming in the 
absence of further instructions that he could act in "case of 
necessity," Fullam decided on September 14 to land men to 
protect Hormiguero, Constancia, and Soledad centrales.60 He 
then put a force of four officers, seventy men, and two 
machine guns ashore and called for reinforcements, with the 
ecstatic approval of the sugar planters. He personally doubted 
that the rebels would resist since they seemed to welcome 
intervention.61 
Fullam might have been chagrined if he had known of 
events in Havana. The day before his men went ashore 
at Cienfuegos, another landing party had disembarked at 
Havana and then, under direct orders from Roosevelt, gone 
back to the "Denver." Shortly after his ship's arrival on 
September 12, Commander J. C. Colwell, "Denver's" captain, 
visited Estrada Palma. The President, Colwell discovered, 
was delighted by "Denver's" appearance, which he said 
strengthened his government.62 The city, Colwell learned, 
was rife with rumors of treason, massacre, race war, looting, 
and arson. As a result of a conference with Estrada Palma, 
Sleeper, and Steinhart, Colwell ordered a battalion of sailors 
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(some 120 men) and three field pieces ashore to prevent an 
uprising in Havana. The landing party took up positions in 
the Plaza de Armas which controlled the main thoroughfares 
and, not incidentally, protected the President's palace. No 
sooner were the sailors ashore than two things happened: a 
delegation of the Liberal's Central Revolutionary Committee, 
led by Zayas, approached Colwell and offered to surrender 
their forces to him, and Sleeper learned that Roosevelt did 
not want any Americans to land without his orders.63 The 
new order read: "Vessels sent to Cuban waters are under 
orders of the President, who will determine when and how 
they shall be used for protection of American life and prop­
erty. Ships may be used for asylum." Sleeper tried to get 
the sailors back aboard "Denver" that night, but Colwell put 
him off until the next morning because he believed his men's 
presence had stopped mob rule in Havana and because he 
thought he could negotiate the rebels' surrender.64 Colwell 
admitted, however, that the government had used the time 
the Americans were ashore to regroup its troops, distribute 
more arms and to continue fortifying the city. During the 
night a force of Rural Guards under General Alejandro 
Rodriguez sallied out to meet the rebels, but were scattered 
in a skirmish near Wajay. The fight was most notable because 
General Rodriguez had his monogrammed raincoat captured 
by the rebels and Loynaz del Castillo was brained with a 
machete by one of his own men. 
On September 14, also, Estrada Palma convened a special 
session of congress, but his message to them was not a call 
for peace or compromise. Rather, he asked for support and 
approval of his war decrees.65 By that afternoon, however, 
"Denver's" landing party was gone from the Plaza de Armas. 
Estrada Palma was most disturbed. He had asked for open 
intervention on September 13. Americans had come ashore 
(albeit to protect lives and property), but Roosevelt had 
withdrawn them. His reaction was to increase the pressure 
on Roosevelt. Steinhart broke the news to the President: 
Estrada Palma, Mendez Capote, and the cabinet were deter­
mined now to resign and have the congress adjourn. "The 
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consequences will be absence of legal power, and therefore 
the prevailing state of anarchy will continue unless the United 
States Government will adopt the measures necessary to avoid 
this danger."66 
Roosevelt Acquiesces in Intervention 
The landings from "Denver" and "Marietta" may have 
saved lives and property, but their greatest importance to the 
Cuban civil war was their impact on the strategy of both 
the government and the rebel leadership. Both sides appar­
ently saw the landings as the first step of an American mili­
tary intervention, and both renewed their efforts to insure 
that intervention would serve their purposes. Fearing con­
tinued fighting and an insurgent victory, Estrada Palma was 
determined to throw the government into the United States 
hands if Roosevelt would not support him militarily. He was 
convinced that Cuba's future peace and economic stability 
were at stake, that under the Platt Amendment Roosevelt 
must act to prevent the Republic's collapse.67 
The Liberal leaders were equally interested in American 
intervention because they thought if free elections were held 
they would win and, in any event, their government would 
need the United States approval to survive. Despite threats, 
their treatment of American property was hardly destruc­
tive. Rather, they held the sugar plantations hostage, while, 
for Roosevelt's benefit, they demonstrated Estrada Palma's 
military weakness. The Liberals gambled that Roosevelt 
would avoid a guerrilla war if possible, that he could not 
bear, politically, the expenses of a permanent or violent 
occupation. They interpreted the landings to save lives and 
property as the first step in American mediation and from 
that point did little more than encourage the rumors of 
chaos and destruction, which they knew Roosevelt could 
not ignore.68 
At Oyster Bay, Theodore Roosevelt struggled to find a 
way out of the Cuban impasse, which to a degree he had 
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created for himself. By dispatching "Denver" and "Marietta" 
without orders, by urging Estrada Palma to fight on, by act­
ing to protect American lives and property, he had encour­
aged the contestants in the civil war to increase their pressure 
for American intervention. In the face of what appeared to 
be an explosive situation around Havana, where Guerra, 
Asbert, and Loynaz del Castillo had joined their columns, 
Roosevelt hurriedly sent more ships and Marines to Cuban 
waters. Even before "Denver" and "Marietta" put parties 
ashore, he wired Bacon: 
We should have a large force of marines in Havana at the earliest 
possible moment on any ships able to carry them. Cable Steinhart . . . 
that we will send ships and marines as soon as possible for the protection 
of American life and property.69 
Roosevelt, on September 13, was still anxious to avoid 
intervention, and he recognized that Estrada Palma's unpopu­
larity and military weakness made it unwise to intervene on 
his behalf. The Cubans were "not suffering from any real 
grievance whatsoever," yet they had plunged themselves into 
a civil war that endangered their very existence as a nation. 
To find a solution to "what is happening in Cuba . .  . I expect 
to do some tall thinking in the effort to bring about a condi­
tion which shall, if possible, put an end to anarchy without 
necessitating a reoccupation of the island by our troops."70 
The next day Roosevelt acquiesced to American involvement 
in the Cuban insurrection when he increased his military 
commitment to "protect American interests by fulfilling Ameri­
can obligations to Cuba."71 After a conference with Secretary 
Bonaparte, Roosevelt had the Navy dispatch three battle­
ships, a cruiser, and the transport "Dixie," carrying a Marine 
battalion, into Cuban waters. The Marine Corps also formed 
two more battalions at Norfolk and the League Island Navy 
Yard; these embarked on September 16 and 17.72 
In an effort to halt the fighting (which was largely halted 
anyway) and perhaps encourage new negotiations among the 
Cubans, Roosevelt resorted to personal diplomacy. In a long 
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letter to Gonzalo de Quesada, the Cuban minister in Wash­
ington, a letter concurrently delivered to Estrada Palma and 
the Cuban press, the President made his last attempt to avoid 
a military intervention.73 He first reviewed for the Cubans 
his own sincere interest in their welfare and the last seven 
years "of profound peace and of steadily growing prosperity." 
Now "the evil of anarchy" menaced Cuba's "peace, prosperity 
and independence. . . .  " Whoever was responsible for the 
revolt, all Cubans must now recognize the danger to their 
sovereignty. But if Cuba continued to show that she had 
"fallen into the insurrectionary habit," then the United 
States had no other choice but to intervene. All Cuban 
patriots were therefore adjured to find a peaceful solution 
to their differences. 
Roosevelt emphasized, however, that he could not ignore 
the obligations imposed on both nations by Article III of 
the Platt Amendment, and, since he had information that 
American lives and property were endangered, he was con­
strained to act. In his judgment, it was imperative that hos­
tilities cease immediately and that "some arrangement" for 
"the permanent pacification" of the island be established. To 
achieve these ends, he was sending Secretary of War Taft 
and Assistant Secretary of State Bacon to Havana to reconcile 
the warring factions. 
Although the negotiations of the Taft-Bacon Peace Mission 
were far more publicized, praised, and criticized than Roose­
velt's acts up to September 14, the character of the American 
intervention was shaped by the events leading up to the dis­
patch of the Peace Mission. By the time it arrived in Havana, 
occupation was virtually inevitable. The most important fac­
tor was that both the Estrada Palma government and the 
Liberal insurgents calculated on forcing American interven­
tion in their support. Roosevelt's reactions to the Cuban civil 
war left both parties in doubt as to his final position. Estrada 
Palma first received quick presidential attention on his request 
for ammunition and an equally prompt response to his request 
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for warships. The insurgents' public statements, on the other 
hand, showed deeper political and military wisdom. They 
judged that Roosevelt would not risk an unpopular war on 
the side of a weak and "unjust" government. 
Roosevelt's grasp of the Cuban crisis was complicated by 
the Steinhart-Sleeper competition at the Havana end of the 
diplomatic channel, but both men accurately passed on the 
news they received and neither controlled Cuban affairs. As 
sympathetic as Steinhart was to the Estrada Palma govern­
ment, he did not have to encourage the Cuban president to 
ask for help. More serious was Steinhart's judgment on 
Sleeper's competency, but his own prejudices and interests 
were known to Roosevelt and Bacon. While they communi­
cated to Estrada Palma through Steinhart, they also weighed 
Sleeper's cablegrams which continued to come to them. How­
ever misleading or excited Steinhart and Sleeper might have 
been, it was Roosevelt who failed to realize how inaccurate 
one of his basic assumptions was: that the Cubans would 
compromise their differences rather than turn the island over 
to the United States to govern again. Perhaps if Roosevelt 
had had Elihu Root's counsel, he would have seen some other 
diplomatic alternative, but even Root could not have changed 
the military implications of a Cuban intervention. 
The crucial decision not to support Estrada Palma, for this 
is what the Gonzalo de Quesada letter was, rested primarily 
on military considerations. Roosevelt, Taft, Bell, and Funston 
were in essential agreement that a guerrilla war in Cuba 
was a real possibility and that such a war would be costly 
in lives, American property, and the administration's popu­
larity at home. Throughout their deliberations, they were 
aware that they risked another war on the Philippine model 
if they aided Estrada Palma. Furthermore, though the Army 
and Navy were better prepared than in 1898, troops and 
ships could not be moved rapidly enough to save the Cuban 
economy if the insurgents decided to live up to their Septem­
ber 15 deadline to destroy foreign property. The naval inter­
vention, by itself, was of little assistance to the planters in 
the back country. 
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The hurried dispatch of "Denver" and "Marietta," accom­
panied by Roosevelt's belated restriction of their instructions, 
increased the hope of Estrada Palma and the insurgents that 
the United States would intervene in their favor. The landings 
to protect lives and property had a significant impact on the 
course of the rebellion, for afterward neither side showed any 
inclination to compromise. Instead both parties polarized 
around the men working to increase the American involve­
ment. Estrada Palma's decision to resign, which must be linked 
with the re-embarkation of "Denver's" sailors, was never 
modified, for he considered the United States failure to sup­
port him foolish, dishonorable, and unfaithful to the Platt 
Amendment. Face to face with "Marietta's" parties around 
Cienfuegos, the insurgents, on the other hand, were quick 
to impress the Americans with how co-operative they could 
be with the occupying forces.74 
Whether Roosevelt realized the impact of the landings or 
simply did not care after September 14 is uncertain. With 
the approval of both the State Department and the Secre­
tary of the Navy, the landings continued after the dispatch 
of the Taft-Bacon Peace Mission.75 The transport "Dixie" put 
her Marine battalion ashore to replace Fullam's sailors around 
the centrales. At the same time the Mission was working to 
avoid an occupation, the Marines extended American protec­
tion to foreign properties in Santa Clara. 
Roosevelt's letter to Gonzalo de Quesada, which followed 
the news of the landings, did not encourage an all-Cuban 
compromise as the President had hoped, however slightly. 
To the Cubans, his message was as enigmatic as his earlier 
statements and acts.76 Was or was not the United States 
intervening, and on whose behalf? Though Roosevelt's plea 
to stop fighting did have some effect, his announcement of 
Taft and Bacon's departure for Cuba reinforced rather than 
discouraged the efforts of the Cuban government and the 
insurgents to make the United States responsible for ending 
the revolt. If Roosevelt believed Taft could argue the United 
States out of its involvement in the Cuban insurrection, he 
badly misjudged the skill, the subtlety, and ambitions of the 
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politicos. Roosevelt's unwillingness to accept the risk of a 
Cuban war committed the United States to intervention on 
the insurgents' terms. It also established the policy of the 
military occupation that followed intervention and influenced 
the course of Cuba's political development. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SECOND INTERVENTION 
FROM the oubreak of revolt in Cuba to the dispatch of the Taft-Bacon Peace Mission, 
Roosevelt's major concern was to avoid involving the United 
States in a guerrilla war in Cuba. Such a war would quite 
likely strip the continental United States of troops, become 
expensive in lives and money, and be enormously unpopular 
with the American voter. Yet the complex, muddy insurrec­
tion in Cuba simmered on, and Roosevelt could not escape 
the conclusion that, whatever happened to the Taft-Bacon 
negotiations, American forces might be needed in Cuba. 
Therefore, as Taft left for Cuba and even as he later met 
with the politicos in Havana, the military phase of Roosevelt's 
Cuban diplomacy gathered strength. It was to become increas­
ingly important in the President's deliberations and in its 
effect upon the course of the negotiations of the Taft-Bacon 
Mission. 
On his way to Havana, Taft detrained in Washington to 
assemble his party and to meet with Generals Bell and 
Ainsworth to review the plans for the deployment of troops 
to Cuba. On September 15 Taft reported to Roosevelt that 
the force was organized on paper, orders were ready, and 
that the three expeditions (each of approximately six thou­
sand men) could be supported logistically.1 A copy of the 
General Staff's plan reached Roosevelt two days later, and 
after examining it, he returned it to the War Department 
for revision.2 Roosevelt's major criticism of the General Staff's 
plan was that it did not reflect General Funston's recommen­
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dation that the Army, if it had to fight the insurgents, should 
use primarily cavalry and mounted infantry.3 General Bell 
replied that he was more or less in agreement with Funston's 
assessment of possible operations and that the back-up (or 
second) expedition would be composed solely of cavalry.4 
While the plan emphasized matters of organization, supply, 
and transportation, the analysis of the problems of campaign­
ing in Cuba and the type of warfare that might be expected 
could not have increased Roosevelt's willingness to commit 
troops in support of Estrada Palma. The General Staff pointed 
out the limitations imposed by Cuba's lack of roads, the 
problems of supply and security, and the terrain advantages 
a guerrilla force would have in waging a prolonged war.5 
The Army's operations against the insurgents would entail a 
long occupation and large numbers of soldiers "for occupy­
ing railways, bases of supply and strategic points to enable 
mounted troops [to] operate safely in [the] interior."6 The 
British military attache in Washington, after a conversation 
with Captain Dwight E. Aultman who had recently returned 
from his fact-finding mission to Cuba, believed that as many 
as forty thousand soldiers might be needed in Cuba. If so, 
Roosevelt would have to raise another thirty-five thousand 
men to keep the Army properly prepared, and such men 
would be raw recruits not available for immediate service. 
A war in Cuba would strip the Army posts in the United 
States of all experienced troops capable of national defense 
or expeditionary duty elsewhere.7 
Even as Taft and Bacon bargained with the politicos 
in Havana and occasionally threatened to land troops, Army 
officers in Washington told the press how unappealing they 
found the prospects of pacifying Cuba. Members of the Gen­
eral Staff saw war in Cuba as "a campaign of chasing and 
reconcentration," needing perhaps one hundred thousand 
men.8 The New York Times reported: 
Officers who have had experience in the Philippines especially have 
no desire to take part in settling the Cuban mess by force. They say 
that there is only one way of ending a guerilla campaign down there 
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. . . and that is by reconcentration, which would be certain to raise 
a storm of protest in this country.9 
The Washington Post's headlines on September 22 read 
"Reconcentrado is the Hint Given Cuba . . . May Adopt 
Weyler's Policy." In another article on September 23, the 
New York Times again drew a parallel between Cuba and 
the Philippines. In discussing General Bell's campaign in 
Batangas, "a form of concentration which resulted in estab­
lishing peace," it reported that this experience prepared the 
Army for "the sort of work that would have to be done in 
Cuba."10 As for an Army consensus on a Cuban war, the 
New York Times found the officers it interviewed in agree­
ment that a counterguerrilla campaign would be "long and ex­
tremely arduous, with no opportunity for distinguishing one's 
self, and the result . . . will be the annexation of Cuba."11 
The political dilemma which might grow from a fighting 
intervention in Cuba did not escape the British press. The 
Times thought the whole business enormously amusing if the 
United States Army and an American general had "to resort 
to the devices of the much-abused General Weyler—recon­
centrado camps, trochas, and the rest."12 The Graphic ap­
proved of Roosevelt's "judicious threats" to dampen the 
politicos' pleas for intervention and recognized that to sup­
port Estrada Palma would be foolish: "With the conquest of 
the Philippines still uncompleted, a guerrilla war in Cuba, 
such as the veterans of the Spanish war could have sus­
tained, would have been exceedingly disagreeable."13 
The naval intervention, ordered by Roosevelt on September 
8 and 14, continued during Taft's negotiations in Havana. 
By the night of September 21, there were three battleships 
("Louisiana," "New Jersey," "Virginia") and two cruisers 
("Denver" and "Des Moines") in Havana harbor. The next 
day two more cruisers arrived with eight hundred Marines. 
By October 1, three more battleships and two more cruisers 
had arrived and the number of available Marines increased 
by two thousand.14 At Cienfuegos on September 23, Com­
mander Fullam placed the Cuban Central Railway under the 
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United States protection and put sailors and Marines aboard 
its trains.15 In all, Estrada Palma, by surveying the naval 
buildup, could gamble that the United States would not let 
the revolt go on, even to the point of taking temporary 
political control in Cuba and occupying the island to the end 
of the disorder. 
The military situation in Cuba, as the Taft-Bacon Mission 
soon found, was growing tense, for the officers of both the 
insurgents and the government militia were on the verge 
of losing control of their unruly followers.16 Although the 
insurgents had, in the first month of operations, limited them­
selves to requisitioning horses and arms, the rebel army had 
grown so large that its soldiers had to forage widely to eat. 
With each day the risk of general disorder and destruction 
increased.17 By September 27, Sir William Van Home was 
writing that if the United States did not end the revolt quickly 
"it may require an army of 150,000 men and prolonged guer­
rilla warfare to secure the United States in the peaceable 
occupation of the country."18 
It was against this background of increasing combustibility 
that Secretary of War William Howard Taft attempted to 
negotiate a peaceful compromise that would keep the United 
States from occupying and governing Cuba. 
Taft in Havana, Roosevelt at Oyster Bay 
Leaving Roosevelt at Oyster Bay on September 14, William 
Howard Taft and Robert Bacon headed for Havana bearing 
the President's confidence, his faint hope for peace without 
intervention, and the burden of his previous military com­
mitments.19 Taft was painfully aware that the Peace Mission 
was a frail hope. To Elihu Root he wrote that he found his 
position "quite embarrassing" because he knew so little of 
Cuba. He thought only that the Cuban government was "a 
house of cards" and that the United States must act to salvage 
the Cuban nation.20 To Roosevelt, Taft expressed doubt about 
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his qualifications for fulfilling the President's expectations: 
" . .  . This trip is a little like purchasing a pig in a poke, 
I know so little of the actual situation."21 The mission's sec­
ond member was no happier about his job. Robert Bacon, the 
taciturn, cosmopolitan lawyer from the House of Morgan and 
Assistant Secretary of State, thought the United States should 
have supported Estrada Palma from the first, a position he 
never modified.22 
Taft's biggest worry in Washington, after seeing that the 
General Staffs plans were prepared, was whether interven­
tion was constitutional. He was assured that, in the opinion 
of Judge Advocate General George B. Davis, it was. Roosevelt 
was duly notified of the good news.23 The President's reaction 
was predictable: although he appreciated the opinion, he 
would not "dream" of waiting for a Congressional mandate 
to act, and his decision to intervene, if "necessary," would be 
a useful precedent for future Presidents.24 Both Roosevelt and 
Taft recognized, however, that constitutional sanctions were 
handy tools to silence domestic critics. 
Taft then organized his Mission and entrained for Tampa 
on the afternoon of September 16. Besides Bacon and some 
clerks, he took along Captain Frank R. McCoy, Leonard 
Wood's aide then detailed to the Army War College, and 
Frank S. Cairns, a former Cuban customs officer and secret 
service operative for Wood. Both men spoke Spanish and 
had a wide knowledge of Cuban politics. On the ride south, 
Taft and Bacon were briefed on Cuban aifairs by Albert G. 
Robinson, author, reporter for the New York Sun, and long 
time friend of Cuban nationalism. Robinson made two major 
points: that Estrada Palma would be difficult to deal with 
because he believed if he failed no other Cuban government 
could succeed, and that unless peace and credit were quickly 
re-established Cuba faced economic collapse.25 
Aboard the cruiser "Des Moines" the next day (September 
18), Taft and Bacon discussed the Cuban situation with 
McCoy and Cairns. McCoy cautioned Taft about Robinson; 
he was a radical and unduly friendy with the insurgents and 
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some unscrupulous Americans in Havana. It was true that 
Estrada Palma was stubborn, perhaps through age, but it 
was also a fact that Mendez Capote and the Moderates would 
undercut the President if they felt the need. McCoy and 
Cairns agreed that Jose Miguel Gomez was popular, but 
Alfredo Zayas was a "scoundrel and shyster . . . the cheapest 
demagogue on the island." Steinhart, on the other hand, was 
knowledgeable and absolutely trustworthy.26 
The atmosphere in Havana, as the city awaited the Peace 
Mission, was best described by an American reporter: "If the 
Queen should lead Alice straight from Wonderland into the 
heart of this amazing Cuban war, they would both feel per­
fectly at home."27 Early on the morning of September 19, 
the "Des Moines" anchored in Havana harbor and the Peace 
Mission set to work. Amid cheers of "Viva Taft y Bacon . . . 
Viva Mis'tah Roo-velt," Taft stepped ashore in top hat and 
morning clothes with Bacon taking advantage of his shadow. 
The first conferences were with Dr. Juan O'Farrill, the 
Secretary of State, and President Estrada Palma. The latter 
gave Taft and Bacon a long lecture on the virtues of his 
administration and the treachery of the rebels. If anything 
was clear after Estrada Palma finished, it was that compro­
mise was going to be difficult.28 The commissioners' first con­
cern, however, was to get the insurgents and government 
forces to observe the truce declared by Estrada Palma after 
the publication of the Gonzalo de Quesada letter. By threat­
ening to land sailors and Marines, Taft, through McCoy, 
Ladd, and Cairns, was able to get General Montalvo (the 
new Secretary of Government), General Rodriguez, and 
Colonel Avalos to hold their positions and the insurgents 
(Guerra, Asbert, and Loynaz del Castillo) to do likewise.29 
At the same time, the American officers made a quick tour 
of the rebel camps, where they found the insurgents numerous 
(around twelve thousand), poorly armed, and quite popular 
with the rural people. Clearly, the rebels were capable of 
great destruction (estimated at $100 million worth or the size 
of American investments), and their foraging was becoming 
uncontrolled. The government troops were too few and inef­
 95 The Second Intervention
fective. In Taft's words, "we cannot maintain the Palma gov­
ernment except by forcible intervention against the whole 
weight of public opinion in the island."30 
Establishing themselves at Minister E. V. Morgan's home 
in the suburb of Marianao, which was between the lines, 
Taft and Bacon began to piece together the Cuban political 
puzzle, hoping that a compromise might be found. They 
learned that Freyre de Andrade, now a congressman, and 
Montalvo admitted rigging the 1905 elections and that some 
Moderates were belligerent to the point where they "were 
willing to do anything to force intervention."31 The Moderate 
party, represented by Mendez Capote, would, however, abide 
by the peace commissioners' decisions, and at least some 
Moderates consented to have the 1905 elections voided if the 
rebellion would end.32 
The initial difficulty in dealing with the insurgent-Liberal 
leadership was to insure that whoever negotiated for the 
Liberals spoke also for the rebel generals. Agreement was 
quickly reached in a conference among Alfredo Zayas (who 
"played the game well from first to last," according to 
McCoy), the imprisoned members of the revolutionary junta, 
and the rebel generals: Zayas would speak for the Liberals 
and the Constitutional Army.33 
Taft decided that the Peace Mission would negotiate from 
the compromise proposed by Menocal and the veterans, which 
he thought was a fair solution. Taft believed that if the con­
gressional elections of 1905 were nullified and new elections 
held, Estrada Palma would still be acceptable to the Liberals. 
Estrada Palma had his faults, but his honesty and "disinter­
ested" patriotism were unquestioned and having him in office 
would give the next government "constitutional continuity" 
and the confidence of businessmen. Taft also realized the 
presidency was the most powerful force in the Cuban govern­
ment, and Estrada Palma was more to his philosophical liking 
than the other candidates he had met.34 
On the basis of their earlier statements, both parties seemed 
agreed that new laws for elections, the judicial system, the 
civil service, and provincial and municipal organization were 
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needed. The main points of contention were the restoration 
of the officials removed in 1905 and 1906 and the validity of 
the elections of 1905. Taft concluded that the congressional 
elections must be voided, while Estrada Palma's office could 
be negotiated. The problem was the rebel generals' popularity 
and their potential for mischief. As for American goals, Taft 
wrote Roosevelt: 
Of course what you and I want is peace, and to get these insurgents 
to lay down their arms and go back into the country, and I am willing 
to sacrifice a good deal to do this, because it is possible the next gov­
ernment will have sense enough to lay the foundation of an army that 
will suppress future resorts to violence in remedying political wrongs.35 
Thus far in the negotiations Roosevelt concurred with Taft's 
views, though he doubted that Estrada Palma could be saved. 
He believed the compromise plan would work because the 
Moderates "must accede" or fall from power. But if the insur­
gents did not accept the terms, Taft should ask them for 
counter-proposals rather than threaten intervention.36 Only 
as a last resort should Taft land troops "to save life and 
property in Havana," and in any case the use of the word 
"intervention" must be avoided.37 
On September 24, Taft formally approached the Revolu­
tionary Committee (Zayas and his fellow Liberals) with the 
compromise. The essence of Taft's plan was: 
1. Estrada Palma would continue as President for a full term. 
2. Senators and representatives elected in 1905 would resign. 
3. An electoral law would be drafted by a mixed commission and new 
elections would be held, perhaps as early as January. 
4. New laws would be enacted to protect municipal autonomy, establish 
judicial independence, and create a non-partisan civil service. 
5. All the provincial and municipal officials elected in 1905 would have 
to stand for re-election. 
6. The rebels would disarm and disband under a general amnesty. 
Though the Liberals wanted Estrada Palma's powers of 
appointment curtailed and their partisans restored immedi­
ately to provincial and municipal office, "they indicated the 
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probability of their acquiescence."38 The Moderates and 
Estrada Palma, however, held to the position they had pre­
sented to Menocal when they learned the "Denver" was on 
the way: the elections of 1905 must stand; the Liberal party 
must limit "its requirements to the settlement of a future 
right."39 Otherwise, Estrada Palma said, he would not con­
tinue in office. He added that the compromise was "useless," 
that the commissioners were "prejudiced," and that it was 
"inconsistent with his dignity and honor" to accept such a 
solution.40 Taft's reaction was just what Estrada Palma must 
have expected, for the Secretary, despairing of a compromise 
and fearing war, asked Roosevelt for more ships and men.41 
The next day, when Estrada Palma again notified Taft he 
would resign and take the whole government down, Taft 
asked the President's permission to land troops and assume 
control of the Cuban government "until a more permanent 
policy may be determined."42 
Roosevelt, however, was not yet ready to accept the 
inevitability of an American occupation of Cuba. While Taft 
was assaulting the Cuban civil war frontally in Havana, the 
President was guarding the administration's flanks and rear, 
and he was fearful that they were not yet secure. On Septem­
ber 22, he had warned Taft that "it is important from the 
standpoint of public sentiment here that we shall make it 
plain that we are exhausting every effort to come to an 
agreement before we intervene."43 
Roosevelt saw the Cuban problem reopening all the old 
issues of annexation, imperialism and Army authoritarianism 
in the insular possessions. One of his major worries was that 
American business interests had financed the revolt, but an 
investigation by Frank Cairns indicated that voluntary Ameri­
can contributions to the Liberals' war chest had been few.44 
Still there was the problem of Roosevelt's influential Con­
gressional critics. Ben Tillman, John Sharp Williams, and 
Joseph W. Bailey, he wrote Charles W. Eliot, were always 
ready to jump him on the imperialism issue.45 From within 
his own party, he heard from Joseph B. Foraker and Albert G. 
Beveridge. The first warned him that it was unconstitutional 
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to intervene without Congressional assent; the second sug­
gested he "take the Island—advice about as rational as 
requests I used to get at the time of the anthracite coal 
strike, to 'take the coal barons by the throat.'"46 Yet, as the 
Times of London observed, neither the Republicans nor the 
Democrats could gain much from a Cuban intervention, for 
the former had been lauding the restraint in the new 
Roosevelt-Root Latin American policy statements and the 
latter had been hailing Cuba as a noble example of what the 
United States might expect if the Philippines were granted 
independence.47 
Diplomatically, Roosevelt was under no real pressure 
because Great Britain, France, and Germany believed the 
United States would protect their nationals without active 
intercession; only Spain wanted to organize a common voice 
to urge the United States to intervene. The Great Powers, 
however, feared damaging their good relations with the 
Roosevelt administration.48 From a conversation with the 
American minister to Spain, Lord Acton, the British minister, 
gathered that the United States did not want to annex Cuba 
and that it was agreeably surprised by the mild reaction of 
the European press to the Cuban crisis.49 The lack of foreign 
interest was awkward for both the Cuban government and 
Roosevelt. At one stage, Estrada Palma's ministers supposedly 
considered having their troops destroy German and British 
property to increase the pressure on the United States.50 
Roosevelt, on the other hand, upon learning that the European 
diplomats in Havana favored intervention, observed: 
I should not be at all sorry to have the foreign consuls act as to 
intervention of their governments . . . because it would make our 
course clearer and give us an even more complete justification.51 
When Taft reported that the compromise plan had failed 
on September 25, Roosevelt equivocated on intervention. First, 
he made a personal appeal to Estrada Palma to rise above 
honor to save his country, which Estrada Palma was already 
convinced he was doing by resigning and forcing the Ameri­
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cans to take control. Roosevelt was confused as to how condi­
tions could have "changed so completely," and urged Taft 
to keep trying, to work closely with the Liberals to find a 
compromise: "I do not believe we should, simply because 
Palma has proven obstinate, put ourselves in the place of his 
unpopular government and face all the likelihood of a long 
drawn-out and very destructive guerrilla warfare."52 Still, 
Taft could land troops if necessary. 
In Havana, Taft worked to patch together another compro­
mise before Estrada Palma resigned. With the Liberal goals 
almost achieved, Alfredo Zayas co-operated with him in order 
to head off an actual occupation. The Moderate position 
remained unchanged. Taft began to feel the chances for non­
intervention slipping away: " . .  . our suggestion as a basis 
of compromise seems to be thought a great victory for the 
Liberals . . . Palma and the Moderates will now take away 
their dolls and not play." Although he did not like "temporiz­
ing and compromising" with rebels because it "is a bad 
precedent," " . .  . we did not make and were not responsible 
for the situation which we found."53 
Roosevelt agreed with Taft that dealing with rebels was an 
evil thing, but that the Secretary had probably saved Havana 
from rioting and arson. The President urged Taft not to give 
up, but to avoid using the word "intervention." The whole 
affair was regrettable, but not "in the slightest degree due 
to any act of ours."54 In another cable the same day (Septem­
ber 26) Roosevelt had more afterthoughts about the compro­
mises offered the rebels, and concluded that the concessions, 
considering Estrada Palma's military weakness, were "the 
least of two very serious evils." The President feared the 
revolt had set a bad precedent, that of remedying political 
disputes by force, but that however likely another revolt, the 
Cubans should have one more chance at self-government.55 
Although Taft expected hostilities to begin again between 
the ill-disciplined militia and the insurgents and doubted 
that Estrada Palma would change his mind, he still hoped a 
provisional Cuban government could be formed. Estrada 
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Palma had called another special session of congress to accept 
his resignation on September 28; the Peace Mission had but 
two days to find a replacement. Zayas was working with 
some Moderates, Taft reported, and he himself had warned 
them that any intervention would be temporary. This warn­
ing, he hoped, would dishearten the annexationists in the 
Moderate party.56 When Taft worried about the constitution­
ality of a new government, Roosevelt told him the problem 
was meaningless. The American goal was still any settlement 
which avoided war and intervention: 
Remember that we have to do not only what is best for the island 
but what we can get public sentiment in this country to support, and 
there will be very grave dissatisfaction here with our intervention unless 
we can show clearly that we have exhausted every method by which 
it is possible to obtain peace and the perpetuation of the government 
with some show of order prior to our taking control ourselves.57 
The provisional government scheme, however, did not 
gain much support, and Taft, upon learning that the Moder­
ates were planning a counterinsurrection, again asked for 
Roosevelt's approval for immediate intervention. The Presi­
dent's reply re-emphasized the need to justify intervention 
to the American public: 
. .  . I do not see that two revolutions would be . .  . more objection­
able than one, and as far as our attitude before the people of the 
United States is concerned it would make our position even better, for 
if we have to intervene I shall not object to any additional proof that 
the intervention was inevitable. . .  . If we have to put down the 
insurrection it will, of course, take many months and a large force, and 
the people of this country will need to be convinced that there was no 
later alternative. . . -58 
On September 28, Taft, Zayas, and other Cuban politicos 
went on with the charade of forming another government 
before the congress met that afternoon. By now Taft realized 
that both the Liberals and Moderates favored an American 
occupation, the former to have their new elections, the latter 
because they hoped it would bring annexation: 
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But neither party is willing to take the responsibility of saying so 
out loud. Accordingly they are going to take the cowardly fashion of 
breaking a quorum and running away and leaving old Palma, (who 
after all is a good deal of a hero, really the only hero I know of in 
the Cuban revolution), hanging by his gills between Heaven and 
Earth.™ 
The Moderates were even prepared to scatter the congress 
by force if it attempted to choose a Liberal as provisional 
president.60 During the day, Taft cleared the wording of an 
intervention proclamation with Roosevelt (who was observ­
ing naval gunnery practice at Buzzard's Bay) and reviewed 
the course of the negotiations. He reassured the President 
that the insurgents would not fight the Americans and that 
last minute Moderate delaying tactics should not deter the 
United States from intervening. Roosevelt finally gave Taft 
the go-ahead to land Marines and to take control when the 
Cuban government no longer existed.61 
At nine o'clock that evening a fraction of the Cuban 
congress met for the second time that day in an atmosphere 
charged with emotion. There were the predictable impas­
sioned speeches by the island's most accomplished orators, 
and then, rather than accept the President's resignation, a 
delegation of senators went to see him. Estrada Palma lis­
tened to their pleas to remain in office, and admitted that 
his personal desire was to do so. As William Inglis reported 
the President's last moments in office: 
[Estrada Palma said] "But here, we have a question of the dignity 
of the government. We are deprived of authority by an armed element 
which has risen against us. I must go." 
Not another word was spoken. The President of the Senate seized 
the right hand of Don Tomas and drew his left arm around the aged 
man in a close embrace. Tears were in the eyes of both. As Dolz turned 
away, he was sobbing. Duque Estrada, Mario Garcia Kohly, Fortun, 
all the rest, embraced the President and turned away weeping. But the 
old man neither wept or spoke. He seemed dazed. The Cuban Republic, 
savagely torn by her own greedy sons, was dying before him. And a 
little while later he heard passing his palace the measured tramp of 
American marines on their way to guard the millions in the state Treas­
ury—the real cause of the revolution.62 
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The citizens of Havana waited expectantly for the political 
drama to play itself out. As Lieutenant of Artillery Horacio 
Ferrer watched the Cuban flag over Morro Castle lowered 
at sunset, he sadly reflected that it would never be run up 
the staff again.63 Around midnight Estrada Palma formally 
submitted his resignation to the peace commissioners. 
In the early hours of September 29, William Howard Taft 
worked to make the occupation as popular as possible. Upon 
receiving Estrada Palma's resignation, the Secretary of War 
called the Marines ashore and issued a proclamation stating 
that in the absence of a Cuban government, the United 
States, "to restore order," had temporarily assumed political 
control of the island. He established a provisional government, 
naming himself governor. The Cuban flag would continue to 
fly and the laws of the Republic would remain in effect. The 
Provisional Governor called upon "all citizens and residents of 
Cuba to assist in the work of restoring order, tranquillity, 
and public confidence/'64 The second American occupation of 
Cuba had formally begun. 
Occupation and Disarmament: October, 1906 
With intervention and occupation a fact, Roosevelt accepted 
it as an inevitable and temporary alternative to "a destructive 
and wearisome civil war," occasioned by Estrada Palma's 
military weakness.65 He was satisfied that Taft had done all 
he could to get a compromise, that annexation was still unwise, 
and that the Republican party would not be politically penal­
ized for the intervention.66 Back in Washington, the President 
talked with Sir Mortimer Durand, the British ambassador; 
Roosevelt "seemed very confident about restoration of order. 
He said he had no wish to annex either Cuba or San 
Domingo."67 In another conversation Elihu Root told Durand 
that the intervention would be terminated as quickly as pos­
sible, and, in a letter persuading Gonzalo de Quesada to 
stay at his post, the Secretary of State stressed the need now 
to work again for Cuba's independence: 
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To secure the successful accomplishment of this purpose as speedily 
as possible, all friends of Cuba ought to unite their earnest efforts. With 
hopeful courage and determination on the part of Cuba's real friends all 
this wretched business will soon be over, and we shall look back upon 
it as merely a hard lesson in the course of Cuba's development in the 
art of self-government.68 
At the Havana end of the "wretched business," William 
Howard Taft also did all that pleasant speeches could do 
to disarm the Cubans and to insure that they did not mis­
understand the United States intentions. In an address at 
the opening day exercises of the National University, the 
Provisional Governor spoke with Hispanic courtesy and deli­
cacy. He praised the accomplishments of Spanish culture and 
the progress of the nation: "The island of Cuba, established 
as a Republic four years ago, made such rapid progress in 
four years as almost to intoxicate those of us who believed 
in popular government." Now, however, Cuban democracy 
had faltered, and it was necessary for the United States to 
catch Cuba in "its stumble in the progress toward self-
government." Sadly but willingly, the United States, proudly 
showing its readiness "to expend its blood and treasure" for 
the "progress of popular government," would help Cuba move 
forward again. Taft's major suggestion was to be less class 
conscious, less committed to Utopian ideals, and much more 
interested in business: 
Therefore I urge upon the young men who are going out into life 
to-day . . . that they devote their attention, if they have estates in the 
island, to the betterment of those estates; and that others who have not 
estates, if they can get into commercial houses and into commercial 
pursuits, do so that when twenty-five years hence, a sympathetic 
stranger comes here again he may not find the governing or political 
class, the commercial class, the class representing the sciences and the 
professions, all different and divided, so that you do not have the 
benefit of a mixture of all those classes to form that without which a 
successful republic is absolutely impossible—a safe, conservative, pa­
triotic, self-sacrificing public opinion. 
Exhorting the Cubans to "be not discouraged," Taft concluded 
his speech with the lesson that disappointment often leads to 
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new successes and then finished with a rousing " \ Viva la 
Republica de Cuba!"69 
In the meantime Marines of the hastily formed Provisional 
Marine Brigade landed and fanned out across the countryside 
to guard sugar properties and railway facilities and to garrison 
the troubled towns where insurgents and the militia still glow­
ered at each other along rifle barrels. Led by the legendary 
Colonel L. W- T. Waller, pacifier of Samar, the two-thousand­
man brigade, broken into company detachments, kept the 
peace until the Army arrived.70 The Marines met only threat­
ening gestures from the disgruntled militia. The insurgents 
were singularly co-operative. One Marine officer, First Lieuten­
ant William P. Upshur, described the whole business to his 
parents as a welcome change from shipboard life. His first 
letter began with a classic phrase for Marines: "No doubt 
you have been wondering what under the sun has become of 
me." He quickly assured his parents that the landings had 
been safe and the journey of his company to Pinar del Rio 
uneventful: 
The whole thing is exactly like Richard Harding Davises [sic] 
description of a revolution. We have the dirty rabble of Negroes armed 
with every tipe [sic] of antiquated weapon (a general to about 8 men) 
the palms and other tropical vegetation, the queer houses and of course 
the palace. . . . the people are harmless . . . our detachment could 
clear the island of them in a jiffy.71 
Duty in Pinar del Rio was excellent, the shopping good, the 
people friendly, and when the Marines left in late October 
the town band and color guard, carrying the Cuban and 
American flags, marched with Upshur's company to the sta­
tion. Earlier there had been banquets and speeches; at the 
station a cheering crowd bid the Marines farewell.72 
Throughout the island the business of disarmament and 
demobilization went on during October. The work was 
directed by Brigadier General Frederick Funston, who had 
arrived in Havana late in September to assist Taft and 
command the American forces in Cuba. 
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On September 29, the Revolutionary Committee had agreed 
that the Constitutional Army would disband, surrender its 
arms and horses, and return home. Taft appointed a Dis­
armament Commission of Cuban veterans and American offi­
cers to co-operate with the Liberal generals to this end.73 
The Commission members joined the rebel columns and began 
the trying task of sending the celebrating insurgents home.74 
Aided by the pull of work in the sugar and tobacco fields, 
the commissioners were able to disperse the insurgents. 
Guerra's troops were bought off with ham sandwiches and 
were allowed to carry their weapons home with them before 
they were confiscated. In Ernesto Asbert's camp, disarming 
was slowed by many violent arguments and posing for photo­
graphs; there Funston found only 693 rusty rifles from seven 
thousand men, no ammunition, no pistols, and no machetes.75 
Major Ladd had much the same experience with Loynaz del 
Castillo's men; he estimated that about 12 per cent of the 
arms were surrendered. Loynaz del Castillo, in fact, told his 
men that "the Constitutional Army is not dissolved but in an 
apparent way" and that they should hold their weapons, for 
"we know that the American government is willing to grant 
almost anything before having to fire a gun in Cuba."76 In 
an interview Pino Guerra analyzed the rebel position in a 
more positive fashion: "The revolution is ended and we have 
won, so we are supremely content."77 
Working to get the insurgents back to their homes in time 
for the harvest, the Disarmament Commission did not quibble 
over the number of arms it received. As Major Ladd reported, 
it was concerned that it collected only 3,153 weapons from 
twenty-five thousand men, but more arms could easily be 
obtained anyway, and the prime consideration was to disband 
the Constitutional Army. By October 8, the insurgents had 
returned to their homes and the militia was mustered out of 
the service. In the latter's case, the government's rifles were 
largely recovered. The number of arms that remained in the 
peoples' hands, however, was a continuing source of concern 
to the Provisional Government.78 
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One incident marred the process of disarmament, as far 
as Taft was concerned, and that was the disposition of the 
insurgents' horses. During the revolt the insurgents had gath­
ered mounts wherever they found them, and no record of 
ownership was attempted. Horse-trading had been common 
during the revolt and the alteration of a mount's physical 
characteristics was easy. Yet the insurgent generals had prom­
ised to restore "property which was taken by them for military 
purposes," and Taft wanted their horses returned. At the 
time, Taft was not in the best of humor: "I have to put up with 
the strutting about of insurgent generals in their uniforms, and 
their complaints by the other side of them, although in my 
heart . . . profane expressions of disgust press for utter­
ance."79 Taft was in no mood to give the rebels any more 
than they had already won. Funston and Ladd did their 
best to round up the horses; certificates were drafted in Span­
ish vesting temporary custody of each horse with the in­
surgent possessing it, with "ownership to be determined later," 
but between the drafting and printing this phrase was lost. 
Before the Disarmament Commission could correct the error, 
the rebel officers hurriedly issued the original certificates.80 
Both Funston and Ladd believed the incident (if regrettable) 
was minor, and that rebel possession of the horses was instru­
mental in getting them to go home.81 Taft thought ques­
tions of private property were most serious, and, greatly 
disturbed, he asked Roosevelt if the Provisional Government 
could indemnify the owners, and Roosevelt agreed.82 
The most significant repercussion of the horse incident was 
that Taft relieved Funston and sent him back to his post 
in California, replacing him with the Chief of Staff, Brigadier 
General Bell. Although Taft said Funston was no longer 
needed in Cuba because there would be no military opera­
tions, he relieved the general for not being respectful of 
private property (about eight thousand horses) in violation 
of the truce agreements. Taft was through with the unortho­
dox and mercurial Funston: "He has two o'clock courage 
and ability to meet an emergency that such courage gives 
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him, but when it comes to organization and execution of 
plans I think he is lacking."83 In military circles, Funston's re­
lief was laid to friction with some of his former Cuban com­
rades, but the Army did not miss the point that pacification 
still caused sticky problems with their civil superiors.84 
Even as Taft gloomily considered the problems of inter­
vention and occupation, the Cubans themselves celebrated 
the end of the revolt and the coming of la zafra. William 
Inglis saw Guerra's insurgents return to Pinar del Rio, and 
he was infected by the passion of the hand-waving, scream­
ing crowd at the station. As the train pulled in, it was met with 
thunderous vivas from the mob packed along the platform: 
Mob: "Viva los Liberates!" 
Rebels: "Viva Cuba!" 
Mob: "Viva nos liberadores!" 
Rebels "Viva la Constitution!' 
Everybody: "Viva los Americanos. Viva la Paz! Viva Taft y Bacon! 
Viva-a-a-a Mit'ter Roo-velt!" 85 
In Havana, the Liberals began to collect contributions to 
erect a statue of Roosevelt, and Commander Colwell of the 
"Denver" got a gold watch and a banquet in his honor from 
the grateful revolutionary junta.86 With Taffs announcement 
of a general amnesty on October 10 and with the insurgent 
army dispersed, the August Revolution, to the insurgents' 
way of thinking, drew to a happy and successful close.87 
Uncomfortably settled in the palace, "as cheerful as Spring 
Grove cemetery," Provisional Governor William Howard Taft, 
in his scant moments of reflection, thought that the Cuban 
intervention had been "wretched from the beginning." In let­
ters to Elihu Root and his brother Charles, Taft reviewed 
the events of September, and the dominant tone of his ac­
count was futility.88 The cause of the revolt, he believed, 
was the coercion in the Porfirio Diaz style used to thwart the 
popular will in the elections of 1905. "The theory is all right, 
but the practice failed because there was no Diaz and there 
was no force to suppress the revolution which followed." 
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When he arrived in Havana, he learned two inescapable 
facts: the insurgents had arms and men enough to wreak 
havoc, and the Moderates wanted annexation. He and Roose­
velt had agreed to steer a course between war and annexation, 
and their goal was "to get the people dispersed and down to 
work in the tobacco and sugar fields." Affairs in Havana had 
been a "nightmare"; if the United States had supported the 
Cuban government, there would have been war and the 
destruction of American-owned property. If it had not inter­
vened at all, the result would have been the same.89 Now the 
United States, Taft wrote the President, as it acted the role 
of receiver or trustee for Cuba, must make the best of a bad 
situation. It must show the "South Americans that we are 
here against our will and only for the purpose of aiding 
Cuba. . . ."90 
As appraised by the sophisticated Captain Frank McCoy, 
who understood the Cuban people and their problems, "some 
kind of intervention was absolutely necessary" for Cuba had 
truly been in turmoil.91 The revolt "was a fight between the 
'Ins' and 'Outs' with no principle at stake," sparked by the 
Moderates when they adopted "the Porfirio Diaz scheme of 
running a Latin-American Republic, without the force nec­
essary to solve the problem . . .  " Instead the government 
had "relied on the Platt Amendment, with its backing of the 
United States." In the Peace Mission's negotiations, the Lib­
erals "outplayed" the Moderates, who worried about "their 
sacred honor and dignity" and "sulked in their tents." Taft, 
McCoy wrote Wood, "soon found he was up against a dif­
ferent lot of people" from, the Filipinos, but on the whole 
(since Wood couldn't be there) the Secretary "handled the 
thing ably and with wonderful tact for a new comer to Cuba." 
Both Taft's and McCoy's accounts reveal the commissioners' 
feeling that their mission had successfully stopped the war 
on the insurgents' terms and that the chance of any other 
settlement had been closed before they arrived in Cuba. 
In the meantime, Roosevelt made sure that the Cubans 
would bear the historical responsibility for this situation by 
publishing the diplomatic correspondence leading to the 
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Peace Mission before the occupation was a week old.92 The 
Taft-Roosevelt correspondence and the full report of the 
Peace Mission were made public two months later. The docu­
ments printed in the Taft-Bacon Report and Foreign Affairs, 
1906 have in fact perpetuated the Roosevelt administration's 
interpretation of the Peace Mission's conduct, and American 
historians (critics and apologists alike) have largely accepted 
Roosevelt's evidence.93 Conceding Roosevelt's thesis that he 
did not want intervention for both the United States and 
Cuban interest, one must still conclude the Taft-Bacon Mis­
sion was sent as much to protect Roosevelt's political leader­
ship at home as it was to stop the war in Cuba. To a large 
degree, Taft's job was to negotiate the United States out of 
the impasse Roosevelt helped create when he sent ammunition 
and ships to Havana. In the eyes of Cubans of varying politi­
cal persuasions, the United States, until the Taft-Bacon Mis­
sion arrived, was stiffening the otherwise impotent Cuban 
government.^4 
The contemporary Cuban reaction was a mixture of relief, 
political self-justification, and despair with the nation's politi­
cal weakness, but few dismissed the revolt lightly. Representa­
tive of the Liberal-nationalist viewpoint, Enrique Collazo 
described the revolt as the necessary destruction of a non-
Cuban government built upon the moral and economic preju­
dices of Leonard Wood and Estrada Palma.95 Outraged by 
the political nihilism of 1908, Roque E. Garrigo emotionally 
deplored the Cubans' inability to reach the social harmony of 
their ideal: 
In the Nation, in the provinces and in the Cuban municipalities, 
there are, nor can there be, more than two points of view: that of the 
privileged ones, vile adultorers of the [political] system now marvelously 
full of their bastard ambitions, their stupidities and their frauds; and 
that of those who suffer in placid tranquillity, lacking the spirit of 
true citizenship, in unqualified fear of the abusers.96 
For Enrique Jose Varona, who had watched the events of 
September take place with characteristic sang-froid, the Ameri­
can commissioners had destroyed the Cuban government 
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because they feared the loss of the foreign property held 
hostage by the rebels. Varona could see no other reason why 
the United States government had abandoned the rule of law, 
which was one of its guiding principles. He believed that the 
influence of foreign capital was the "major social force" in 
Cuba, that with its vast resources foreign capital had moved 
in its own self-defense to end the war and halt the politics 
of violence and destruction: 
Thus far it has limited itself to crushing the Government of Sr. 
Estrada; and it will substitute another when it becomes advantageous. 
Without bias it will take tomorrow the necessary steps as they appear 
to it in order to avoid the disagreeable need of repeating the operation. 
Thus our first revolt will be liquidated. Those who worry about the 
future of the Cubans in their own country will help in liquidation with 
sadness, shame and fear.97 
Among Cuban historians the machinations of pro-annexation 
property owners and the deleterious effect of the Platt Amend­
ment on Cuban domestic politics have vied as the major 
causes of the intervention. Few have denied the event's impor­
tance. Martinez Ortiz believed the August Revolution was a 
greater disruption of the nation's life and a greater source of 
disillusionment and insecurity than the war for independence; 
he thought that if the war had continued the nation would 
have dissolved in social revolution. Roig de Leuchsenring cast 
the Platt Amendment as the chief villain because it encour­
aged the politicos to plead and threaten to gain American 
support and then evade their responsibilities when the United 
States became involved. Portell Vila stated that the instability 
of Cuban post-colonial society made revolt inevitable, for 
which intervention was a poor solution and annexation a 
constant threat. The Platt Amendment gave the American 
and Spanish property owners all the promise they needed to 
agitate for intervention.98 
There is little doubt that Roosevelt and Taft believed that 
nothing could be worse for any society than to be sundered 
by rebellion and to have law and order collapse. As far as 
Cuba was concerned, Roosevelt and Taft were friendly with 
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the Estrada Palma government and the conservative values 
under which it governed. Why then did they, in effect, allow 
it to collapse? To a large degree they realized that sanctioning 
rebellion would be an unhealthy thing for Cuba internally 
and that the destruction of foreign property would be the 
island's economic (and perhaps political) ruin. Yet the single 
most important factor in the matrix of social, economic, and 
geopolitical considerations that they weighed was their fear 
of the American public reaction to a military pacification of 
Cuba. In this fear, the President and Secretary of War were 
reinforced by the advice of their military advisers and 
diplomatic representatives in Cuba. 
Roosevelt and Taft, however, rode the historical analogy 
of the Philippine Insurrection much harder than did Generals 
Funston and Bell. Doubtless for reasons of institutional self-
protection and their concept of national security, these senior 
officers and the General Staff were not anxious to intervene 
in support of Estrada Palma. Their plans and correspondence 
indicate, though, that they believed they could suppress the 
rebellion (if not save the sugar mills) with eighteen thousand 
troops if they could be relatively free in conducting the pacifi­
cation on their own terms. It was the particulars of these 
terms that concerned the President. 
Faced with the possibility of active military intervention in 
Cuba, Roosevelt armed himself with a large supply of justifi­
cations. Which ones were for his conscience and which for 
public consumption is hard to say. Clearly, the constitutional-
legal sanctions that encouraged him to act served both. His 
concern for Cuba's peace and well-being was real enough, 
but so was his desire to escape the interventionist-imperialist 
label. Incongruously the two justifications he used to start 
the naval intervention of September 8 (that he was acting 
"to protect American lives and property" and to pre-empt 
European intervention) were designed to satisfy American 
public opinion and yet the act of naval intervention served 
to prolong the Cuban rebellion and end the possibility of 
compromise. The arrival of "Denver" and "Marietta" were 
the key events which directly influenced the style and timing 
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of the subsequent occupation, determining that it would be 
peaceful and result in a political victory for the Liberals. 
Believing that a failure to protect foreign lives and property 
would cause a storm of protest in the United States, Roosevelt 
felt compelled to send ships to Cuba. By doing so, he narrowed 
his chances of avoiding an occupation. 
The Cuban government and the rebels calculated on 
winning American influence to their side, and Roosevelt did 
nothing to discourage their hope for American intervention. 
The Cubans were correct in assuming that Roosevelt could 
not let the war go on; they were willing to gamble that inter­
vention would work to their advantage. The rebels made the 
most astute assessment of American reaction by guessing that 
Roosevelt would not fight to support a weak regime estab­
lished by rigged elections. The Moderates, on the other hand, 
committed a basic mistake when they equated Roosevelt's 
bellicose righteousness with a personal freedom to order troops 
to fight in defense of law, order, constitutional government, 
and the sanctity of property. Insensitive themselves to the 
popular restraints upon democratic government, they thought 
Roosevelt would risk an unpopular war simply to uphold 
political abstractions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE UNITED STATES ARMY PACIFIES CUBA

W:'HEN political events in Havana suggested the resignation of the Estrada Palma government, 
the United States Army prepared its expedition to Cuba. 
Warned by the War Department on September 25 that inter­
vention was imminent, the General Staff, using its Cuban war 
plans as a basis, began to organize the expeditionary force. 
The Ordnance and Quartermaster Departments had an­
nounced the readiness of supplies in mid-September; now 
they prepared to purchase additional munitions and horses 
and charter transports. 
The basic task organization, in line with the General Staff's 
earlier estimates, was modified only slightly and orders were 
dispatched to the units tabbed for Cuban service on Septem­
ber 29, after the intervention became official. The expedition­
ary force consisted of five two-battalion infantry regiments 
(Fifth, Eleventh, Seventeenth, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-
eighth), two two-squadron cavalry regiments (Eleventh and 
Fifteenth), one light artillery battery (Fourteenth Field Artil­
lery), two mountain batteries (Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Field Artillery), the Second Battalion of Engineers, the Sig­
nal Corps' Company I, and the Hospital Corps' Companies A 
and B. The War Department prescribed a division level staff 
for the expedition, including seven members of the General 
Staff Corps. The port-of-embarkation was Newport News, 
Virginia. Thirty days' supplies would be loaded out with the 
troops, and units were to embark with full equipment for 
field service.1 
From posts as far distant as Fort Russell (Wyoming), Fort 
Snelling (Minnesota), Fort Des Moines (Iowa), and the 
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Presidio (California), the units of the expeditionary force 
moved toward Newport News. Fresh from summer maneu­
vers, many of the troops had scarcely unpacked. The news of 
the move was not entirely welcome; desertions in the Eleventh 
Infantry rose when the men learned fever-famous Cuba was 
their destination. To bring two battalions to nearly full 
strength, each regiment stripped its third battalion to fill its 
ranks. Officers were ordered back to their commands from 
the Infantry and Cavalry Schools (over the Commandants' 
protest) and from other detached duty. Three instructors at 
West Point departed, though Colonel Hugh Scott, the Super­
intendent, tried to save his football coach. General Bell's reply 
was crisp: 
If West Point has come to that frame of mind where it thinks that 
coaching a football team is sufficient excuse for keeping a captain away 
from his troops when it is ordered to a foreign country for possible 
war service, then the Chief of Staff feels that the time has come for him 
to weep. I am certain . . . that others have over-persuaded your 
judgement.2 
The command and the title of the force moved about as 
rapidly as its troops. Frederick Funston officially commanded 
the force as of October 2, 1906, although he was unaware of 
his appointment and hardly had time for it anyway. On Octo­
ber 4, Secretary Taft ordered General Bell to Cuba to assume 
command, which Bell did on October 10. Bell held the post 
until the end of the year when he returned to Washington. 
His replacement, Brigadier General Theodore J. Wint, lasted 
until February 25, 1907, when illness forced the sixty-one 
year old cavalryman to retire. Brigadier General Thomas H. 
Barry, previously head of the Army War College and acting 
Chief of Staff in Bell's absence, then commanded the Cuban 
force until the end of the intervention. The command itself 
was first called the First Expeditionary Brigade. As the troops 
arrived in Cuba, Taft named the expedition the Army of 
Cuban Intervention, but, reconsidering the political wisdom 
of that title, he redesignated the force the Army of Cuban 
Pacification on October 15. Such it remained. 
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As well as the General Staff had been warned and as 
expeditiously as the Army sailed from the United States, the 
five-thousand-man expeditionary force took a month to assem­
ble in Cuba. There a thousand waiting Marines joined it. The 
movement, nevertheless, was a notable achievement in Army 
history, for the rapidity and efficiency of the deployment, 
planned and supervised by the General Staff, demon­
strated the value of contingency planning and the improved 
readiness of the Army.3 
The Fifth Infantry arrived first in Havana on October 6, 
having left New York City five days earlier aboard the Army 
transport "Sumner." Meanwhile at Newport News, the quar­
termasters built an embarkation depot at the end of a spur of 
the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad. In the next two weeks, 
sixteen merchant vessels under government contract sailed 
with troops for Havana. The press of the ships at Newport 
News (first come, first contracted) slowed the movement, for 
each had to be inspected and, in some cases, modified to meet 
Army regulations. The loading of supplies was not well organ­
ized and much equipment was lost. Still the expedition began 
to leave Newport News on October 10 and the deployment 
was completed by the end of the month. In Havana the 
transports were unloaded at the Western Railway wharf, 
where lines of khaki-clad Americans queued down the gang­
planks to the waiting trains which carried them to Camp 
Columbia west of the city. With the Marines no doubt com­
menting freely on the Army's "speedy" reaction, the soldiers 
then headed inland to their posts. By October 29, the Army 
of Cuban Pacification (which included the First Provisional 
Marine Regiment) garrisoned the island with six thousand 
men. The second military occupation of Cuba had begun.4 
Cuba Pacified 
The Army of Cuban Pacification was the muscle and steel 
behind the Provisional Government, and from the outset its 
mission was to deter insurrection in Cuba. Roosevelt hoped 
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the Army would not become involved in law enforcement per 
se. This was the task of the civil government and the Cuban 
Rural Guard. Writing Taft, the President was insistent that 
the Army's role be passive. Although it would provide the 
"moral force" behind the civil administration, the Army must 
hold itself aloof from Cuban affairs: 
I feel it is most important that if any bloodshed occurs it should be 
between Cubans and Cubans, not Americans and Cubans. Please have 
the strictest instructions issued. . .  . In the event of disorder, the 
American troops should not be called upon until the last resort. . .  . I 
am most anxious that there should be no blood shed between Americans 
and Cubans.5 
Taft interpreted Roosevelt's instruction for the Army in a 
circular issued October 12, 1906. The Provisional Governor 
reiterated the President's orders to avoid conflict with the 
Cuban people. The Army was to "exert every effort to mani­
fest all the courtesy possible to Cubans of all parties." The 
soldiers must remain orderly and inconspicuous (a goodly 
assignment for so many red-blooded American boys) and 
responsive to the wishes of the Provisional Governor. Diplo­
macy and discipline were to be the watchwords; there would 
be no repetition of the rowdiness which enflamed the Fili­
pinos. As the troops fanned out along the island, General Bell 
personally visited each post to lecture his officers and 
men on "the peculiar circumstances of their service." His 
indoctrination program was swift and effective.6 
Bell had had his doubts in September about the Army's 
role in any intervention, but Taft made clear that the Army 
of Cuban Pacification would be under the orders of the Pro­
visional Governor and, through him, responsible to the admin­
istration in Washington.7 The civil authority, as in the United 
States, would dictate policy for the Cuban bureaucracy and 
the Army alike. 
Roosevelt's goal, the creation of a new Cuban government 
by free elections, demanded that the island be rid of violence. 
Though the Army's presence was a positive factor in the Pro­
visional Government's plans, the Army's mission, as defined 
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for it, looked essentially passive. As defined by General Bell, 
however, the Army's role was seen as mediative as well as 
deterrent: 
Troops are . . . not expected to take part in an active way in the 
suppression of disorder unless an extreme emergency arises in which 
it is absolutely necessary for them to protect life and property. Their 
duties should be generally limited to tendering their good offices in 
preventing friction between conflicting elements. Their presence in a 
community should create such a sense of security that the Rural Guards 
and local police should be able to suppress disorders. To this end all 
officers and enlisted men of this command will exert every effort to mani­
fest all the courtesy possible to Cubans of all parties. They will par­
ticularly avoid taking sides with any party or faction.8 
The Army high command in Cuba recognized that much of 
its influence depended on the troops' good behavior and its 
own responsiveness to the needs of the Provisional Govern­
ment. Yet its own definition of "moral force" (at least that of 
its commanding general) was more than the naked threat of 
armed power. Pacification, in the Army's experience, was to 
a degree a process of assuming moral leadership. The pres­
ence of large numbers of Americans made this inevitable. The 
Army, which "though small in numbers . . . has nevertheless 
shown itself everywhere and has quietly covered every nook 
and corner of the entire island," could serve by its example 
as a representative American institution.9 This aspect of the 
occupation was explicit in General Barry's message of June 
26, 1907. Congratulating his men on their "self-restraint, good 
judgement, sound discretion, and intelligent appreciation of 
the purposes of our government," Barry pointed out that 
the Army of Cuban Pacification had an obligation that 
transcended its use as guarantor of peace: 
The duty of the Army here, as elsewhere, is to give effect to the 
policies of our Government, and if, in carrying out such policies, the 
principles of liberty, independence, and self government, as set forth 
in "The Declaration of Independence" and exemplified in that national 
life of our country, are so demonstrated, it is believed that one of the 
essential objects of our presence here will have been accomplished.10 
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Such a high call to duty was part of the Army's tradition, 
earlier applied in the Philippines and Cuba, and it is likely 
that General Barry's sentiments were shared by his fellow 
officers. One, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bullard, writing 
in the Journal of the Military Service Institution, stated that 
the Army was playing a positive role in the regeneration of 
the Cuban people by its moral example.11 
Many officers in the important staff and command positions 
of the Army of Cuban Pacification had had ample experience 
in military government in Cuba and the Philippines. Ten 
principal staff officers and regimental commanders had Philip­
pine service behind them; three others had played important 
roles in the Military Government of Cuba. Colonel William 
Pitcher, Twenty-seventh Infantry, for example, bore the sobri­
quet "Ten Dollars or Ten Days" Pitcher from his tour as 
Havana chief of police and police judge. Although the influ­
ence of Leonard Wood's proteges was greater in the Provi­
sional Government than in the Army of Cuban Pacification, 
several officers had served with him in Cuba and the Philip­
pines. It seems likely that the Army's leadership shared Bul­
lard's view that the Army's position could not be neutral on 
questions of public order, justice, and tranquillity. 
Whatever the views of its officers on the nature and aims 
of the occupation, the Army of Cuban Pacification was 
essential in reducing political unrest and public insecurity.12 
Throughout the twenty-eight months of the occupation, the 
Army of Cuban Pacification carried out a program for pre­
venting insurgency. The major phases of pacification were: 
(1) the physical occupation of Cuba's population centers and 
communications network; (2) the use of practice marches 
to intimidate the rural population; (3) the establishment of 
a nationwide network to collect, analyze, and distribute mili­
tary and political intelligence; (4) the preparation of a 
detailed topographic map to aid future counter-guerilla/ban­
dit operations; and (5) active participation in a road-building 
program. In all these activities the Army of Cuban Pacification 
was successful enough to establish the surface tranquillity 
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the Provisional Government required to accomplish its 
political objectives. 
The geographic pattern of the garrisons established by the 
Army of Cuban Pacification provides insight into the military 
aspects of the occupation and the political and economic re­
quirements of American policy. Throughout October, 1906, 
the Marines and the first Army units to arrive were dispatched 
to places where large numbers of rebels and militia were 
being disarmed or where foreign owned sugar centrales were 
endangered. Subsequently some of these units, mostly Marine 
and infantry companies, were transferred. By November, with 
the complete assembly of the American troops, a basic pattern 
for Cuba's physical occupation emerged.13 
The Army of Cuban Pacification was deployed geo­
graphically to occupy the major population centers judged 
to be politically restless, to control Cuba's rail and coastal 
shipping system, and to protect the island's economic wealth, 
particularly the sugar business. The troops' supply require­
ments and the possibility of active field operations also influ­
enced the occupation. Garrisons were placed in twelve of the 
fourteen Cuban cities with populations over ten thousand. 
Of the Army's remaining fifteen posts (of a total of twenty-
seven with an additional Marine company on the Isle of 
Pines) six more were in towns of five thousand or more.14 
Seven posts were established near centrales in Santa Clara 
province. The remaining two posts were at Ciego de Avila 
in Camaguey (site of the Stuart Sugar Company) and at 
Neuvitas, a small Camagueyan port. 
The garrisons also controlled Cuba's transportation system 
by occupying a line that approximately bisected the country 
along its railroad nets, running west to east: Pinar del Rio, 
Guanajay, Guines, Santa Clara, Placetas, Sancti Spiritus, 
Ciego de Avila, Camaguey, Holguin, Santiago de Cuba. The 
Havana area was controlled from Camp Columbia, the Army's 
headquarters and largest garrison. Occupied coastal towns 
were (in addition to Havana and Santiago) Cienfuegos, Ma­
tanzas, Trinidad, Caibarien, Manzanillo, Cardenas, Neuvitas, 
and Baracoa. 
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Another of the multiple factors which influenced the 
physical occupation was the geographical origins of the 
August Revolution. A province-by-province breakdown (by 
troop strength and number of posts) reveals that of the three 
most rebellious provinces (Pinar del Rio, Havana, and Santa 
Clara), Santa Clara represented the Army of Cuban Pacifica­
tion's major provincial investment. There was both a political 
and economic reason for this pattern. In area Santa Clara was 
as large as both Pinar del Rio and Havana, about 8,300 
square miles. The four garrisons in Pinar del Rio and Havana 
(Pinar del Rio, Guanajay, Guines, Camp Columbia) could 
adequately perform their jobs because of the area's good rail­
road net. In Santa Clara, the Army of Cuban Pacification 
high command placed fourteen posts, manned by four Army 
battalions and five companies of Marines. Discounting head­
quarters, artillery, and service troops at the Army headquar­
ters, the number of combat units in Santa Clara equalled 
those in Pinar del Rio and Havana together. A major reason 
for this troop concentration in Santa Clara is that it was the 
territorial base of Jose Miguel Gomez and his most ardent 
Liberal supporters, who were particularly numerous and 
violence-prone in the Cienfuegos area. A politico-economic 
explanation for the large number of posts is obvious upon 
examining the Military Information Division's 1907 map of 
Cuban sugar mills: Santa Clara was the site of the greatest 
concentration of sugar mills, many foreign-owned. As an epi­
logue to the August Revolution, the centrales "Constancia" 
and E. F. Atkins' "Soledad" got a troop of cavalry each. 
The possibility of active operations in Cuba dictated the 
types of units occupying the Cuban posts. The provinces torn 
by rebellion in 1906 were garrisoned by the Army's four cav­
alry squadrons with infantry support. All battalion-squadron 
posts had pack trains. This organization provided for both 
mobile operations and base security. The Army of Cuban 
Pacification headquarters kept a reserve of combined arms 
(infantry, Marines, cavalry, artillery, and support troops) 
concentrated at Camp Columbia near Havana. This force, 
centered in the troubled western provinces, had good railroad 
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and water connections with most of the island's population 
and agricultural centers. 
Before passing from the manner in which the Army of 
Cuban Pacification established its posts, it must be noted that 
however inconspicuous the soldiers were supposed to be, they 
were generally garrisoned inside each city proper (except in 
Havana), often in the old Spanish barracks. 
The Army of Cuban Pacification used practice marches by 
its scattered units to impress the campesinos with the potential 
of American arms. Each garrison commander was ordered to 
keep at least one column constantly on the move about the 
countryside.15 The explicit purpose of the marches was to 
demonstrate "to the lawless that order must be maintained 
and to assure the people that they will be protected from 
robbery and disturbances."16 Acknowledging his comman­
ders' complaints that the burden of the marches on men, 
animals, and equipment was becoming intolerable, General 
Barry, in the spring of 1907, modified the march orders. 
March schedules were reduced to allow more time for gar­
rison duties, marksmanship, and field exercises. The number 
of marches was decreased, but their duration was increased 
up to three weeks. 
When the marches began there was some fear in the United 
States, reflecting widespread misconceptions about climate and 
human physiology, that too rigorous exercise would exhaust 
the soldiers' "store of power," the danger to the white man 
in the tropics. A New York Times editorial gently criticized 
the Army for believing men could become acclimatized, 
warning against "native foods" and too much labor in the 
sun.17 The marches, however, did not bring the Army to 
physical ruin. To dramatize his men's hardiness, General 
Barry ordered two troops of the Eleventh Cavalry to make a 
forced march back to their post from maneuvers near Havana 
in April, 1908. The force, in close order and full equipment, 
rode 110 miles in thirty hours without losing a trooper or 
mount. 
The practice marches continued until the end of the 
occupation. In 1908, the Army made ninety-two marches cov­
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ering 5,300 miles. During October and November, at the 
height of the rainy season, the Army had all its units out on 
two consecutive twenty-one day hikes with all animals, guns, 
and transport. Under the existing weather conditions " . .  . 
the natives believed it impossible to carry on operations," but 
the soldiers negotiated the sticky roads and swollen streams 
. . i  n such a manner as to amaze the populace."18 
The Army of Cuban Pacification had brains as well as feet, 
and it put great emphasis on creating a nationwide intelli­
gence system. Even before the occupation was underway, 
General Bell tried to collect information by asking the Dis­
armament Committee to compile complete rolls of all the 
insurgents to incude names, homes, physical descriptions, and 
types and numbers of arms. This intelligence, Bell stressed, 
"may prove of extreme value."19 Recognizing the importance 
of an effective intelligence program to the pacification of 
Cuba, Bell sent two officers (Major D. D. Gaillard and Cap­
tain John W. Furlong) of the General Staff's Military Informa­
tion Division to Havana. Based at Marianao, Gaillard and 
Furlong were assisted by Captain Dwight E. Aultman, a 
Wood veteran who spoke fluent Spanish and who had visited 
Cuba in early September. These officers were functioning as 
the Army of Cuban Pacification's Military Information 
Division by October 11. 
The Military Information Division organized the country 
into twenty-six intelligence districts, coinciding with the gar­
risons outside Havana.20 With the exception of the numerous 
Santa Clara stations, whose officers reported to a provincial 
supervisor, Major William D. Beach, each district had an 
intelligence officer to collect and forward information to 
Havana. Throughout the occupation, the Military Information 
Division supervised mapping, compiled an extensive file of 
photos and personality sketches, and wrote extensive descrip­
tions of the terrain, towns, and communications system.21 It 
employed Cuban agents and spent liberally (more than $1000 
monthly) for information. Its original allowance, provided 
from the War Department's Emergency Fund (created by 
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Congress in 1899), was $20,000. During the Second Inter­
vention, the Military Information Division provided the Pro­
visional Governor with much of the political intelligence he 
received, and, as his files show, he relied heavily upon its 
analysis of Cuban political developments.22 
Among the methods used to maintain peace in Cuba, the 
Army attached great importance to mapping the island. Gen­
eral Bell regarded the mapping as absolutely essential to the 
pacification operations and began the work in October, 
1906.23 Although the Military Government had started map­
ping Cuba in 1899, it had not finished the task. The Spanish 
maps were inaccurate; only the railroad surveys were depend­
able. Because of such difficulties, General Bell asked for and 
got an additional engineer battalion (the Third) which ar­
rived in February, 1907. The Army's Chief Engineer super­
vised the work (assisted by the Military Information Divi­
sion) and fully employed his men, but more than half the 
mapping was done by line units. Reconnaissance parties (one 
officer, four to seven enlisted men) did the leg work, sketch­
ing all topographic features.24 The sketches were rough and 
emphasized roads, trails, old Spanish fortifications, and land­
marks. The completed map, finished in the spring of 1907, 
was detailed beyond complete belief. The master copy is 
composed of seventy sheets, each sheet 32 by 35 inches. 
Reproduced for field use, the map was distributed to the 
troops in 1908, and corrections were continuously made. If 
even close to accurate, the map would have been an 
invaluable aid in military operations.25 
The reconnaisance parties were seen throughout Cuba and 
the result of their work was publicized to reassure some and 
discourage others. One officer wrote General Bell that the 
map was good, a vast improvement on the Spanish maps. The 
officer admitted the map had errors, but through personal use 
he had found it basically accurate.26 A New York Sun dis­
patch praised the map as crucial in preventing or defeating 
revolts. Refuting claims that Cubans could still go into the 
hills and confound American troops, the Sun retorted: 
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The Americans have mapped the country thoroughly—every hill, 
ravine, swamp, thicket, watercourse and trail. Cuba has no topographical 
secrets for the General Staff; it knows the island better than all the 
practicos, or guides, in existence, and there is no maze an American 
officer with a map in his pocket could not thread, no camp he could 
not find.2? 
Lieutenant Colonel Bullard, in an interview, emphasized 
the map's deterrent value. The Army's exploration of the 
island, he said, had impressed the Cubans and they now real­
ized that the soldiers knew the countryside better than they. 
Bullard concluded that "if the Army can but get past the term 
of pacification without firing one hostile shot, it is prob­
able that we shall thereby have already accomplished the 
conquest of future revolution."28 
The mission of the Second Battalion of Engineers when it 
was assigned to the Cuban expeditionary force was to handle 
map making and, in case of hostilities, provide engineer sup­
port for the Army of Cuban Pacification. At the Provisional 
Governor's request, the engineers became involved in build­
ing roads. General Bell originally sold the road-building pro­
gram to the Chief of Engineers as a military necessity, but 
this argument was secondary to providing jobs for the unem­
ployed during the rainy season and to open markets to Cuban 
farmers.29 The engineers worked on four roads in western 
Pinar del Rio which were to link the towns of Guane and 
Pinar del Rio with the lines of the Western Railway and the 
coast. The Corps of Engineers, not accepting the military 
rationale for these public works projects, withdrew five com­
panies of engineers after the mapping was finished. Never­
theless, by the end of 1908, Army engineers had graded 
ninety-two kilometers of new road and macadamized sixty-
nine, at a cost of $1.6 million. Much of the expense, reported 
the Army of Cuban Pacification's Chief Engineer, Major 
Mason M. Patrick, was due to working in the rainy season 
and the high wages paid native labor.30 The engineers' con­
tribution to the Provisional Government's road-building pro­
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gram, however, represented a fraction of the total effort of 
construction. 
The Army and Cuban Policy 
In reviewing the several phases of the Army's pacification 
program, it is clear that the internal security that the Army 
of Cuban Pacification maintained was essential to American 
goals in Cuba and gave the Army commander and his sub­
ordinates an important voice in the execution of American 
policy. There is no significant evidence that the Army abro­
gated a major political role to itself during the occupation, 
but because its officers, in both the Army of Cuban 
Pacification and the Provisional Government, shared common 
experiences and values, it had a cohesiveness of opinion 
and certainty of judgment that influenced the Provisional 
Governor's political program. 
On the whole, the officers of the United States Army 
serving in Cuba believed that the longer and stronger the 
American influence over Cuban affairs, the better the island's 
chances for peace and prosperity. Reduced to the simplest 
ideological terms, the officers believed that race and tradition 
rendered the Cubans unfit for self-government until they 
learned American ways: individual moral responsibility, pri­
vate enterprise in economic matters, fair play in all private 
and public associations, truthfulness, tolerance for others and 
discipline for one's self, and obedience to the law and to the 
constituted government. In terms of Cuban politics, the offi­
cers, according to Lieutenant Colonel Bullard, were sympa­
thetic to the old Moderates. This attitude was rooted in the 
revulsion the Americans felt toward rebellion of any kind; 
the officers, however, generally refrained from direct 
intervention into local matters.31 
There is evidence of frustration and ambivalence in the 
officers' reaction to the eccentricities of Cuban life. Around 
them they saw poverty, ignorance, sickness, and purposeless­
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ness spawning the disorder they were supposed to prevent. 
Describing a fight between American soldiers and some Rural 
Guards in front of a house of prostitution, one regimental 
commander drew a sharp picture of Cuban life: 
The occurrences in themselves between Rural Guards and soldiers 
have been of little importance and were it not for the attitude of the 
hoodlum and vagrant element who congregate in and around houses 
of ill-fame, cantinas and cafes, always armed with knives and generally 
with revolvers and who are against constituted government in any 
form and who urged on the recruit rural guards by taunts of cowardice 
and vile epithets to engage in combat with American soldiers, the slight 
ill feeling engendered would have promptly died out. . .  . In any 
communities [sic] of the Island if a man stubs his toe or a dog fight 
occurs the majority of the population, men, women and children, espe­
cially the vagrant class, flock to the scene, blocking the way, talking, 
gesticulating and producing veritable pandemonium.32 
More discouraging to the officers than the irresponsibility 
of the poor Cubans and their demagogic leaders was the 
attitude of the well-to-do. Although the Cuban people were 
unfit to manage a stable government, Major Francis J. Kernan 
wrote, "this does not mean that there are not honest and able 
men in Cuba." It did, however, mean that propertied Cubans 
as a class held themselves absolutely aloof from governmental 
service and political parties. They were "as unavailable to 
lend character to the Cuban government as if they dwelt in 
China." Cuba had two alternatives, armed autocracy or Amer­
ican tutelage, Major Kernan concluded, and "we might 
as well count on Cuba as a field for tropical service 
indefinitely."33 
The administration's policy of playing down the Army's 
role in the occupation apparently worried the officers, for such 
a decision deprived them of the authority they had enjoyed 
under General Wood's government, and they believed it hurt 
their status in Cuban eyes. The Army and Navy Journal re­
ported that the officers feared that the Cubans did not believe 
the soldiers would fight to keep order.34 Another observer, 
however, believed that the common people "desired no fur­
ther trouble with the Americans whom they consider 'merci­
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less/ and that war with the American forces would be one of 
extermination and absolutely fatal to Cuba."35 In any case, 
the Army's inclination was to draw out the occupation as long 
as possible, hoping that the "better elements" could be per­
suaded to enter politics; those Cubans now interested in 
politics, Army officers in Havana told junketing Republican 
congressmen, were unfit to manage public affairs.36 Still the 
American goal was only to find honest leaders, insure repub­
lican government, and keep peace so that Cuba might 
prosper. As one colonel put it: 
Every year that passes by brings new prosperity to Cuba. Cuba is 
for the One Hundred Millions Americans [sic] a wonderful, beautiful 
and charming country which lies at its door. She is the sleeping beauty 
waitting [sic] the kiss of love. . .  . It will not be many years before 
Cuba will be the delight, the paradise of the western hemisphere. Once 
the Cubans are rich, prosperous and happy they will forget talking 
conspiracy.37 
Havana's English-language press seized upon the Army's 
malaise to agitate for continued occupation and to threaten 
potential rebels. The newspapers told their readers that the 
Army of Cuban Pacification chafed for action. The Havana 
Post declared that the soldiers ("who have not had the scent 
of blood since a year ago") would welcome a fight; revo­
lution in such an atmosphere was foolhardy.38 The Havana 
Daily Telegraph, mourning the eventual withdrawal of the 
American troops, urged them to stay on, for "revolution is 
racial in Cuba and it will take several generations to bring 
the people to the point where they can govern themselves.39 
The Army's stay in Cuba, including its relations with the 
Cuban people, was more than an experience in alienation and 
disgust. First the soldiers had some physical discomforts to 
surmount. The major inconvenience was the hurricane of 
October 18, 1906. Sweeping out of the Gulf of Mexico (where 
it had already pounded Biloxi and Pensacola), the storm 
devastated the western end of Cuba. For forty-eight hours, 
Havana was a slice of the Inferno—trees ripping from the 
ground, live wires sparking in the sheets of rain, roof tiles 
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winging down flooded streets. Down came Camp Columbia's 
tent city; down came the Havana telephone and power lines; 
and partially down went two transports in the harbor, drown­
ing two hundred Army mounts. For Cuba the hurricane was 
as great an economic disaster as the August Revolution, but 
the Army of Cuban Pacification quickly repitched its shelters, 
restacked its supplies and went on with the occupation. 
By December, 1906, the Army headquarters staff was 
caught in the business-as-usual problems of military adminis­
tration. The Judge-Advocate juggled court-martial percent­
ages to prove that Marines were more unruly than soldiers; 
the Chief Quartermaster worried about the semi-monthly 
supply ship from Newport News and the distribution of 
$200,000 in stationery and blank forms (triplicate). The Chief 
Commissary struggled to find refrigeration for the frozen 
beef sent from the United States (cost: nine cents a pound), 
hoping that the price of Cuban beef would drop. The Medi­
cal Department dealt with periodic yellow fever scares and 
fought the more immediately dangerous typhoid. As a medi­
cal commentary on Cuban-American relations, it should be 
noted that medics treated nearly 10 per cent of the command 
for assorted venereal diseases, which had a higher incidence 
than diarrhea-dysentery. In January, 1907, company venereal 
disease inspections began on a weekly basis.40 Then, having 
interfered with one off-duty diversion, the Army acted further 
to protect the troops' health: 
Respectfully referred to the Commanding General, Army of Cuban 
Pacification, with the information that the views of the Surgeon General 
are concurred in by the Acting Secretary of War, who directs that the 
sale of Coca-Cola by the post exchange be discontinued.41 
At Camp Columbia the occupation had a style rare in the 
other garrisons. There the men were comfortably quartered, 
well fed, given excellent medical attention, and barred from 
many of the Havana fleshpots. The officers could join the 
American Club of Havana as non-dues-paying members and 
officers' families could have hotel accommodations and fares 
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at half-price, courtesy of the Cuban railways. Summer recrea­
tion at Camp Columbia, announced General Barry, included 
polo, boating, and bathing.42 And then there was the great 
Cuban Olympiad of June 29-July 4, 1908. Involving 1,300 
participants and designed to impress the Cuban spectators, 
the Army held games "to develop the resourceful brain, the 
accurate eye, and the spirit of courage." The athletic and 
military competitions, in General Barry's perishable prose, 
were a great success: 
On the green-clad parade, rising high above the blue waters of the 
gulf and swept by breezes, with all the colors of the different arms of 
the service blowing from the brawny breasts of the soldier-athletes, the 
scenes and events of this first Olympiad of Cuba formed a brilliant 
background for its distinguishing spirit of achievement and good will.43 
The Cubans' reactions were not reported. 
In the provinces, occupation duty was hot, monotonous 
and hard.44 In addition to the practice marches, the soldiers 
had to bear the normal garrison instruction, inspections, 
equipment upkeep, and police of buildings. Finding pure 
water was a continuing problem. The rations were dull, as 
usual, and not so good, the Marines griped, as the chow fur­
nished by the Navy. Social contacts in the occupied com­
munity were generally limited to other Americans, hucksters, 
and the skin-traders. An inspecting officer left this description 
of Ciego de Avila, the worst of the battalion posts: 
The town . .  . is the most unattractive station for troops that I have 
yet seen. The streets are dirty and unpaved, and in the whole town there 
are but three buildings with a second story to them, and they are 
small. The hotel is vile and dirty. . . . There are no means of enter­
tainment or diversion. The result of this condition is evidenced among 
the men by the fact that at my inspection, there were fourteen prisoners 
in the guardhouse, many of them on account of over-indulgence in 
liquor.45 
However routine the occupation became for the American 
troops, their presence contributed to the economic welfare 
of the communities which housed them and incidentally con­
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tributed to the island's pacification. The funds spent locally 
by the Army came from two sources, individual pay and 
goods and services purchased by the garrisons. In the twenty-
eight months of the occupation, paymasters counted out some 
$4 million in pay to bored and thirsty soldiers, and it is fair 
to guess that much of this money ended in Cuban hands. 
Secondly, the Provisional Government paid for a host of 
items out of the revenues of the Cuban Treasury: rent for 
quarters and property, maintenance and repairs, water, sew­
age disposal, construction materials and labor, and sanitation 
services. Total disbursements for these items was $850,000. 
When local prices permitted, in addition, the Chief Commis­
sary authorized the purchase of ice, beef, forage, and perish­
able foods by individual posts. The Chief Quartermaster, too, 
spent $4 million during the occupation, much of it in Ha­
vana.46 In fact, James L. Rodgers, Steinhart's successor as 
Consul-General, reported that American spending supported 
the Cuban economy through a world recession in 1907 and 
a glutted sugar market in 1908; Rodgers specifically men­
tioned the local impact of Army funds for spreading the pros­
perity throughout the population.47 Though the expenditures 
of the Army represented only a fraction of the sums spent by 
the Provisional Government to bolster the Cuban economy, 
they made, nonetheless, a substantial contribution to the 
stability the Army was assigned to maintain. 
The Army of Cuban Pacification's influence on American 
policy in Cuba was based on its military responsibilities on 
the island and the attitudes of its officers. Though it remained 
responsive and obedient to civil direction, the Army, by coun­
seling caution and by stressing the political unrest its intelli­
gence officers reported, contributed to the progressive length­
ening of the occupation. The Army's sympathies and rational 
preferences were to expand American control of Cuban affairs. 
Though its political orientation by implication favored the 
alien business class, the Army was not as committed to eco­
nomic imperialism as it was to benign paternalism. It was 
most interested in improving education and public health, in 
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curbing social and political exploitation of the common peo­
ple, and in eliminating violence. 
However favorably disposed it might have been to increas­
ing American influence in Cuba, the Army did not take the 
part of the annexationists. Indeed, its own institutional self-
interest demanded that it halt any political agitation which 
might lead to rebellion. Cuban problems might come and 
go, but the Presidency and the Congress went on forever, 
and another war of pacification on the Philippine model could 
hardly be to the Army's advantage. There was more to this 
consideration than political expediency, for the Army re­
garded the new extracontinental possessions as strategic 
aberrations. There were plenty of big-power competitors to 
worry Army planners and too few forces to squander on more 
unpleasant campaigns in the Indies and Pacific isles. 
The Army's own inherent value system committed it to law 
and order in Cuba just as surely as its belief in disciplined 
democracy made further tutelage attractive. In reading the 
Military Information Division's reports, one cannot help see­
ing that violence and anarchy for whatever purpose (and 
however inconsequential) horrified the American officers. The 
irony of the Cuban situation was that only another general 
insurrection between 1906 and 1909 would have given Roose­
velt the justification to establish a clear-cut protectorate over 
Cuba. The Army of Cuban Pacification, which best recognized 
the long-range benefits that complete American political con­
trol of Cuba could bring the common people, saw to it that 
such a revolt never occurred. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE POLITICS OF THE CUBAN OCCUPATION

T; ESTABLISHMENT of an American army and government in Cuba reopened the whole 
problem of Cuban-American relations. Roosevelt insisted pub­
licly that American intervention had occurred through the 
acts of Cubans, especially the Estrada Palma administration; 
the goal of the intervention was simply to restore representa­
tive government in Cuba, for there had been no basic altera­
tion of the Cuban-American relationship outlined in the Platt 
Amendment. Roosevelt introduced this view of view in his 
open letter to Gonzalo de Quesada, and it was repeated by 
Taft in the proclamation which established the Provisional 
Government on September 29: 
The provisional government . . . will be maintained only long enough 
to restore order and peace and public confidence, and then hold elec­
tions as may be necessary to determine those persons upon whom the 
permanent Government of the Republic should be devolved.1 
Roosevelt spelled out the purpose of the intervention and 
the goal of the occupation in his sixth annual message to 
Congress, December 3, 1906. He took this opportunity to 
reassure Americans that the intervention was not an admin­
istration-inspired act to annex Cuba, nor was it solely to 
protect foreign investments. His discussion of the Cuban situ­
ation ended with a warning to the Cubans that they could 
not indefinitely count on the United States to referee their 
political squabbles without risking permanent occupation. In 
the first objective of his statement, to silence domestic criti­
cism of the intervention, Roosevelt was successful. His good 
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intentions seemed clear enough: the Provisional Government 
would only " . .  . administer the island for a few months" 
until there was enough peace to hold an election and form 
a new Cuban government. His sermon to the Cubans, the 
veiled threat to act "right" or else, left the weaknesses in 
Cuba's political system still unfaced: 
The United States wishes nothing of Cuba except that it shall prosper 
morally and materially, and wishes nothing of the Cubans save that they 
shall be able to preserve order among themselves and therefore to pre­
serve their independence. If the elections become a farce, and if the 
insurrectionary habit becomes confirmed in the Island, it is absolutely 
out of the question that the Island should continue independent; and 
the United States, which has assumed sponsorship before the civilized 
world for Cuba's career as a nation, would again have to intervene and 
to see that the government was managed in such orderly fashion as to 
secure the safety of life and property. 
The path to be trodden by those who exercise self-government is 
always hard, and we should have every charity and patience with the 
Cubans as they tread this difficult path. I have the utmost sympathy 
with, and regard for, them; but I most earnestly adjure them solemnly 
to weigh their responsibilities and to see that when their new govern­
ment is started it shall run smoothly and with freedom from flagrant 
denial of right on the one hand, and from insurrectionary disturbances 
on the other.2 
Privately, Roosevelt weighed the ramification of the new 
intervention, his promise to sponsor a new Cuban govern­
ment, and whether such a course held any real hope for 
Cuban stability. He remained concerned about the possible 
reaction of American voters to any other policy but the an­
nounced one, and he believed that his administration had 
barely escaped major criticism for the intervention itself. His 
attentions in the fall of 1906, too, were on more important 
subjects: the Congressional elections, the gubernatorial race 
in New York, his forthcoming trip to Panama, The Hague 
Conference, the Algeciras negotiations, and tensions with 
Japan. In the moments when he considered the Cuban prob­
lem, he found that he still had lingering doubts about Cuban 
independence. He concluded that one more revolt in Cuba 
would force a more permanent occupation.3 Roosevelt, how­
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ever, would not support a policy of acquisition under the 
circumstances of 1906-7: 
There can be no talk of a protectorate by us. Our business is to estab­
lish peace and order on a satisfactory basis, start the new government 
and then leave the island. . .  . I will not even consider the plan of a 
protectorate. . . . The good faith of the United States is a mighty 
valuable asset and must not be impaired.4 
Both Root and Taft shared Roosevelt's view that the Cuban 
government should be restored. Root, unhappy with the inter­
vention's effect on the new American image he had cultivated 
in Latin America, opposed any acts by the Provisional Gov­
ernment that would antagonize the Cubans or prolong the 
occupation. Taft, more doubtful about the next Cuban gov­
ernment's chances for survival, nonetheless agreed with Roose­
velt and Root that the primary objective of the occupation 
should be to reshape the Cuban electoral process. The com­
ponent parts of this mild electoral reform were to give the 
Cuban municipalities more legal autonomy, establish laws 
which would insure honest elections run by non-partisan of­
ficials, create a civil service system which would protect gov­
ernment employees from dismissal on political grounds, and 
make the Cuban judiciary independent.5 Taft was, never­
theless, skeptical about whether such American grafts on the 
Cuban body politic would flourish long; the Provisional Gov­
ernment faced "a very heavy task," he wrote his brother 
Charles. The situation in Cuba was appalling: 
. .  . the bitterness of political rancor, the absence of patriotism and 
moral courage, the aloofness of the conservative and property holding 
classes, the peeping out of racial and class differences . . . the venality 
and corruption that permeates the municipal and central government 
so far as the legislature is concerned are calculated to make a man who 
seeks to set up self government feel as he is making bricks without 
straw.6 
In Taft's opinion election frauds had caused the Cuban 
revolt. Elihu Root shared this assessment. The Secretary of 
State was in favor of doing no more during the occupation 
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than tightening up the electoral laws and getting the economy 
going. Writing Leonard Wood, Root stressed the limited goal 
of the intervention: to make the minimum constitutional 
changes necessary to insure orderly elections. The problem, 
Root stated, was that the Cuban congress had not passed 
the laws necessary to execute the Constitution of 1901, laws 
which would provide for the peaceful transfer of political 
power through "a reasonably fair sort of election." The 
Cubans, of course, had forced the United States to intervene, 
but Americans must be patient with them. After weighing 
the alternatives, the United States realized that " . .  . the 
only thing to do was to go in and set them up and give them 
another chance."7 
In replying to a letter from James H. Wilson (who again 
advocated free trade as the way to stabilize Cuba), Root 
wrote that he had been trying to arrange a more favorable 
tariff for Cuba. From such a treaty, "I hope to get some ma­
terial advance in the direction of greater freedom of reciprocal 
trade." Root had found Congress stubborn: without annexa­
tion there would be no free trade. Even a new tariff was un­
likely. Root himself believed that annexation was out of the 
question, and unwise: "I think it is much better for Cuba 
to govern herself than it is for us to try to govern her. The 
sooner we can get them going again and get out, the better 
I shall be pleased."8 To a wider audience Root emphasized 
his opposition to annexation. In a speech on January 14, 1907, 
to the National Convention for the Extension of the Foreign 
Commerce of the United States, the Secretary of State denied 
that annexation was the best policy for Cuba: "Never! So 
long as the people of Cuba do not themselves give up the 
effort to govern themselves."9 
The Roosevelt administration stressed the temporary nature 
and the legality of the occupation. The official interpretation 
was that Cuban sovereignty was unimpaired because Article 
III made intervention part of Cuba's constitutional system. 
Root believed the Provisional Government was, therefore, the 
legitimate government of Cuba and should govern in ac­
cordance with Cuban organic law.10 Following Roofs rea­
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soning, the American Journal of International Law concluded 
that "Cuba is in possession of its own government and is not 
occupied by the United States."11 To heighten the illusion, 
Cuba carried on formal diplomatic relations (even with the 
United States) as a sovereign nation during the occupation, 
and the Cuban flag was flown. The administration, by such 
acts, pacified Congress as well as Cuba; in voting a supple­
mental appropriation for the Army of Cuban Pacification, the 
Senate hardly murmured.12 
The Roosevelt administration had no intention of making 
the Provisional Government a political issue in the United 
States, either by antagonizing the Cubans to the point of 
revolt or by encouraging any Congressional debate on the 
temporary administration of the island. The Army of Cuban 
Pacification was crucial to the first problem, and the Provi­
sional Government to both. Roosevelt, with Taft's and Root's 
concurrence, decided to use a civilian governor in Cuba, 
supervised by Taft through the Bureau of Insular Affairs. 
Analyzing Roosevelt's efforts to balance political control of 
the Provisional Government against Cuban sensitivity, the 
Times of London observed that "red tape is to be lavishly used 
in the attempt to bind the wound that Cuban independence 
has suffered."13 Whatever Leonard Wood's virtues (or those 
of any other general), Roosevelt wanted a responsive civilian 
managing Cuban affairs, someone skilled in compromise and 
personal diplomacy, someone knowledgeable in Hispanic law 
and of unquestioned loyalty to the administration's goals, a 
man who understood the relationship of administration in 
Cuba to politics in the United States. Roosevelt's choice, at 
Root's suggestion, was Charles Edward Magoon. 
Magoon and Wood in Cuba 
In the selection of a civil governor, Roosevelt was limited 
by the fact that the United States had no real colonial civil 
service outside of the Army. The only two available candi­
dates with the requisite knowledge and sensitivity to policy 
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were Beckman Winthrop, governor of Puerto Rico, and 
Charles E. Magoon, former governor of the Canal Zone and 
minister to Panama. Taft wanted to send Magoon to the 
Philippines, but Root convinced the President that Magoon 
was the man for Havana. Magoon, a Nebraska lawyer who 
had earned Root's admiration for his researches on the His­
panic codes, had been Law Officer of the Bureau of Insular 
Affairs. His Panama service had proved him to be good at 
pacifying the Corps of Engineers and Latin Americans. Root 
described him to Taft as "large and serene, like some others 
of my acquaintance, of sound judgement, good temper, never 
fears responsibility and perfectly adapted to control excitable 
elements which have to be dealt with."14 
Tactful to the point of pliancy, honest, congenial, unimagi­
native, Charles E. Magoon had been an able administrator 
in Panama though he spoke little Spanish and had not the 
slightest touch of brilliance. His forte was paperwork, com­
promise, and untangling the cobwebs of the law. A bachelor 
of forty-five, physically cut from the same portly pattern as 
Taft, Magoon looked exactly what he was: a prosperous, hard­
working country lawyer. He enjoyed a good table, and his 
favorite exercise was riding in an automobile. He was a "solid 
type." The virtues which made him Roosevelt's man in 
Havana, however, proved to be weaknesses when seen in 
Cuban eyes. That Magoon was not a military man (was not, 
in fact, Leonard Wood), that he was unflamboyant, unin­
spiring, and conciliatory, damaged his effectiveness in Cuba. 
Most of the criticism leveled at him by Cubans stems from 
the policy he was executing, and he has borne the historical 
burden. According to Cuban tradition, he invented botellas 
(soft jobs) and graft, took bribes, favored American busi­
nessmen, and was "a lazy, miserly, good-for-nothing slob."15 
To govern Cuba, where personal appearances were every­
thing, Roosevelt selected a man who was a hopelessly con­
ventional American civilian, and a bureaucrat at that. Magoon 
was all the things Leonard Wood was not. As governor of 
a land populated with military heroes, Magoon was incon­
gruously pacific. By selecting a passive executor of admin­
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istration policy, Roosevelt sacrificed the potential effective­
ness of an American Governor-General surrogate. Much Cuban 
resentment and frustration over the occupation was bound to 
focus on the person of the governor. The chief casualty was 
Magoon's character, but the morale and influence of the Pro­
visional Government must also have diminished with the 
Governor's reputation. Many of Magoon's problems in his 
relations with the Cubans would have been lessened if he 
had worn a uniform and acted as the Cubans thought a ruler 
should. 
From the day of his assumption of office, Magoon left no 
doubt about how he had been ordered to handle the "Cuban 
problem." The Provisional Government had to protect "life, 
property, and individual liberty" (which had been accom­
plished), and then "restore the ordinary agencies and methods 
of government" under the existing laws and general provisions 
of the Cuban Constitution.16 In terms of day-to-day adminis­
tration, Magoon approached his task as an exercise in partisan 
politics. He agreed that it was "necessary to have good laws," 
but the heart of his task was to promote party cohesion in 
Cuba, and patronage was his chief instrument.17 
Roosevelt and Taft saw the problem in the same way; they 
had started the Provisional Government on this path before 
Magoon arrived in Havana. Taft had already promised the 
Liberals that he would see that vacancies in the bureaucracy 
would go to qualified Liberals in order to balance out the 
Moderate domination in the executive departments.18 To 
further pacify the insurgents, Magoon restored Liberal admin­
istration in twenty-two of the thirty-two municipalities where 
the Liberals claimed the Moderates had arbitrarily removed 
their partisans in 1905 and 1906. To aid in the selection of 
Liberal officeholders, Magoon worked with the Liberal Com­
mittee, composed of the leading members of the Revolution­
ary Committee and "heroes" of the August Revolution. The 
Committee (known to the Liberals as the Committee for 
Appointments) was formed to make the Liberals speak with 
one voice on patronage problems. Its original members were 
Pino Guerra, Eduardo Guzman, Ernesto Asbert, Alfredo 
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Zayas, Jose Miguel G6mez, Tomas Recio, Demetrio Castillo 
Duany, Jose de Jesus Monteagudo, Juan Gualberto G6mez, 
and Carlos Garcia Velez.19 
Staffing the executive departments of the Cuban govern­
ment presented a different problem to the United States 
policy-makers, for they wanted close fiscal control and an 
American-oriented administration. The Moderate secretaries 
had resigned with Estrada Palma. Rather than appoint new 
men for such politically sensitive posts, Taft, during his brief 
tenure as provisional governor, made the chief clerks (also 
Moderates) acting secretaries. To insure that the depart­
ments functioned effectively Taft assigned four Army officers 
as advisers to the secretaries of five key departments: Colonel 
Enoch H. Crowder, Departments of State and Justice; Lieu­
tenant Colonel Edwin St. J. Greble, Department of Govern­
ment; Lieutenant Colonel William M. Black, Department of 
Public Works; and Major Jefferson R. Kean, Department of 
Sanitation. 
Although Major Eugene F. Ladd returned to the United 
States after his audit of the Treasury, an American Treasury 
official, J. D. Terrill, served as adviser to the Department of 
Hacienda. Major Herbert J. Slocum was detailed to assist 
the commanding general of the armed forces. Major Frederick 
S. Foltz served as chief of the Provisional Governor's office 
and, later, supervisor of the Havana police. Lieutenant Col­
onel Robert L. Bullard and Captain James A. Ryan became 
Magoon's aides and political agents. Major Francis J. Kernan 
and Captain George W. Read headed the American repre­
sentatives on the Cuban Claims Commission, which settled 
claims arising from the insurrection; they had six American 
officers as assistants, all of whom spoke Spanish. Eight more 
officers went to the Rural Guard as advisers. Four engineers 
went to the Department of Public Works; four Army doctors 
joined the Department of Sanitation, and three officers, the 
Department of Government. By the end of 1908, the Army 
had fifty-eight officers serving with the Provisional Govern­
ment.20 Only the Department of Agriculture, Industry, and 
Commerce remained solely in Cuban hands; even the Depart­
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ment of Public Instruction temporarily went under American 
control in 1908 when Lieutenant Colonel Bullard became act­
ing secretary. As for the role of the officer-advisers, one 
American observed that 
. . . they are de facto secretaries. Of course, to placate the Cubans,— 
and it does seem as we are afraid of them, strange as it may seem,— 
or else diplomacy is the fetish just now,—there must be acting secre­
taries, but they simply sign papers and do what the advisors tell them.21 
Secretary Taft personally selected the department advisers, 
and his criteria for appointment, understandably, was prior 
experience in Cuba or the Philippines in civil government.22 
His chief advisers in the selection process (which began on 
September 27, 1906) were Captain Frank R. McCoy, Leonard 
Wood's trusted aide, and Frank Steinhart, consul-general and 
former chief clerk of the Military Government. Thus it is 
not surprising that most of the officers detailed to the Pro­
visional Government had a striking common denominator: 
they had been effective administrators in Leonard Wood's 
Cuban government.23 Those who were not part of Wood's 
coterie had seen equally extensive service in the Philippines. 
A survey of the officers who played major roles in the Provi­
sional Government indicates the breadth of their experience 
in pacification operations and colonial administration:24 
Colonel Enoch H. Crowder.—Military Secretary and Legal 
Adviser to the Military Governor of the Philippines. Judge 
Advocate General, Department of the Philippines. Associate 
Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines. 1898-1901. 
Lieutenant Colonel Edwin St. John Greble.—Adjutant 
General, Department of Matanzas-Camaguey. Superintendent, 
Department of Charities and Corrections, Cuba, 1899-1902. 
Lieutenant Colonel William M. Black.—Chief Engineer, 
City of Havana. Chief Engineer, Department of Cuba. Super­
visor, Department of Public Works. Cuba, 1899-1902, "Good 
record and has confidence of Cubans." 
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Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bullard.—Service in the 
Philippines in posts from regimental commander to provincial 
governor, 1899-1904. With Wood on Sulu, 1902-3. 
Major Jefferson R. Kean.—Medical Department. Associated 
with Gorgas, Carroll, and Lazear on the Yellow Fever Com­
mission. "Succeeded Greble as superintendent of hospitals 
and charities; excellent man in any kind of duty." Cuba, 
1898-1902. 
Major Herbert J. Slocum.—Adviser, Rural Guard. Cuba, 
1899-1902. 
Major Frederick S. Foltz.—Provost marshal of Havana. 
Chief, Cuban secret service. Captain of the Port of Havana. 
Cuba, 1899-1902. 
Major Francis J. Kernan.—Military government in Cuba, 
1899. Aide to General Arthur MacArthur, Military Governor 
and Commanding General, Department of the Philippines, 
1900-1902. 
Captain George W. Read.—Military government in the 
Philippines, 1900-1902. 
Captain James A. Ryan.—Provost marshal and provost judge 
in the Philippines, 1900-1903. 
Leonard Wood's influence in the Second Intervention was 
present from the start. Steinhart played a crucial role in 
Havana, and McCoy and Ladd were the military advisers 
in the Taft-Bacon Mission. Wood himself wanted to return 
to Cuba; when Roosevelt turned down his request, he was 
comforted by the thought that so many of his old comrades 
had returned to Havana.25 Steinhart, in particular, was to have 
a major influence on Magoon, for he became the Governor's 
principal adviser on Cuban politics. Steinhart, McCoy wrote 
Wood, "has done you credit. He has your administration and 
policy always in his mind's eye."26 
How did the veterans of Wood's regime react to Magoon's 
charitable treatment of the Cuban politicos? They could not 
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help but measure the new policy against the acts of the 
Military Government. Steinhart, called the "Prime Minister" 
by the officers, described his part in Magoon's government 
in a revealing letter to his former general. Steinhart told 
Wood that he was "the Cabinet and considering the balance 
of the Cuban Generals, I think I am well fitted for the posi­
tion—at least they could not have selected a worse Mikado." 
He was running a "general employment agency," Steinhart 
wrote. The Liberals were fighting each other for offices while 
the conservatives and Americans harassed Magoon from the 
sidelines. The former insurgents had noticed the Provisional 
Governor's capacity for leniency and would probably soon 
"go to the woods," not for revolution, "but to make an 
honest dollar stealing without committing murder." The com­
mercial interests were advocating tariff revision, on the 
principle of "to hell with the public," to increase their own 
profits. Assessing Cuban affairs after a year of American occu­
pation, Steinhart could see no constructive outcome to 
Magoon's policy: 
Were I competent to put it [Cuban politics] clearly before you I 
could make a fortune as a riddle solver. The man who can see the 
end ought to be the head of a star gazing brigade and should be able 
to tell the color of the hair on the lady in the moon. . . . "Doctor 
Time" is the one who can help this country . . . the Presidential elec­
tion is as far off now as it was then [January, 1907] . .  . if held now 
[October, 1907] it is nothing less than an international crime.27 
The Army officers in the Provisional Government were not 
in sympathy with Roosevelt's permissive treatment of the 
Liberals or with Magoon's attempt to strengthen the Cuban 
political system by encouraging cohesive parties. Instead, 
they saw their task in pragmatic and humanitarian terms, 
but restricted by politics. They were there "trying to recon­
struct the Republic of Cuba with the back ground [sic] of a 
strong military intervention, made necessary by the existence 
of disturbing elements."28 To accomplish the betterment of 
the Cuban people, the United States, instead of banking on 
the politicos, should establish, as Major Slocum put it, "a 
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superior resident control" because the Cubans now despaired 
of ever managing self-government. Slocum put it bluntly to 
Colonel Hugh L. Scott: 
They [the Cubans] say that their dream, their hope, their sentiment 
for which they and many others fought for, has been accomplished, 
and they have failed beyond doubt. They have had their independence; 
they have demonstrated that they cannot have it without a controlling 
influence in the hands of our government; I entirely agree with it.29 
Lieutenant Colonel Greble, adviser to the Department of 
Government, shared Slocum's views on Cuba's unfitness for 
self-government or partisan politics. He disapproved of 
Magoon's failure to attack Cuba's social ills. American policy, 
he wrote Colonel Scott, "seems to be the idea . .  . to inter­
fere as little as possible with existing conditions."30 In writ­
ing General Wood, Greble questioned the wisdom of the 
occupation's goals: 
. . .  . It seems to me that the whole thing resolves itself into an 
attempt to re-establish a government, the best possible, which will 
protect the foreign interests in this Island, and such policy is being 
pursued. There is no doubt that we can establish a government and 
there is not much doubt in my mind that such government won't last 
very long . . . 31 
Eighteen months later, Greble saw no reason to change 
his opinion that the United States government had taken 
an expedient, but unwise, course by establishing a civil gov­
ernment in Cuba. "I've spent a lot of time in half dreams," 
he wrote Wood, "of the old days in Cuba with you and 
perhaps whole dreams of what would have happened had the 
old crowd been here again." Greble assured Wood that the 
elections would go all right in form, but there would be no 
change in the people's voting habits; they would vote for 
local protection and favors, for the candidate most likely to 
win. The Cubans were still unfit to govern: "There will be 
no trouble while we are here," but a new Cuban government 
"will not last without an active intervention of the U.S. or 
some force strong enough to make the malcontents behave." 32 
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For Major Jefferson R. Kean, M.D., adviser of the Depart­
ment of Sanitation, Magoon's sensitivity to Cuban political 
pressures handicapped the humanitarian work he was doing 
through the public health services. Only Steinhart's influence 
kept Magoon from interfering with the Army's work, Kean 
wrote Wood. He reported that "things are not exactly the 
same as in the other Intervention. It seems to me there is not 
so much zeal, and there is certainly more pessimism and more 
politics. . . . "33 The Provisional Government was too political 
and its favoritism to the Liberals had made Kean revise his 
hopes that the Republic would survive. The "best people" 
were uninterested in politics, and "without some restriction 
of suffrage, I think the future of the Republic is hopeless. 
. . . "
34
 The conduct of the Provisional Government had made 
efficient, just and humane administration so difficult that the 
Army officers' morale was sinking: "The Cubans are probably 
being pacified all right, but I think there may be an uprising 
at any time among the advisors." 35 
In examining American policy in Cuba, Lieutenant Colonel 
Bullard believed it was based on ignorance, "though we do 
it with intentions that would honor angels." The dilemma in 
Cuba was that the Cubans were "a people of monarchial 
habit, tradition, customs . . . and even genius . . . with re­
publican, constitutional ideals and aspirations." The Cubans 
had become addicted to violence, but were still willing to 
bear the oppression of authoritarian government, high taxes, 
and local jefes. America should either provide tutelage or not 
interfere at all, but repeated interventions and the sponsorship 
of the politicos was fruitless. "Time, time will be needed for 
adjustment here." 36 
On the whole subject of Cuban politics, the Army officers 
probably shared the frank analysis of Captain Andrew G. 
Dougherty, an adviser to the Rural Guard: 
I have spent four and a half months in the Province of Santiago 
[Oriente], horseback, living and talking with these people . . . there 
are no two men or group of men in the Province of Santiago, or for 
that matter in all Cuba, who can . . . speak for the "people of San­
tiago" or any considerable part of them.37 
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Whatever their disenchantment with Roosevelt's policy to 
create a viable party system, the officers in the Provisional 
Government did not attempt to appeal their case to political 
pressure groups in the United States or ally themselves with 
the alien-conservatives in Cuba. None of them had the force 
or political stature of Wood or Wilson; the restraints upon 
them in terms of their professional self-image and their 
careers were real and assertive. That they questioned the 
essential wisdom of occupation policy is certain. That they 
obstructed it is less so. Yet the longer the occupation lasted, 
the more complex the political problems became and the 
more intense the pressure upon Magoon, largely from his 
officers and the business elite, to increase American control 
for the purpose of making lasting changes in the island's 
institutions. The officers' influence upon Magoon depended 
largely upon how accurate he believed their assessment of 
conditions in Cuba to be, and he relied on them heavily. In 
retrospect the officers' contempt for politics Cuban-style was 
justified in terms of the political events they witnessed, for the 
act of intervention itself made it more difficult than ever to 
identify party alignments in Cuba. 
The Political Residue of the Intervention, 1906-1907 
As the work of disarming the insurgents and militia 
progressed, as the Claims Commission began to pay for 
damages, and as la zafra put the people to work, Magoon 
tackled the reconstruction of the Cuban political system. 
He found the Liberals ascendant and the Moderates mori­
bund. Each group presented different problems, similar only 
in their complexity, and complex because neither of these 
loose personal alliances was a political party. 
The Liberal party in the first six months of the occupation 
fell completely apart. In September and October, 1906, the 
Liberal leaders were given a facade of solidarity when the 
Revolutionary Committee, which had bargained with Taft, 
was institutionalized as the Liberal Committee. This com­
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mittee was to advise the Governor on the Liberal position 
on controversial issues and suggest candidates for appoint­
ment. Its membership (by agreement of the Liberals them­
selves) reflected the rapid rise in the Liberal ranks of the 
military leaders of the August Revolution: Pino Guerra 
(president), Eduardo Guzman (vice-president), and Ernesto 
Asbert (secretary). Only Enrique Loynaz del Castillo was 
excluded. The committee also included the prerevolt Liberal 
notables, but they were temporarily eclipsed. 
October, 1906, was the Liberals' honeymoon month. For 
two weeks they promenaded, dined, and orated in Havana, 
and capped the celebration with a victory rally at the Payret 
theater on October 15. They considered the insurrection suc­
cessful and their influence with the Provisional Government 
strong.38 They would not have been so jubilant had they 
known that Taft had instructed Magoon that American policy 
was to "neutralize" and "prevent" Liberal efforts to dominate 
the next elections.39 Unaware of this instruction, the Liberals 
pushed Magoon on the question of patronage, telling him 
that Taft had promised them that Liberals would replace all 
the "undesirables" in the administration. They held to their 
argument that they stood for honest government, impartiality 
in the appointment of officials, and free elections. Juan 
Gualberto Gomez reminded Magoon that Cubans would not 
tolerate further injustice: 
. .  . A country never has a revolution without it is necessary. A mob 
or street disturbance is brought about by half a dozen people, but for 
a revolution it is necessary that the whole people participate. . . . 
When the people have been impelled to revolution it is a mistake to 
impede the development of that idea of revolution, because in such 
case what is done is to prepare a second revolution. That is what we 
wish to avoid here.40 
Magoon, however, held firm to his position that no new 
secretaries would be chosen, that only qualified men would 
be appointed to other positions, that the congress would 
remain in recess, and that the Liberals would not control 
Cuban politics. 
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By mid-winter the leading Liberals had fallen out among 
themselves. Part of the power struggle stemmed from the 
popularity of the military chieftains of the August Revolution 
and the conflicting views on the presidential nomination for 
the promised elections. Another factor was traditional per­
sonal and regional rivalries. One more divisive influence was 
the struggle for the patronage which Magoon, in the name 
of fair play and party harmony, had promised to distribute. 
As early as January, 1907, the Liberal Committee was inter­
nally split over patronage control and the presidential nomi­
nation. The leading contenders, Jose Miguel Gomez and 
Alfredo Zayas, were soon trying to line up supporters, and 
the Liberal party dissolved into two shifting factions.41 
The Liberal split complicated what might have been a 
ludicrous issue: the repeal of the laws banning cock-fighting. 
In February, acting on a Zayista tip, the Havana police broke 
up a private pelea de gallos arranged for some American 
officers and arrested Jose Miguel Gomez and Pino Guerra. 
Their arrest sparked a mass rally, organized by Monteagudo, 
in Havana and a mob of fifteen thousand demonstrated in 
front of the national palace for repeal of the ban. Impressed 
by the crowd's reaction, the Miguelistas made repeal a cam­
paign issue, which angered the Havana SPCA and the con­
servatives. Although Magoon believed Wood's law ill-advised, 
he (on Taft's advice) declined to rule on the problem. Pri­
vately he was dumfounded at the furor such an incident 
could create.42 
By the spring of 1907, the Liberals were completely divided 
into Miguelistas and Zayistas on national matters, while 
strong men held local power in the provinces. In anticipation 
of elections to be held in June, two separate slates of candi­
dates were prepared by the factions. The Military Information 
Division gave Gomez the balance in Pinar del Rio and 
Camaguey (thanks to Loynaz del Castillo and Cisneros 
Betancourt). Zayas held the city and province of Havana 
(his home) and Oriente, where he was supported by Juan 
Gualberto G6mez and Castillo Duany. Provincial jefes Gen­
erals Eduardo Guzman and Jose Luis Robau held Santa 
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Clara, once Gomez territory, and were uncommitted. Only 
in Matanzas did the conservatives have a chance; to win 
elections elsewhere they would need the potential alien vote. 
Summarizing the situation, Captain Furlong believed the 
Zayistas more stable than the "military" Liberals, but pictured 
both groups as incurably radical and incapable of honest, 
peaceful government.43 
To encourage a party differing with the Liberals, Magoon 
turned to the wreckage of the Moderate party in an effort to 
salvage a conservative opposition. The Moderates, however, 
were finished as a unified party. The Moderates' immoderate 
behavior in the 1905 elections and during September, 1906, 
ended whatever popular appeal they once had. The Roosevelt 
administration itself administered the coup de grace by pub­
lishing the diplomatic correspondence with Palma, Sleeper, 
and Steinhart and the Taft-Bacon Report; both sets of 
documents clearly put the onus of the intervention on the 
Moderates.44 
Following the establishment of the Provisional Government, 
the Moderate leaders met in Havana and formally dissolved 
their party on November 3. As one Cuban wit observed, the 
Moderates were simply disposing of "a corpse that has been 
unburied for some time and exposed to the sun." At the 
final Moderate meeting, however, General Juan Rius Rivera 
proposed the formation of a new conservative party with a 
far-reaching program. He advocated the redrafting of the 
Constitution to include a six- or eight-year presidential term, 
new procedural rules for the congress, the extension of the 
suffrage to propertied foreigners, and greater central control 
over provincial and municipal government. He also proposed 
the creation of a five thousand man regular army.45 Two 
weeks later Rius Rivera abandoned his attempt for lack of 
support. The American minister reported that the new party 
had been obviously an alliance of sugar planters and cigar-
makers working for a protectorate, and the Cubans had 
realized immediately that it was a facade.46 
Discouraged by the Moderate's failure to regroup, Magoon 
called in a number of conservatives and assured them that 
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the Provisional Government had not capitulated to the 
Liberals. He told them that the Liberals had regained the 
positions denied them by fraud and that if the Moderates 
would select a group like the Liberal Committee, they too 
could have a voice in the patronage. The purpose of Magoon's 
offer was "to see the Moderates reorganized and begin to sit 
up and take notice as otherwise they will continue their 
present agitation that moral peace is as far off as ever."47 
Magon found, however, that the former Moderates could not 
agree among themselves. Their anger at being blamed for 
the intervention and the temporary nature of the occupation 
divided them into three groups. The first favored no dealings 
at all with the Provisional Government. Another was allied 
with the Nunezistas of Havana and was awaiting a Liberal 
split. This group was unified by its hate for Zayas and was 
sympathetic to Jose Miguel Gomez. A third faction, Magoon 
reported, wanted to compel a long intervention by fomenting 
unrest. This faction included many office-holders and was 
agitating among the dissatisfied Negroes.48 
By March, 1907, however, Magoon wrote Taft that the 
ex-Moderates would soon form a new conservative party, 
which had a good chance of success at the polls if plural 
voting, the alien franchise, and proportional representation 
were adopted. Magoon thought the conservatives would 
participate even if only proportional representation was 
enacted.49 
Secretary Taft Visits Havana: Cuban Policy Revised 
Although Roosevelt and Taft had planned to hold Cuban 
elections in June, 1907, the disarray of Cuba's political parties 
forced them to reconsider their timing. In April, 1907, Taft 
visited Havana for four days (April 7-10) and reviewed 
Cuban problems with Maigoon, the Army officers in the Pro­
visional Government, the leaders of the Liberal factions, con­
servatives, and alien businessmen. At that time, Roosevelt 
was still firm that the American intervention should be termi­
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nated as quickly as possible, but he was acutely aware that 
withdrawing too hastily could bring even greater disaster 
than the United States had coped with the previous year.50 
From Washington, British ambassador James Bryce reported 
that the administration believed there was little desire among 
Americans to annex Cuba. Indeed, Bryce observed, Roosevelt 
thought his handling of the Cuban situation had won general 
approval. Repeated, endless intervention, in the administra­
tion's view, was preferable to annexation. The administration 
believed that the difficulties in the Philippines had created 
an underlying public aversion to more colonial experiments, 
while travelers from Cuba said that only the larger planters 
and commercial elite there favored annexation.51 
It was against this background that Taft returned to Cuba. 
During his stay in Havana, he sampled enough conflicting 
opinions to become convinced that the date of the elections 
should be postponed, but also that the promise of elections 
should be reinforced by positive action for their accom­
plishment.52 Taft's decision to recommend postponement was 
based on several factors. First, he found the Liberals, particu­
larly the "military faction/' eager (perhaps too eager) to hold 
elections sometime in 1907. One of the Liberals' fears was 
that if elections were not held shortly there would be a revolt 
which would force an American protectorate. The Liberals 
believed a national census, judged essential by the Provisional 
Government for fair elections, could be carried out in four 
months. Taft, however, thought their fears exaggerated and 
their desire for speedy elections offset by their trust in Ameri­
can policy. The Liberals had "blind confidence in the United 
States" and would take postponement peacefully.53 
The rise of a conservative opposition party under the 
leadership of Rafael Montoro, former minister to Great Britain 
and onetime autonomist, also influenced the decision to ask for 
postponement.54 Taft's goal was not necessarily to favor a 
conservative party (though emotionally he probably did), but 
to give Cuban voters some choice other than the candidates 
of the Miguelistas and Zayistas. Talking with conservatives 
(whom he called "Conservatives," though the party had not 
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yet been formed officially), Taft found them willing to accept 
an indefinite postponement. The Havana bankers, seconded by 
the Chamber of Commerce, stated that they needed at least 
one year's notice of the withdrawal in order to stave off a 
financial collapse.55 
Governor Magoon had believed as early as January that 
the weakness of the political parties made it unwise to hold 
elections until 1908.56 His position on the timing of elections 
was shared by Colonel Crowder, adviser to the Departments 
of State and Justice and president of the Advisory Law Com­
mission. As a result of the Commission's review of the Cuban 
constitutional system, Crowder already had reported to Taft 
that the whole electoral system needed drastic revision and 
that a national census was essential.57 Crowder was no advo­
cate of hasty reform of the law; indeed he recognized that 
Cuba needed its entire criminal and civil codes revised as 
well as its political legislation modified.58 Magoon and Crow­
der, lawyers both, were concerned that the Provisional Gov­
ernment should have enough time to draft new laws, which 
they hoped would lessen the chance of election injustices and 
unrestrained spoils politics. 
For a number of reasons, then, Taft drew up a plan outlining 
the preconditions for American withdrawal. They were (1) the 
drafting and declaration of a new electoral law, (2) the com­
pletion of an accurate census, (3) the holding of municipal 
and provincial elections after a voter registration based on the 
census, and (4) six months later, the holding of national elec­
tions. The elections would be closely supervised by the Pro­
visional Government. The American withdrawal would come 
some three months later when the new president was inaugu­
rated. The Provisional Government, however, would follow 
this loose timetable only if the country remained peaceful.59 
Taft cabled Roosevelt for his decision and the President replied 
simply, "I approve."60 By the time Taft left Havana the under­
standing was that the census would take a year and that the 
first elections would follow in the tiempo muerto of 1908.61 
Taft's Havana visit was a major event in the conduct of the 
occupation, for it reassured the Cubans that the United States 
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fully intended to leave the island in the forseeable future. 
His open letter explaining the election plans to Governor 
Magoon was circulated throughout the island. It was a clear 
pledge of withdrawal, with the proviso that there be no 
violence in Cuba. This proviso, that "the carrying out of this 
plan is of course strictly dependent on the tranquillity of the 
country," may have had a sobering effect on the politicos, 
but it also meant that the annexationists within Cuba were 
offered one last chance to provoke a protectorate and avoid 
a repetition of "the Crime of 1902." In the complex and 
confusing events that troubled the tiempo muerto of 1907, 
Magoon, the officers of the Provisional Government, and the 
Army of Cuban Pacification were to experience their most 
trying moments. 
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C H A P T E R S I X 
THE ANNEXATIONISTS AND MASSO PARRA: 
THE REVOLT THAT NEVER WAS 
D the confused and dangerous days of 'September, 1906, there had been a brief 
annexationist boom in the United States and Cuba. American 
sugar planters and financiers, Spanish businessmen in Cuba, 
the New York press, and some European journals agreed 
that the Cubans had had their independence and forfeited 
it.1 While Roosevelt and Root discouraged the agitators in 
the United States with public statements condemning annexa­
tion, the alien and conservative business groups in Cuba 
clung to the faint hope that American protection would not 
be withdrawn. 
Taft found during his brief tour as Provisional Governor 
that the businessmen of Havana, nearly all annexationists, 
were as troublesome as the politicos. Though the Spanish 
seemed incapable of organizing opposition to the United 
States goals, the American adventurers in Cuba posed a real 
threat to peace. Writing his brother Charles, Taft described 
the American agitators as "the yellow dog type, not business 
men, who are also strongly in favor of annexation and who are 
equal to stirring up trouble just for the purpose of bringing 
about annexation."2 
Charles Magoon quickly learned upon taking over the 
governorship that the "business interests," favoring annexation 
or an American protectorate, were unconvinced that there 
was peace in Cuba. In order to prolong the United States 
occupation, these men (many of them ex-Moderates or non­
party types) were perfectly capable of secretly financing a 
revolt by Cuban dissidents. American citizens were a vocal 
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minority among the agitators, Magoon wrote Taft. Their 
alarms to the contrary, peace prevailed in Cuba, Magoon 
insisted. As for the annexationists, the Governor believed 
that their efforts would be futile; they were, nonetheless, a 
dangerous nuisance: 
Eventually no good will result from such misrepresentation and they 
are playing with fire in their endeavor to keep up public excitement and 
magnify unimportant incidents into important and alarming events.3 
Magoon's lack of sympathy with the annexationists, who 
plagued him daily with plans to establish a permanent pro­
tectorate, soon turned them against the Provisional Govern­
ment. They remained militantly opposed to the restoration 
of a Cuban government. Focusing their ire on the Gover­
nor, they wanted to secure his removal, Magoon thought.4 
Although the Governor was sensitive to criticism, he was no 
paranoid. One Cuban annexationist, Jose de Armas, was 
already in touch with Taft. Believing him sympathetic with 
the Cuban conservatives, Armas implored the Secretary to 
keep Roosevelt from returning the island to the "Cuba Libre 
politicians." The annexationists could not organize a political 
party, Armas said, because such open opposition to Cuban 
independence would only stimulate the nationalists. Only 
Washington could help the annexationist cause.5 
Sugar planter Edward F. Atkins wrote Taft that "a general 
feeling of unrest" prevailed in Cuba because of the high cost 
of living and low sugar prices. He knew Taft was aware that 
the businessmen, storekeepers, merchants, and planters wanted 
the United States to stay on, but Atkins wondered if the Sec­
retary realized that such desires were common among the 
Cubans themselves: 
I find that an almost universal sentiment exists on the part of the 
Cuban country people who have any interest at stake however small, 
that some form of control by the United States is desirable and neces­
sary, and this feeling, I understand, extends to the more industrious of 
the black population, the class opposed to such a course being those 
who seek minor offices and those who seek benefit through any dis­
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turbed conditions, among them large numbers of the irresponsible 
blacks without families or property.6 
Havana was the seat of annexationist agitation and criticism 
of the Provisional Government. Among the Americans there, 
James Runcie, a former Army officer and one-time Wood 
confidant before he embarrassed the general with his annexa­
tionist propaganda, formed the Good Government League. 
The goals of the League were unclear. The American minister 
admitted that Runcie could be simply trying to interest busi­
nessmen in politics, but he thought it more likely that the 
League was a cover for the annexationists.7 The Americans 
were reluctant to sponsor a conservative party because they 
feared that the emergence of such a party would speed the 
withdrawal of American troops. The Army's continued pres­
ence was essential if a protectorate was to be established.8 
The Spaniards, on the other hand, worked to discredit the 
Provisional Government by accusing it of ignoring the advice 
of the Havana financiers and merchants, and all those of 
"pure Latin stock." 9 
If the annexationist spirit or the dissatisfaction it fed upon 
had been limited to the salons and counting houses of Havana, 
Taft and Magoon easily might have coped with it. Troubling 
reports from other parts of the island, however, flowed into 
the Governor's office. After returning from a trip through 
Cuba in December and January (1906-7), the Reverend 
Albion W. Knight, Episcopal Bishop of Cuba, told Magoon 
of conditions and attitudes much like those Atkins reported 
to Taft. The Americans he had seen, Bishop Knight said, 
favored annexation or a protectorate, but stood aloof from 
politics. Bishop Knight characterized the typical American's 
attitude: 
He does not hesitate to express his opinion, but he does not assert 
or inject his activity into the situation. He leaves the matter in the 
hands of the Government and the Cuban people. I do not mean to state 
that it is due altogether to indifference or to delicacy of feeling, but 
more to a well grounded belief that to leave the people of the Island to 
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adjust their own affairs will more quickly bring about annexation or a 
Protectorate.10 
Bishop Knight hastened to add that the Cubans themselves 
wanted peace and independence, in that order. Their greatest 
concern was to avoid the economic catastrophe of another 
revolt. Although they were not sympathetic to annexation, 
they valued the security provided by the American troops. 
From widely scattered Army stations, the Military Informa­
tion Division received reports from its intelligence officers 
that the talk of revolt was more than idle gossip. Caches of 
weapons, used or recently smuggled, were constantly being 
reported, and often linked with foreign property owners.11 
Sometimes the reports proved false or exaggerated, but the 
rumors heightened the sense of insecurity the annexationists 
were cultivating. When Colonel John Van Orsdale of the 
Seventeenth Infantry told the Military Information Division 
that two thousand new English rifles from Jamaica had been 
smuggled into Camaguey, Captain C. I. Crockett looked into 
the matter and found it a hoax. The Englishman who con­
vinced Crockett that the arms had never landed admitted, 
however, that "it is necessary to show the Americans that they 
must remain in Cuba."12 After an investigation in Oriente, 
Captains Charles F. Crain and Andrew G. Dougherty agreed 
with an English hotel owner they interviewed that the plant­
ers in the province would eagerly contribute $50,000 to any 
aspiring rebel. The planters' motive was to fight the United 
States into annexation.13 The Military Information Division 
found substantially the same rationale behind a report by a 
Mr. Barker, merchant of Havana, that nine thousand new 
rifles had been landed at Mariel Bay for Pino Guerra.14 
The false alarms did not obscure a very real need to disarm 
the Cubans. Lieutenant Colonel Bullard, for example, learned 
that General Jose Luis Robau had eight hundred thousand 
cartridges stored in Santa Clara and a large number of rifles. 
He warned the jefe that any uprising would be crushed 
quickly, and promised more public works for the province.15 
Bullard thought Robau's war-talk was simply part of the 
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Miguelistas and Zayistas' strategy to extort extra jobs from 
the Provisional Government. The trouble was that one never 
knew when a fanciful revolt might become real. The Military 
Information Division did what it could to track down weapons, 
and its undercover agents paid seven dollars for a voluntary 
turn-in. The agents also bought arms by posing as revolution­
aries, but the American officers were aware that the arms they 
received were a small percentage of those in Cuban hands. 
Much of the frustration, vindictiveness, and passion which 
the annexationists hoped to exploit dissolved after la zafra 
of 1906-7 began and American troops had occupied the 
trouble spots. As the harvest progressed, Magoon's personal 
agents and the officers of the Military Information Division 
agreed that, despite the alarms, most of Cuba was at work, 
business was good, and violence was limited to banditry and 
factional name-calling.16 
Even during la zafra, however, economic insecurity in Cuba 
troubled the Provisional Government and the tiempo muerto 
promised to be worse. Rumors of revolt jarred the domestic 
price structure and credit system. During February when an 
uprising was feared in Camaguey, campesinos flooded the 
market with cattle, driving beef prices down as much as 30 
per cent. The profit-makers were the cattle buyers, who, not 
incidentally, started the talk.17 
At other levels of competition, as Magoon learned, unrest 
was profitable; some Americans talked rebellion in order to 
discourage German sellers of sugar refining machinery.18 The 
sugar planters themselves faced fires in their ripe cane fields 
from two sources. First, there were professional arsonists who 
threatened the fields and extorted money from the planters 
or sinecures from the local officials.19 Secondly, the cane-
cutters would fire the fields, for, being paid by the weight of 
the cane they cut, they could harvest enough burned cane 
to earn $3.50 to $4.50 a day. Working on the tough green 
stalks, they could earn only $1.50 to $2.00 for the same work.20 
Arson in the cane and tobacco fields caused the tension and 
the number of armed men in the provinces to increase. To 
protect their fields, the planters armed their own excitable 
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retainers or hired gangs provided by the local alcalde.21 
Another predictable reaction to arson came from the Span­
ish financiers who, upon news of violence, cut off the cash 
advances the planters needed to pay their laborers.22 It took 
no genius to guess what the unemployed laborers would then 
do. As for the planters, there always seemed to be someone 
eager to buy their land at depressed "unrest" prices. 
Faced with economic conditions for which they could offer 
only palliatives and fearing the political implications of the 
annexationist movement, Magoon and his advisers also had 
to entertain a group of junketing Republican congressmen in 
March, 1907.23 The attitudes of these visitors illuminates the 
Congressional restraints on Roosevelt's Cuban policy- At the 
head of the delegation was none other than Joseph G. Cannon, 
the powerful and autocratic Speaker of the House. His entou­
rage was the cream of the Republican "regulars": Senator-elect 
Charles Curtis of Kansas; Representatives James S. Sherman 
(N.Y.), chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign 
Committee and chairman of the Committee of Indian Affairs; 
James A. Tawney (Minn.), chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee; Henry C. Loudenslager (N.J.), chairman of the 
Committee on Pensions; J. Van Vechten Olcott (N.Y.); James 
R. Mann (111.); William B. McKinley (111.); and J. Hampton 
Moore (Pa.). 
This group of investigators sailed into Havana aboard a 
German steamer and there saw the ubiquitous gunboat 
"Panther", all of which moved "Uncle Joe" Cannon to worry 
about European influence in the Caribbean and German sea 
power in particular. J. Hampton Moore also noted that thirty-
three vessels of the United States Navy were in port. Ashore, 
where Moore marveled at the children playing baseball under 
the Spanish-language Lydia Pinkham billboards, the delega­
tion was greeted by Magoon, Steinhart, Morgan, Governor 
Nunez, and Mayor Cardenas of Havana. The congressmen 
soon met representatives of the American Club, German Club, 
Spanish Club, the Cuban clubs, the Chamber of Commerce, 
and several "financial institutions." Cannon was not very im­
pressed with the conservative businessmen: "These rich fellows 
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are too cowardly to fight their own battles/'24 The Speaker 
was most unhappy with the way America's Cuban policy was 
working. It was based on "the very sublimity of altruism," 
but American capital (which "induced improvement" wherever 
it went) would not benefit Cuba unless American control was 
increased. Didn't the Cubans realize the Reciprocity Treaty 
was costing the United States $10 million annually, Cannon 
asked? As Moore summarized the Speaker's assessment of 
the Cuban problem: 
We had found the baby on our door-step and the spirit of father­
hood required that we should put it asleep o' nights and provide for 
its maintenance. We were doing something for the baby, but its appe­
tite was enormous and its disposition to cry at unseemly hours was 
characteristic. Indeed, the baby seemed to be getting the best of the 
bargain all the way through, for it was still doing business for itself 
under the protection of its new-found parent.25 
Cannon, according to Moore, told his Havana audience 
that although the American people would not now accept 
involuntary annexation, "it is not unnatural, however, that we 
should look forward to the time when Cuba will become a 
part of the United States, and when the other islands of the 
Caribbean Sea shall be so regarded."26 No doubt the Speaker's 
words heartened the "professional Cubans . . . men of re­
finement and property" whom he addresesd. At the con­
clusion of their visit, the congressmen generally agreed that 
they supported Roosevelt's course in Cuba. If there was one 
more revolt, however, "may not the American people fairly 
insist that the time has come to protect Cuba against her foes, 
within or without, by annexation?"27 As Moore saw the 
Cuban problem: 
. . . Shall we continue to govern her by proxy at our own expense 
and annoyance, or shall we end the trouble once and for all in the way 
the United States may be trusted to end it—firmly, but with justice and 
humanity, and with due regard to the right of Cubans to the pursuit 
of life, liberty and happiness.28 
And back to New York sailed Speaker Cannon and his friends, 
while Magoon and his advisers must have wondered what 
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the visit had done to their efforts to hold the annexationists at 
arms-length and pacify the politicos as the tiempo muerto 
approached. Already, Magoon had word from Santa Clara 
that a drought had caused considerable suffering; food prices 
were going up, and only immediate public works employment 
could head off the growing lawlessness.29 
At this critical time, Secretary of War Taft suggested in a 
speech in St. Louis that "we may not have committed our­
selves to a policy best adapted to the welfare of the Cubans/' 
Taft's speech, published by the conservative Diario de la 
Marina the same day it was delivered, moved Jose de Armas 
to write the Secretary that his words had heartened the 
annexationists.30 Taft might have given Magoon encourage­
ment rather than the annexationists, for at the time of the 
St. Louis speech, the Governor faced banditry in Santa Clara 
and Oriente, a cigar workers' strike in Havana, and a growing 
yellow fever epidemic. The Provisional Government could 
(and did) act decisively in these cases, but the general 
political situation posed a different and potentially more 
serious danger to the peace. 
The split of the Liberal party into Miguelistas and Zayistas 
meant that all over Cuba a reorganization of the personal 
factions was necessary. Local uprisings or the threat of revolt 
were an intrinsic part of this process. In Pinar del Rio, for 
example, Pino Guerra, considered by Magoon to hold the 
balance between Gomez and Zayas, was at odds with the Paez 
brothers, his former supporters.31 To prove their ascendency 
over one another, the two groups were raising funds through 
fraud (e.g., forged horse certificates), blackmail, and extor­
tion. Each faction threatened revolt to demonstrate the 
strength of its popular appeal. The Paez brothers accused 
Guerra of being too co-operative with the government. To 
increase their own following, they encouraged anti-American­
ism with popular ditties: "The little American rooster is 
crowing now but keep quiet, brothers; gather your tobacco, 
and when our work is done he will crow no more."32 
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In Havana and Matanzas, Liberal groups loyal to the "half­
crazy" Loynaz del Castillo had formed paramilitary organiza­
tions called the "Constitutional Militia" in the spring of 1907. 
While their announced purpose was to deter the conserva­
tives from trying to incite violence, the units constituted a 
shadow army available to the highest bidder.33 In Oriente, 
the Miguelistas considered a revolt to impress Gomez with 
their potential voting strength, and at the same time hoped 
the Provisional Government would buy them off with work.34 
Partially screened by the sound and fury of the Miguelista-
Zayista reorganization, another political movement gathered 
strength in the summer of 1907: an all-Negro party. Whether 
such a racially-based party might have developed without 
the American occupation is problematical, but the Negro 
movement began only after the intervention. The organizers' 
motives were mixed, but dissatisfaction with their share of 
Liberal patronage and confidence that the Negroes would be 
fairly treated by the Provisional Government seem to have 
been among the more obvious reasons for the movement's 
rise.35 In March, 1907, the Negro movement started rumors 
among the whites of a race war in Cuba, and the rumors 
persisted throughout the summer.36 Upon closer investigation 
the Military Information Division discovered that the Negro 
movement was not simply another political faction. In various 
provinces under such names as "Union Social," "Gran Coali­
ci6n Social de Occidente," "Antonio Maceo Association," and 
the "Camaguey Directory," the Cuban Negroes attempted to 
institute a broadly based, reform-oriented mass social move­
ment. The Negroes' goals included the reorganization of the 
economy, moral regeneration, the elimination of discrimina­
tion in the courts, free public instruction, and full political 
participation.37 The Negro associations, the basic units in the 
movement, were regionally based; their major figures, Evaristo 
Estenoz and Luis Pena, were former insurgent officers. 
The Negro associations were vigorously opposed by the 
leading Liberals, white and Negro, including Pino Guerra, 
178 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION 
Juan Gualberto Gomez, and Martin Morua Delgado. The 
Liberals' concern is understandable because the Negro move­
ment endangered the Liberal patronage system. The Negroes' 
case against the Liberals was made clear in the Lajas Declara­
tion, signed by twenty-three Negro leaders in Santa Clara: 
If the title of revolutionist will get one public positions, we Negroes 
are revolutionists, too; and if it is necessary to be capable, we Negroes 
have ability also; and just as a white man goes to fill a position with­
out any experience and acquires his knowledge while in that office, the 
colored people can do the same.38 
The Provisional Government's concern with the Negro 
movement was as great as that of the politicos, but it was 
not certain what the Negroes' goals were or how they would 
try to achieve them. The movement, however, could not be 
ignored, and it formed an essential part of the pattern of 
tension that held Cuba in the tiempo muerto of 1907. Strikes, 
unemployment, drought, yellow fever, high prices, rumors of 
revolt, the political factions in flux—all threatened to shatter 
the surface tranquillity. The central question that bound the 
interests of the government, the politicos, and the annexation­
ists was: Would there now be a real, general insurrection? 
The Masso Parra Conspiracy 
On June 22, 1907, the man who would attempt to turn 
Cuban anxiety into a bloody revolt against the Americans 
walked into the Cuban consulate in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 
asked for the news from Havana, and then announced he 
was returning "home."39 His name was Juan Masso Parra 
and his business was insurrection. Son of a Spanish merchant 
in Manzanillo, Masso Parra fought on the insurgent side of 
the revolt against Spain until January 19, 1898. On that day 
he and his entire battalion of 107 men defected to the Span­
ish, and resumed fighting, against the insurgents, as merciless 
guerrillas. Masso Parra later explained his treachery as dis­
gust with the Cuban generals, but he was also paid hand­
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somely to change sides. As a result of his change of allegiance, 
he became one of the most hated men in Cuba; he returned 
Cuban hostility full measure with a notorious book, Masso 
Parra contra Cuba. He often said, his father reported, that 
nothing would please him more than to fight Cubans again.40 
Masso Parra made his headquarters after 1898 on the island 
of Curacao. He boasted that both Colombia and Venezuela 
paid him not to ply his trade within their borders. Twice he 
tried to return to Cuba, but General Wood and Estrada 
Palma refused to let him land. In late July, 1907, inexplicably, 
he was allowed to return to Cuba, where he immediately 
began to behave like an active conspirator.41 
Apparently rebuffed by the Liberal factions, Masso Parra 
turned to individual radicals with no apparent common inter­
est except political conspiracy per se. One was Juan Ducasse, 
the only Negro general linked with the conservatives; he was 
former colono who had lost his land for debts to the Cuban 
Land and Leaf Tobacco Company, a subsidiary of the Ameri­
can Tobacco Company.42 Masso Parra also enlisted Jose 
Lara Miret, white, a Liberal, a veteran, and a former Rural 
Guard officer dismissed for defecting to the Constitutional 
Army in 1906. Since then Lara Miret, a protege of Loynaz del 
Castillo, had been active in organizing the subrosa Consti* 
tutional Militia.43 
During August Masso Parra met with leaders of almost 
every identifiable political group in Cuba. The theme of his 
interviews apparently was that the Cubans should attack the 
Americans and destroy foreign-owned property. Among those 
he approached with this appeal were the Zayistas (who 
defended him in the press), the Miguelistas (who denounced 
him), Evaristo Estenoz of the Negro movement, Spaniards, 
conservative planters, local jefes of every affiliation, and 
foreign businessmen.44 To complicate matters for the Provi­
sional Government, which was trying to sort out the con­
spiracy, the Bureau of Insular Affairs forwarded a bulky file 
implicating Masso Parra with the civil war in the Dominican 
Republic. Magoon, however, was convinced that Cuba was 
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Masso Parra's major interest, and that his conspiracy involved 
the Negro associations of Havana and Pinar del Rio.45 
By mid-September Masso Parra's contacts had narrowed to 
two distinct groups, Spanish and Cuban businessmen and 
representatives of the Negro associations.46 Rumors of an 
anti-American rising grew in western Cuba. The Havana press 
reported fresh plots every day, and several intelligence reports 
linked Masso Parra with the Tobacco Trust.47 The Military 
Information Division alerted Magoon that the plans for a 
revolt were set, arms were cached and that only last-minute 
complications kept violence from beginning in Pinar del Rio. 
The major complication was Pino Guerra, who was persuad­
ing the Cubans involved that a revolt would mean annexa­
tion. Guerra's own interest, Captain Furlong believed, in 
quelling the revolt was to win favor with the government, 
perhaps even to being named commanding general of Cuba's 
armed forces.48 
Magoon's own conviction was that Masso Parra was the 
agent of financial interests fomenting revolt to bring on an­
nexation. Masso Parra himself admitted this much to a secret 
service agent.49 On the basis of the intelligence reports of 
September 22 and 23, Magoon acted to break the conspiracy 
before the rising, supposedly scheduled for September 27, 
could begin. Among his first moves was to cable Frank Stein-
hart, who was in New York negotiating another Cuban loan 
with Speyer and Company. Magoon told Steinhart that revolt 
was imminent, that he must return at once. Steinhart wired 
back: "Coming soon as steam can carry me. Keep stiff upper 
lip. We will lick them sure." In another cable, Steinhart sent 
advice rather than encouragement: "Tell Hill [George S. Hill, 
a Havana financier] name of Steinhart that he is making 
trouble for himself."50 Magoon wired back that some eleventh 
hour negotiations in Havana promised success: 
Have had several interviews with party you name. He is active and 
believed honest efforts counteract movement. Chiefs both parties active 
and energetic. News received this afternoon encouraging. Efforts behalf 
Government producing good results.51 
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The conspiracy itself began to unravel as it became apparent 
in Havana that the Provisional Government was aware of the 
plot, but not panic-stricken. In the towns of Pinar del Rio, San 
Juan y Martinez and Consolation del Sur, the local politicos 
hastily denied complicity and pledged their loyalty to the 
Provisional Government.52 Both the Zayistas and Miguelistas 
were loud in their condemnation of Masso Parra. At the heart 
of their denunciations, the Military Information Division re­
ported, was their fear of a Negro revolution. On the other 
hand, Cuban conservatives, the Spaniards, and the Germans 
hoped a Negro revolt would break out because it would 
force the United States to establish a military government and 
end the "Negro problem" and "the chance of Negro control" 
of an independent Cuba.53 Since these views were widely 
publicized, the Negro associations, the suspected backbone 
of the revolt, must have had some second thoughts. Signs 
of panic among the probable backers of the revolt, the annex­
ationists, appeared in a news release drafted by the Havana 
Merchant's Association and published by the New York 
World. The World article pictured Cuba as on the brink of 
a great antiforeign rebellion caused by Magoon's leniency with 
the Cuban radicals and the reduction of the Army of Cuban 
Pacification to three thousand men. Cuba, the World reported, 
was near chaos, and its credit was ruined.54 
In Havana, Magoon, upon learning that the leaders of the 
plot were assembled for the last time before going off to the 
countryside, ordered their arrest. Under the direction of 
Captain James A. Ryan, the Havana police on the morning of 
September 26 arrested seven men; Masso Parra, Lara Miret, 
and Juan Ducasse were among them. They were charged and 
indicted for conspiring "to burn property of foreigners, ex­
cepting Spaniards" and to revolt.55 In Pinar del Rio a troop 
of the Eleventh Cavalry patrolled the towns the plotters had 
visited and found them tranquil.56 
With the arrest of Masso Parra and his associates, the 
conspiracy collapsed. The comparative ease with which it 
was broken and the improbable violence of Masso Parra's 
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plans gave the whole episode an unreal quality. Magoon was 
undecided whether the Masso Parra affair constituted a 
dangerous threat to peace. In his first report to Taft after the 
arrests, he described the plotters as the agents of persons who 
wished to provoke annexation and discredit the Roosevelt 
administration. Masso Parra's acts had been enigmatic: "the 
pure cussedness of the traditional bad man explains his con­
duct but does not account for money he spent."57 
A week later Magoon wired that all the evidence pointed 
to an alliance-of-convenience between the annexationists and 
some Cuban radicals, that the plot might have been backed by 
Roosevelt's enemies in the United States who had sizable 
business interests in Cuba. On the island itself, Magoon said, 
Masso Parra had no backing except from criminals: "I am 
entirely satisfied that this conspiracy found no favor with the 
inhabitants of Cuba."58 By the time he submitted his annual 
report two months later, Magoon was ready to believe that 
the "attempted conspiracy was brought about solely by the 
instrumentality of Masso Parra, whose life has been devoted 
to rebellion."59 Masso Parra and his fellow plotters, abandoned 
by all but their families, were subsequently sentenced to three 
year prison terms and forgotten. More importantly Magoon 
found himself flooded by expressions of loyalty from the 
politicos and the Cuban press. 
However fantastic in conception and execution, the Masso 
Parra conspiracy was something more than the fanciful postur­
ing of a handful of radicals. The contemporary evidence (and 
subsequent Cuban history) suggests that it was the only 
threat, however small, to Roosevelt's plan to restore the Cuban 
government. Though the plotting ended on September 26, 
the anti-American feelings and unrest on which the conspir­
ators hoped to capitalize did not.60 In Havana, for example, 
although most Cubans viewed the whole affair as an annex­
ationist plot, the secret service agents who revealed the con­
spiracy were called traitors. Captain Furlong also found that 
the radical "Constitutional Militia" was still active after the 
abortive revolt, and arms continued to arrive in Cuba.61 Among 
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the politicos, Zayas and Jose Miguel G6mez took the govern­
ment's part only at the last minute, although both knew of 
the plot. Pina Guerra's help, on the other hand, had been 
crucial to checking revolt in Pinar del Rio. To the surprise 
of the grateful Military Information Division, he did "excellent 
work for the government/'62 
As for the Negro associations, they too continued to grow, 
and were organized in the same year as the Independent 
Party of Color. For the next five years (1907-12), this third 
party tried to arrange patronage for the Negroes by promising 
block votes to whomever offered the most favors. The party 
was outlawed by a 1910 bill prohibiting racially based parties. 
In 1912, in an effort to continue in office, Jose Miguel G6mez 
planned a "little" revolt with Evaristo Estenoz, but the affair 
flamed into a full race war in which three thousand 
Negroes were finally killed by the Cuban Army before the 
fighting ended.63 
The basic human material for a revolt was present in 1907, 
as in 1906, and the annexationists were convinced, after Taft's 
April visit, that 1907 might be the last time Cuban tranquillity 
could be sufficiently disturbed to prolong the American occu­
pation. Clearly they had sufficient motive to stir up at least 
the illusion of rebellion. The statements made by Roosevelt, 
Taft, and Cannon suggested that the administration was still 
not thoroughly convinced that Cuba was ready for self-
government. All business and political logic demanded con­
tinued American occupation. Even if the rebellion threatened 
their properties, the business elite was willing to gamble 
that the Army of Cuban Pacification could smash the rebels 
quickly. At least active fighting might persuade Washington 
to replace Magoon with a general and a military government. 
This change might have both increased the revolt (and the 
chances for annexation) and destroyed the government's 
liaison with the Cuban radicals. Even after 1907, the American 
annexationists continued to protest the anticolonial trend 
in the United States foreign policy, and they were men with 
a cause: 
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While the other nations of the earth have fought tooth and nail to 
add to their domains, in all lands and in all ages territory being con­
sidered a most desirable possession, we Americans lie awake night pain­
fully planning how to rid ourselves of the additions to our greatness, 
resulting from our prowess or from Providential causes. 
Is it not time for us to abandon this childish shrinking from mixing 
in the world with other grown up nations? 
What would Travis and Crockett and Houston, the men who wrung 
the huge State of Texas from the Mexicans, and added it to the Union, 
think of the timid, not to say cowardly, conduct of their descendants 
who pulled down the flag of the United States in Honolulu and in 
Cuba, and would pull it down in the Philippines.64 
In the balance, the Masso Parra conspiracy appears to have 
been exactly what the Provisional Government first suspected 
it was: an alien-conservative attempt to provoke annexation 
by encouraging Liberal dissidents and the Negro associ­
ations to revolt. The Military Information Division, whatever 
Magoon's disclaimers, remained convinced that Masso Parra 
was financed by Spaniards who desired some sort of perma­
nent intervention, if not American, then British, French, or 
German. The Spanish wanted a strong government which 
would provide absolute security for their property interests, 
"not one like the United States, which plays to the common 
people and makes their [the businessmen's] interests secondary 
to politics in the United States."65 Masso Parra, aware of 
the conservatives' wishes, "considered a movement that ap­
peared to be war against the Americans, a means to the 
ends desired."66 
The plan failed for several reasons. First, the Miguelistas 
and Zayistas believed they could turn their support of Magoon 
into more government patronage and halt a challenge to their 
political hegemony at the same time. Both factions feared 
that a revolt would endanger the plans to restore the Cuban 
government, although such a realization was made only 
after each faction decided it could not pin the onus of the 
conspiracy on the other. In addition, the Provisional Govern­
ment, through its public works projects and the Army's prac­
tice marches, made clear to the Cuban people that rebellion 
was unnecessary to get work and unhealthy at best: "As long 
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as they have work and money to support their families they 
will be peaceable, and the politicians will find it difficult to 
stir them up. This is one reason why some politicians are 
antagonistic to public works."67 Within the conspiracy, the 
plotters and their financial backers failed to make the revolt 
credible in their anxiety to create the illusion of a great anti-
American rising. Masso Parra may have worried Magoon, but 
he did not really shake the Army's grip on the situation. 
Ironically, the conspiracy's failure may have given impetus 
to Cuba's Conservative party and the presidential candidacy 
of Mario G. Menocal, sugarman, peacemaker, and respected 
general of the Army of Liberation. Menocal was solidly backed 
by the same people interested in annexation: dissident "Lib­
erals, Conservatives, Spaniards, Americans, and all other com­
mercial and producing classes of the island."68 With the alter­
native of annexation denied them, the conservatives turned 
to party politics. The Provisional Government, by pinching 
off the Masso Parra conspiracy in 1907, destroyed the last, 
desperate attempt to join Cuba to the United States and 
helped create the organized conservative opposition party 
which American policy needed. 
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CHAPTER SEVE N 
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 
AND CUBAN STABILITY 
WiPHEN Charles E. Magoon replaced Taft as Provisional Governor in October, 1906, the 
general guidelines for his administration had been well estab­
lished by the Secretary of War. In his proclamation of 
September 29, Taft assured the "people of Cuba" that the 
Provisional Government, though temporary and under the 
authority of the United States, would be "a Cuban Govern­
ment conforming . .  . to the Constitution. All the executive 
departments and the provincial and municipal governments, 
including that of the City of Havana, will continue to be 
administered as under the Cuban Republic." The courts would 
function normally and the laws remain in effect. As soon 
as peace and stability returned (which presumably meant 
when violence was reduced to non-political proportions) and 
a representative Cuban government elected, the Americans 
would withdraw.1 
However "Cuban" the Provisional Government was supposed 
to be, it was, at the level of administrative policy-making, 
distinctly American-conservative. It was not a businessmen's 
government in the sense that the requirements of the large 
sugar and tobacco planters and the banking and commercial 
institutions in Cuba received highest priority. Rather it was 
a government of lawyers, judges, bureaucrats, and soldiers 
ruling, largely, by balancing what they conceived to be in 
the national interest of Cuba with the demands of American 
foreign policy. Between these two there was a division caused, 
on the one hand, by Cuba's need for revolutionary changes 
in its economic and social structure and, on the other, by the 
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short-term needs of Roosevelt's Caribbean policy. Magoon, 
despite his power to rule by decree, was caught between his 
allegiance to Washington and his ambiguous instructions to 
govern in Cuba's interest. In two different ways he was 
restrained from working meaningful reforms in Cuba: his 
decrees had to be cleared with Taft as consistent with 
American policy and had to be compatible with his own 
assumptions about the proper role of government per se. 
These restraints limited his activities within Cuba. 
At the same time, Magoon had to contend with demands 
for "more" government from two intrinsically hostile groups, 
the American officers on his staff and the Cuban politicos. 
These two groups were not as concerned with the short-range 
aims of Roosevelt's Cuban policy as they were with conditions 
in Cuba itself. Naturally, their own prescriptions for Cuba's 
ills differed widely in both means and ends, but in their own 
way the officers and the politicos spoke for Cuba rather than 
the United States. While the politicos were to a large degree 
excluded from the highest administrative decision-making elite, 
the American officers dominated the day to day activities of 
the Provisional Government. 
The influence of the United States Army in the Provisional 
Government grew during the occupation. American officers 
became increasingly important in politically sensitive posts, 
not only in national government, but in provisional and 
municipal government as well. From Magoon's viewpoint, the 
Army men offered unquestionable advantages over the Cubans: 
they were quick to act, incorruptible, trained in effective 
administration and loyal. Whether he realized their basic lack 
of sympathy with Roosevelt's Cuban policy is uncertain. 
In addition to staffing the executive departments, the 
Rural Guard and the Governor's office, Army officers held 
other important posts. Colonel Black, Colonel Greble, and 
Major Kean, for example, composed an ad hoc Board of 
Municipal Aid, which passed on most municipal expenditures.2 
In the Department of Justice, Captain T. B. Steele headed 
the politically powerful Bureau of Pardons. Three other offi­
cers in the Department of Government handled the admin­
192 THE P O L I T I C S OF I N T E R V E N T I O N 
istration of Cuba's correctional school, insane asylum, and 
charity hospital.3 In April, 1908, when the terms of the pro­
vincial governors and councilmen expired, Magoon appointed 
six officers (either Rural Guard advisers or supervisors from 
the Military Information Division) to serve as governors 
through the next elections.4 Since these officers did not relin­
quish their military duties, they were in a strong position to 
insure peaceful elections. 
Magoon strengthened the executive branch with five dis­
tinctly political appointments in 1907. The Liberal Justo 
Garcia Velez became Secretary of State; his brother Carlos 
was named Inspector of Prisons. The conservative Judge 
Manuel Landa joined Crowder in the Department of Justice. 
Demetrio Castillo Duany, a Liberal leader, was appointed 
chief of the National Penitentiary, and Colonel Charles 
Hernandez, a popular veteran, became Director of Posts and 
Telegraphs. All five men had reputations for effective public 
service under Wood; Judge Landa, former Chief Justice of 
the Audiencia of Havana, was a close friend and frequent 
correspondent of Wood's.5 
In terms of domestic reform, Magoon's understanding of 
Cuba's problems was more comprehensive than his instruc­
tions from Roosevelt to re-establish a new government. After 
successfully completing the first order of business, "to allay 
or turn into proper channels the political strife which had 
divided the inhabitants into two hostile camps . . . ," Magoon 
examined and listed for Taft and Roosevelt the problems that 
had to be dealt with if Cuba was to be truly stable. It is 
unclear if the list was prepared in descending order of priority. 
Its comprehensiveness, however, indicates that the Provisional 
Governor was aware of the magnitude of the task facing any 
Cuban government:6 
1. public health 
2. employment during the tiempo muerto 
3. lack of roads and harbor facilities 
4. the high cost of transportation 
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5.	 the high cost of the necessities of 
life: food, clothing, shelter 
6.	 the small margin of profit on sugar 
and tobacco 
7.	 high interest rates 
8.	 low wages for labor 
9.	 extortion of wage earners by lenders 
10.	 unjust restrictions upon commerce and 
shipping imposed by customs regulations 
11.	 the need for a banking law to protect 
savers 
12.	 the need for a national currency 
In his annual report for 1908, Magoon made clear that 
Cuba would remain unstable until some revolutionary changes 
were made in its national life. Although he did not pre­
sume to tell Roosevelt that the United States was responsible 
for effecting these changes, Magoon clearly described the 
enormity of the needed changes: 
1. To induce the floating population to select a permanent abiding 
place, build habitations and make it their home. 
2. To develop and expand industries so that a larger proportion of the 
inhabitants may secure employment and incomes for twelve months in 
the year.7 
Colonel Enoch H. Crowder, the senior and most influential 
of Magoon's officer-advisers, went further than the Governor 
in committing the Provisional Government to the cause of 
national reconstruction. In a letter to General J. Franklin Bell, 
he pointed out that the Cuban episode was but another in a 
long line of Army nation-saving experiences. The work was 
"closely allied" to that of Wood's government and "substan­
tially identical" to the Army's postwar duties in Mexico and 
the South. It was as demanding as the tasks facing admin­
istrations in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The effective 
fulfilment of the Provisional Government's domestic program 
had great significance for both the United States and Cuba: 
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"Upon the success with which we build depends, in my 
judgement, the avoidance of a more serious military problem 
than we have yet encountered in Cuba."8 
The restraints upon the Provisional Government in its 
programs were several. While Magoon had ample legal power, 
he was mindful that Cuban disapproval of his government 
could endanger the peace and American policy. The expecta­
tion of the Roosevelt administration was that Magoon respect 
the Cuban Constitution and organic law while making accept­
able (to both the United States and Cuba) reforms within it. 
He had to govern efficiently within his revenues and stabilize 
the Cuban electoral system and the political parties. At the 
same time Magoon had to adjudicate several important legal 
disputes between the Cuban government and some American 
contractors and the Catholic church. To put the nation's credit 
on a firm basis, all claims against the government arising from 
the August Revolution had to be settled and political pris­
oners released. In addition, the yellow fever problem needed 
more attention. These issues, however tangential to the basic 
problems of Cuban political and economic development, 
absorbed much of the Provisional Government's energies.9 
Magoon found that administration in the colonial style kept 
him rooted to his desk in the national palace. His routine 
work load was immense. He had to give the final approval 
of the appointments for all political, judicial, and bureaucratic 
personnel, including municipal judges, notaries, court clerks, 
professors and teachers, and the cleanup crew of the con­
gressional offices. He authorized all expenditures, franchises, 
concessions, pardons and amnesties, and approved petitions 
for private relief. He reviewed and ruled on all judicial deci­
sions appealed through the national court system. In his first 
year in office he published over a thousand decrees.10 
The Cuban Treasury, a major American concern, weathered 
the August Revolution and a series of post-intervention eco­
nomic setbacks.11 An ambitious public works program voted 
by the Cuban Congress in 1906 and the August Revolution 
turned Estrada Palma's treasury surplus into an estimated 
deficit of $4 million. When the government's obligations were 
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balanced against the cash surplus of $13.5 million, it looked 
as if the government would end fiscal 1907 in the red.12 In 
his October, 1906, report to Magoon, Major Eugene F. Ladd 
estimated that if Magoon paid for the revolt and carried out 
the programmed Cuban budget, the government would spend 
$31 million and receive $26.8 million. (By comparison, Estrada 
Palma's government had spent $26 million in fiscal 1906.) By 
July, 1907, however, the economy had revived enough to 
bring revenues to $41.2 million of which the Provisional Gov­
ernment spent $39.6 million.13 In the following year, an eco­
nomic decline caused by a weak harvest and the Panic of 
1907 reduced Magoon's revenues to $34 million, but he 
increased the government's expenditures to $44.5 million.14 
Although Magoon budgeted only $23.3 million for fiscal 1908, 
he found it necessary to offset a general economic decline 
with increased government spending. 
The cost of pacifying Cuba came high, and subsequent 
Cuban presidents made expenditures under the same economic 
logic, though not as reluctantly as Magoon. Government spend­
ing in times of low sugar prices was the easiest alternative to 
economic collapse or public violence. When Magoon relin­
quished the Treasury in 1909, he turned over a cash surplus 
of only $2.8 million and obligations for fiscal 1909 totaling 
between $6 and $8 million.15 While many of the Provisional 
Government's expenses were determined for it by Taft (e.g., 
claims settlement, census) and Root (e.g., yellow fever eradi­
cation) and thus open to question, the bulk of the costs 
of the occupation came from providing much-needed ser­
vices and employment which, whatever Magoon's motives, 
were necessary for good health, education, economic growth, 
justice and order. 
The August Revolution itself created an immediate financial 
strain on the Cuban Treasury, which Magoon could not 
correct simply by canceling public works projects. The estab­
lishment of an American-controlled government set off a 
wave of claims for damages and expenses caused by the 
revolt. The claimants' expectations that the Americans would 
settle quickly were realized. While the settlements did not 
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come close to the amounts claimed, the total cost of the 
revolt ($8.6 million) and the amount granted for private 
claims ($1.3 million) was an added burden to the Treasury. 
The claims were adjudicated by two commissions, both con­
trolled by American officers. The first, the Cuban Claims Com­
mission, which settled private claims against the government, 
was headed successively by Major Francis J. Kernan and 
Captain George W. Read. Two of the three board members 
were always Army officers. Another commission, headed by 
Captain Charles F. Crain and dominated (4-3) by Americans, 
investigated and settled expenses and contracts incurred by 
Estrada Palma in fighting the rebellion. 
The Provisional Government was conservative in awarding 
settlements. Aliens, who asked $436,000, received $179,000 in 
damages. Claims for lost horses brought $296,508 to their 
owners, who wanted $653,000. Miscellaneous claims for dam­
ages totaling more than $1 million were settled for $441,000. 
The costs of mobilization to the Cuban government depleted 
the Treasury far worse than did private claims: for guns and 
ammunition, $777,000; for horses, $416,788; for pay for, and 
upkeep of, the men added to the armed forces, $3.2 million.16 
The comparison of damages to mobilization costs amply 
demonstrates an integral part of the Liberal strategy: bank­
rupt the Cuban Treasury (a sure way to get an American 
response) without hurting too much private property. Taft 
and Magoon were sure that the financial drain of the revolt 
on the Treasury would discourage the Cubans from rebelling 
again; more probably it was an incentive for the American 
government to prevent another intervention of the 1906 type. 
Legal Reforms and the Advisory Law Commission 
The Provisional Government gave highest priority to a 
limited revision of Cuba's constitutional system. The goal of 
this reform, which was to be accomplished through the adop­
tion of new laws, was to insure peaceful elections, representa­
tive government at all levels, and an honest, secure judiciary 
and civil service. 
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During the September, 1906, truce negotiations, Taft, the 
Liberals, and the Moderates agreed generally that four new 
laws were essential if the political parties and government 
were to function.17 As passed on by Taft to the Provisional 
Government, the suggested reforms were to establish the 
municipal governments on a more autonomous footing, provide 
for elections supervised by non-partisan boards, protect minor­
ity representation in government, reorganize and free the judi­
ciary from presidential control, and create an efficient civil 
service based on the merit system.18 To study, draft and 
recommend the new laws, Magoon, on December 24, 1906, 
created the Advisory Law Commission.19 The Cuban member­
ship of the Advisory Law Commission was politically balanced 
(five Liberals, four conservatives) in order to give the three 
American members real control of this rump legislature.20 
These Americans were Colonel Enoch H. Crowder, Otto 
Schoenrich (a judge from Puerto Rico on Magoon's staff), 
and Major Blanton C. Winship, Judge Advocate General of 
the Army of Cuban Pacification. 
The working procedures of the Advisory Law Commission 
were designed to make the new laws as palatable in Cuba 
as possible, but not at the expense of American control. The 
Commission divided into subcommittees (electoral law, judi­
ciary law, municipal law, civil service law) where the basic 
research and drafting were accomplished. The subcommittee 
membership worked to give the American and conservative 
members the voting advantage. A finished law went to Magoon 
for consideration by the majority vote of the full Commission. 
Magoon then published the recommended draft for public 
comment, and revisions were considered before the final draft 
became a decree.21 While the procedural details worked to 
the conservatives' advantage, the Advisory Law Commission 
worked under the basic assumption that it could only modify 
the law within the provisions of the Constitution of 1901.22 
This restriction, repeatedly invoked by the Liberals and grudg­
ingly accepted by the Americans, placed very real limits on 
the kinds of reforms the Advisory Law Commission could 
accomplish. The Commission described its work in constitu­
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tional terms as "democratic" and "decentralizing," but in reality 
the laws it passed did not significantly alter the President's 
powers and, in some places, increased those of the national 
government.23 
The work of the Advisory Law Commission, while it satisfied 
Magoon and Taft and did not arouse the politicos, did not 
meet Colonel Crowder's standards for meaningful reform. In 
his first report for the Department of Justice, Crowder recom­
mended that the legal reforms be truly revolutionary, that 
they reach into all phases of Cuban life.24 Crowder recognized 
that the Provisional Government was following a "conservative 
policy of revision" because it did not have the mandate to do 
more. Simply to rectify the political laws was a challenge, for 
they were an incongruous maze of Spanish colonial codes, 
Wood's decrees, acts of the Cuban congress, and decrees by 
Estrada Palma and Magoon. Within this system the minimum 
change, Crowder felt, should be to curb the President's powers. 
He argued, however, that it would be necessary to go far 
beyond revision of the political and administrative laws to 
bring Cuba's "monarchical" system into harmony with the 
ideals of the Constitution. To truly free the Cubans from 
authoritarian habit patterns, changes should be made in the 
civil codes, penal codes, criminal procedural codes, and civil 
procedural codes.25 Crowder wrote: 
The legislative action above recommended is first in importance 
among the reconstructive measures which confront the Provisional Gov­
ernment and the work involved is one of great magnitude. . . . Under­
taken and conducted in Cuba under most favorable circumstances, this 
work, in which the beginning has hardly been made, would protract 
itself over a period of several years. The Republic should, I think, be 
re-established under adequate guarantees [italics added] that this work, 
so essential to the maintenance of orderly and stable government, shall 
be prosecuted to as speedy a conclusion as possible.26 
While Magoon agreed with Crowder that the sweeping 
changes the Colonel advocated were essential if Cuba was 
to progress, he did not recommend that the United States 
assume any more responsibility than it already had for 
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Cuban reforms. Rather, he adhered to the more conserva­
tive Root-Taft position, that some minimal separation and 
balancing of powers under the Cuban Constitution was about 
all the reform the Provisional Government should undertake.27 
Magoon lauded Crowder personally, but he did not support 
the Colonel's specific proposals for more radical legal reforms 
than the four laws to be drafted by the Advisory Law Com­
mission or for post-restoration legislative guarantees.28 The 
best explanation for Magoon's ambivalent position is that he 
was perfectly aware that Taft would not accept the diplo­
matic implications of Crowder's reforms. In fact, the Advisory 
Law Commission did draft the proposed reform codes and 
then passed them on to the Cuban congress in 1909, but they 
did not become law. 
In the two years of its existence, the Advisory Law Com­
mission drafted the four laws considered essential to the 
restoration of the Cuban government, wrote another regulariz­
ing the organization of the executive departments, and drafted 
other measures of secondary importance.29 All were duly put 
into effect by decrees of the Provisional Governor. All the 
laws were acceptable compromises, some were well-thought 
out, but after the American withdrawal none worked as they 
were designed. 
The electoral code, so devilishly complex that it took the 
politicos several months to subvert it, featured permanent, 
mandatory registration of all Cuban citizens, non-partisan 
election boards at the three political levels, and proportional 
representation in electing congressmen and provincial and 
municipal councilors. Despite conservative efforts, no changes 
in the franchise were adopted. The electoral machinery, while 
it was organized in detail so as to be uniform and honest, 
depended on the impartiality of those conducting the elec­
tions. The code clearly was designed on the assumption that 
stable, coherent political parties would dominate Cuban poli­
tics : there were detailed requirements for nominating petitions 
and conventions, for party representation on electoral boards, 
and for minority representation. 
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The two major aspects of the municipal and provincial laws 
were that the provincial and local governments were given 
more theoretical independence and less freedom to spend. 
They could budget without Treasury approval, but could not 
spend more than a fixed percentage of their income on per­
sonnel or exceed a limited bonded indebtedness. In a munic­
ipal tax law, the local tax base was made compatible with 
the national one, but was not radically changed. Irene Wright 
observed that the only thing the Liberals and conservatives 
could agree on was that they did not want tax reform.30 
The code also more or less nationalized Havana by giv­
ing the national government control of the city's police and 
sanitation services. 
The judiciary and civil service laws protected judges and 
bureaucrats from arbitrary removal, fixed their salaries and 
reorganized the courts and the civil service system. Both 
laws were widely discussed in Cuba because they confirmed 
the current officeholders in their posts. Both were modeled 
in their personnel provisions after similar statutes then in 
force in the United States. 
The Advisory Law Commission did succeed in its assigned 
task: making statutory modifications that would enable the 
United States to restore a representative Cuban government. 
The Commission drafted and Magoon decreed a legal, sys­
tematic basis for the peaceful transfer of political power. 
Nonetheless, legal reforms, however well-intentioned, politi­
cally acceptable and brilliantly wrought, were no more than 
palliatives. They were the Roosevelt administration's timid 
solutions to fundamental economic and political problems 
in Cuba. 
Colonel Crowder pointed out the implications of such 
limited solutions. He emphasized that even to bring Cuba 
to the point where its legal system matched its Constitution, 
the Provisional Government would have to sponsor much 
more radical reform than Roosevelt and Taft were ready to 
approve. Crowder identified the Cuban dilemma: it could 
not be anything but an authoritarian or chaotic state until 
 201 The Provisional Government and Cuban Stability
some radical changes were made in more than just its form 
of government.31 
The Economics of Cuban Stability 
The economic situation Magoon inherited in October, 1906, 
was not promising. Though the Cuban economy recovered 
from the credit scare and hurricane of that fall, its vulner­
ability was a continuing problem for the Provisional Govern­
ment. The United States concern was not simply to protect 
foreign property; Roosevelt believed that unless these interests 
were protected, the entire Cuban economy would crumble. 
Happily, the tobacco and sugar crops of 1906-7 proved profit­
able; agricultural and mining production picked up; and 
the financial situation was momentarily stabilized.32 The Panic 
of 1907, which began a world-wide liquidation of credit, 
rocked the economy, but Magoon successfully counteracted 
the scarcity of funds by depositing $5 million from the Treas­
ury in private banks. These funds gave the planters the oper­
ating capital they needed to meet their harvesting expenses.33 
Nevertheless, national income in 1908 was not as high as in 
1907. By la zafra of 1908, however, economic indicators 
showed that a recovery was well advanced. 
The Provisional Governor was aware of the basic instability 
in the Cuban economy, its political implications, and the 
poison it produced in Cuban-American relations. As he said 
in his annual report for 1908, "the industrial situation in 
Cuba is the same as it would be in a manufacturing com­
munity in the United States, where, each year, the mills were 
run to their full capacity, night and day, for six months and 
then closed down for six months."34 In a long letter to 
Roosevelt in 1908, Magoon emphasized that political unrest 
was directly related to the harvesting cycle. Only government 
spending on public works could offset unemployment. Both 
employment and the government's revenues were tied inex­
tricably to the world sugar price, which meant that public 
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works, essential both to internal peace and Cuba's develop­
ment, would have to be financed by long-term loans to the 
Cuban government. Magoon believed that although the gov­
ernment's bonded indebtedness was then $50.6 million, another 
loan of $20-$25 million was mandatory.35 
Early in the occupation, Magoon, at the urging of the 
Cuban Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Navigation, 
investigated the possibility of another, more liberal, reciprocity 
treaty with the United States. Havana businessman Louis V. 
Place urged Magoon to consider a draft treaty that the 
Moderates had ignored. A new treaty would benefit Cuba, 
to be sure, but: 
The Cuban question, I repeat, is an economical question, and needs 
to be settled economically. 
Cuba's economical problems once settled can make Cuba sufficiently 
rich to support any political problems, for her political leaders do love 
Cuba for the fat there is in it.36 
Magoon forwarded Place's letter, and other opinions to 
Elihu Root and asked for the State Department's view of such 
a treaty. Root's reply was brusque: plans for a new reciprocity 
treaty were "rejected, abandoned."37 Some merchants and 
planters turned to lobbying in Washington and agitating for 
annexation in Cuba, but reciprocity remained a dead issue.38 
With a good deal of justice, Diario de la Marino said that 
Cubans and Americans were not ready for mutual under­
standing. The Cubans had wanted American assistance, but 
. .  . it was not supposed that the Americans, besides shedding their 
blood and spending their money for the so-called Cuban cause, would 
change also their principle of protectionist tariffs and ruin great agri­
cultural and industrial interests of their own, merely to make happy a 
people of such different race and mentality.39 
Although the Provisional Government was sympathetic to 
Cuban agricultural development and diversification, it did 
little to alter the conditions under which Cubans farmed.40 
The Provisional Government's major effort was in building 
roads, but its motives were not entirely to stimulate produc­
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tion. Magoon, advised by a fourteen-man commission from the 
Liga Agraria, an organization of sugar planters, put great 
stress on the problems of agricultural credit in his reports. 
Despite the urgings of the sugar planters no action was under­
taken to establish a government-backed agricultural bank as 
then existed in the Philippines, Mexico, and France.41 Beyond 
the $5 million loaned in 1907 on a one year basis, the Provi­
sional Government did nothing to ease the sugar planters' 
credit problems. Magoon changed the tariff slightly to benefit 
the Cuban cattle business, but rejected a proposed home­
stead act as too radical for his government to sponsor. 
In its relations with Cuban labor, the Provisional Govern­
ment was far more solicitous than its predecessors, though 
more from a fear of labor violence than a commitment to 
the working man. During the occupation, a rash of strikes 
swept Cuba involving the unions of the cigar-workers, masons 
and plasterers, railway workers and trainmen, box-makers, 
plumbers, broom-makers, and carpenters.42 Generally the strik­
ers wanted a 10 per cent pay increase and an eight-hour 
working day. The Cuban labor movement was handicapped 
by the competition between the native Cubans and the Spanish 
immigrants, some of whom were anarchists. The strike was 
a favorite device of the Spaniards to clean the Cubans out of 
an industry; they would arouse the Cuban laborers, then take 
the jobs themselves after the walkout.43 The Provisional Gov­
ernment blamed Spanish agitators for the few instances of 
violence which marred the strikes, and would not intercede 
for the employers. It did, however, allow railway strikebreak­
ers to land and others to take strike-vacated jobs.44 The 
Havana businessmen, particularly the Spanish and English, 
were highly critical of Magoon's "pro-labor" government. Some 
formed a "Federation of the Producing Classes of the Island 
of Cuba" to defend themselves from the strikers since the 
government was so pliant.45 For settling the cigar-makers' 
strike in 1907, Magoon received congratulations from Taft 
and General Edwards, chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, 
but in Cuba the governor was not so well treated: "I feel it 
is my duty to report the existence of resentment toward me 
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on the part of large employers of labor and that portion of 
the inhabitants who believe in the Spanish methods of dealing 
with the laboring classes."46 
In its relationship to the Cuban economy, the Provisional 
Government did nothing to alter permanently the basic con­
ditions under which Cubans worked, earned, bought, and 
sold.47 What it did do was to mediate justly between the 
competing, economically important segments of the popula­
tion. In die case of the labor movement and rural workers, 
the government's actions probably increased their expectations 
for equal treatment from succeeding regimes. Although the 
Cuban economy performed well during the occupation, the 
real key to the temporary year-long prosperity was the Provi­
sional Government's own spending. Coupled with increased 
foreign investment caused by the American presence, this 
spending created a business upswing. In 1909, the old pat­
terns of wealth distribution re-emerged; as the American 
Consul-General, James L. Rodgers, reported: 
. . . The fact remains, that a good portion of the abnormal pur­
chasing power of the people disappeared when it was seen that in the 
future Cuba would have to depend largely upon her own resources and 
that under somewhat restricted conditions.48 
Public Works and Good Works: Policy and Administration 
During the twenty-eight months of occupation, within the 
traditional spheres of governmental activity, the Provisional 
Government worked to improve living conditions in Cuba. 
While its programs had to be acceptable to the Roosevelt 
administration, it often planned, appropriated and admin­
istered in what it considered to be Cuba's best interests. How 
the civilian policy-makers defined these interests and how the 
American officers reacted to these definitions reveals some 
significant differences in policy criteria between Magoon and 
his advisers. In general, Magoon was aware of the political 
relationship of his government's activities in Cuba to his 
mission, the peaceful re-establishment of an elected Cuban 
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government. Even when he attempted to provide for Cuba's 
future economic growth, he worked with the political context 
in mind. 
The Army officers, on the other hand, though they were 
only too aware of the political situation, evaluated the govern­
ment's work in terms of professional efficiency and long-range, 
humanitarian accomplishment. They became concerned when 
policy obstructed administration, and, in some cases, they 
recommended reforms which, in the name of efficiency and 
professionalism, reinforced the colonial-centralist nature of 
the Cuban government. In some areas the officers were in 
perfect agreement with Magoon's programs because they 
recognized the government's activities were essential to the 
Army's pacification plan. 
Magoon's public works projects included harbor improve­
ments, waterworks, and sewerage systems, but his major 
interest was in building roads. In 1906, the Provisional Gov­
ernor discovered that Cuba had but five hundred miles of 
macadamized roads, whereas Jamaica, a smaller island, had 
a thousand. Because of this transportation lag, only six of 
forty potential ports were in use. The cart roads were atro­
cious, for the heavily-laden bull-carts with their canted 
wheels slashed the unpaved roadbeds into gullies or mud-
holes. In economic terms, the lack of roads meant that sugar 
colonos and other farmers had to depend on either public 
or company railroads, both expensive, to transport their 
produce.49 To cut transportation costs and force railway rates 
down, Magoon planned to build a central highway across 
the island and to open feeder roads which would serve at 
least two ports (one north, one south) in every province.50 
Magoon also believed that the road-building program was 
essential to Cuban pacification because it provided employ­
ment during the tiempo muerto. He specifically justified it 
this way in his first public report, and he wrote General Bell 
that without the new roads the United States could expect 
another Philippines in terms of time, lives, and cost.51 Irene 
Wright seconded Magoon's views; she believed road-building 
in Pinar del Rio averted Masso Parra's revolt in 1907.52 
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The actual work was performed under the supervision of 
Army Engineers in the Army of Cuban Pacification or by 
officers detailed to the Department of Public Works. Because 
of the shortage of trained engineers in Cuba, American civil 
engineers were also hired. Although some of the construction 
was done by government workers, much of it was handled 
by Cuban and American contractors. A common ploy to 
silence potential "rebels" was for Lieutenant Colonel Bullard 
to see the "leader," make him straw boss, and get road work 
for the whole crew.53 Only then did the Cubans learn that 
American officers would be in charge, an unpleasant discovery 
for the contractors and workers alike.54 
Magoon's original (April, 1907) plans called for the con­
struction or improvement of 2300 kilometers of road at a cost 
of $13 million. The entire public works budget was to have 
been $22 million, as compared with $13.8 million appropriated 
in 1906 by the Cuban congress. By September, 1908, the 
Provisional Government had built 570 kilometers of road, 
expected to finish 190 more before February, 1909, and had 
repaired 200 kilometers. The cost had been $13 million. 
Though Magoon's plans outstripped his accomplishments, his 
government doubled the mileage of Cuba's paved roads and 
halved the costs of transporting sugar and tobacco in the 
affected areas.55 
The entire public works program, which included the 
improvement of harbor facilities, water and sewerage systems 
and the construction of public buildings, was the Provisional 
Government's answer to cyclic unemployment, and by this 
standard it was successful. In assessing the sizable investment 
in public works (1907—$19.5 million; 1908—$16.2 million), 
Magoon believed the expenditures had "greatly stimulated" 
trade and commerce because the money reached all sectors 
of the population. The Cubans agreed, for in June, 1908, 
when the Provisional Government announced that no new 
contracts would be let, the entire Cuban press predicted 
chaos.56 Magoon's final judgment on his projects was more 
benediction than report: "I doubt if history presents an 
instance of more good in more ways resulting from an 
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equal expenditure of public funds in constructing public 
improvements." 57 
The Department of Public Works increased both in size 
and in the scope of its activities during the occupation.58 To 
a large degree it assumed many of the responsibilities given 
to local government for construction and maintenance of 
roads and buildings. During the first year of occupation 
the technical and non-technical permanent employees of the 
department doubled. This trend toward centralized control 
over public works was justified in terms of increased efficiency 
and achievement by Lieutenant Colonel William M. Black, 
the department's adviser. Black believed that the highly pro­
fessional direction given public works projects by American 
and Cuban civil engineers provided "object lessons in ways 
of decreasing the cost, by introduction of modern methods of 
work and modern plant/'59 
Within the Department of Government, Lieutenant Colonel 
Greble and the secretary, Manuel Sobrado, agreed that the 
national government should assume greater responsibilities 
because local governments had not adequately provided funds 
and supervision for Cuba's charitable institutions.60 During 
the occupation, the department assumed complete control of 
construction and maintenance for the public institutions under 
its supervision, centralized these institutions' administration, 
completed the nationalization of the Havana police, and 
broadened the powers and activities of the postal and tele­
graph service. The new municipal law of 1908 gave the 
department supervisory responsibility over all local public 
works projects where national funds were committed. Within 
the department, the secretary was given improved account­
ing and personnel management procedures to strengthen his 
own control. 
In the field of public instruction, the Provisional Government 
did little to arrest the deterioration of Wood's school program. 
There was no crusade to Americanize the Cuban children or 
to stimulate local interest in managing the schools. The Depart­
ment of Public Instruction remained under a Cuban holdover 
from the Wood regime, Lincoln de Zayas, whose principal 
208 THE P O L I T I C S OF I N T E R V E N T I O N 
concerns seem to have been the moral dangers of coeducation 
and the growth of "the whole child." Zayas, despondent over 
the Cubans' failure to accept Wood's reforms, urged that the 
entire public school system be nationalized, but it was not.61 
In 1908, Lieutenant Colonel Bullard became acting secretary. 
He was appalled at the corruption he found: sinecures, offi­
cials carrying their mistresses on the payrolls, falsified reports, 
kickbacks on supply contracts, promotion for sexual and politi­
cal favoritism. His own mission, he guessed, was to keep the 
scandalous conditions hidden until the occupation ended. In 
public education, Bullard observed, pacification meant "dealing 
out the pie."62 
Politics and Public Health 
In the eyes of Major Jefferson Randolph Kean, M.D., 
American policy in the area of public health was poorly 
conceived and not well executed.63 In no other area did the 
professional-humanitarian concerns of an American adviser 
come into more direct conflict with the Provisional Governor's 
political priorities. The basic conflict lay in two areas, the 
United States inordinate concern about yellow fever and the 
necessity of using the Cuban health service as a political 
instrument. From Kean's point of view, the Provisional Gov­
ernment obstructed what he believed were programs designed 
to help the Cuban people. The only concession he won 
was an administrative one which also benefited Magoon, the 
nationalization of the public health service and the creation 
of an autonomous Department of Sanitation. 
Kean's own service in Cuba dated back to the Military 
Government when he had been intimately involved in Wood's 
antidisease crusade. Although he realized that the eradica­
tion of yellow fever had been an inspiring accomplishment, 
he was perfectly aware that the Cubans themselves were 
unconcerned about the disease. They simply did not get it; 
the victims were nearly always non-immune Americans and 
Europeans.64 
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On the other hand, typhoid, malaria, cholera, and tubercu­
losis posed continuing, major threats to the population. In 
1907 in Havana deaths from diarrhea and enteritis among 
children (610) outnumbered the total deaths for all other 
age groups from all other infectious diseases, except tubercu­
losis.65 Only Havana, with lavish appropriations from the 
national government, had attempted to maintain the standards 
set by the Military Government, and it had concentrated on 
yellow fever control. Conditions elsewhere in Cuba can be 
imagined from this report from Matanzas by one of Kean's 
special inspectors: 
Of the occupied houses only two were found to have water closets 
. . . the others had outhouses with earth pits, the conditions of which 
was nasty and foul smelling in the extreme. The patios of the bodegas 
[stores] also contained pig pens, chicken yards and stable, and there 
were wet areas extending under the houses, from all of which very foul 
odors and swarms of flies arose. The patio of Sr. Pages contained a 
chicken yard and a small pig tied by its leg, in the vicinity of the 
latter was a very foul spot from which a swarm of flies arose. A 
leak in a hydrant keeps part of this patio very wet in the region of the 
chicken yard. . . . The keeper of one of these bodegas and a lady who 
had been living for two months near the home of Sr. Pages says the 
number of flies is about what it has always been in this neighborhood.66 
Whatever Cuba's health problems in general, the Provisional 
Government concentrated on stamping out yellow fever. This 
disease had reappeared in Havana in 1905 and 1906, and the 
Roosevelt administration became concerned lest the Army 
become infected, trade and credit in Cuba be hurt by an 
epidemic, and the disease spread to the southern United 
States. (As a matter of fact, the infection came to Havana 
from New Orleans.) Kean admitted that yellow fever did 
pose a threat, principally because the Cuban municipalities 
had neither the will nor the funds to sanitize themselves.67 
Although the Provisional Government went to work on the 
problem, another epidemic broke out in August, 1907, lasting 
until November. The concern in Washington is amply docu­
mented: the American minister in Havana submitted "sanitary 
reports" from Cuba every ten days, and these reports gave 
210 THE P O L I T I C S OF I N T E R V E N T I O N 
the prognosis for each yellow fever case. For the period of 
the epidemic the reports listed sixty-two new cases of yellow 
fever among Spanish immigrants and American soldiers. The 
September reports put the yellow fever problem in perspec­
tive: in that month there were 15 active fever cases, 26 
typhoid cases, and 2094 active cases of tuberculosis.68 
In 1908, another small yellow fever epidemic aroused the 
State Department. Writing Magoon, Elihu Root stressed 
that Cuba must live up to its public health pledge in the 
Platt Amendment: 
If there had been no intervention I should be hammering away 
vigorously at the Government of Cuba to require them to go on with 
the plan for the sanitation of Havana . . . perhaps we ought to declare 
war on you. You are a large mark and would be easier to hit than the 
average Cuban.69 
Despite the Department of Sanitation's successful eradication 
of the fever, the State Department quarantined Cuba (with 
the exception of Havana and Marianao) in April, 1908. Major 
Kean called the quarantine "unreasonable," "unnecessary," and 
a violation of the Sanitary Convention signed by the United 
States and Cuba in 1905. At the time of the quarantine there 
were active cases in only two Cuban towns and no new cases 
in seven weeks, Kean stated.70 Later in the summer, the 
quarantine was lifted. 
The yellow fever outbreaks, the United States government's 
concern about them, and the generally bad condition of public 
health administration in Cuba convinced Kean early in the 
occupation that the sanitary service should be completely 
nationalized.71 Under the existing conditions, Kean observed, 
the municipalities had too few funds and the councilors did 
not enforce the sanitary laws because of family and political 
loyalties. Official indifference was wedded to public resistance. 
Kean's first step to enforce the codes was to have Magoon 
place Army medical officers on the municipal boards of health; 
Kean told the Governor that American supervision was essen­
tial to yellow fever control.72 By the summer of 1907, Kean had 
persuaded the Governor that if he wanted an effective Cuban 
 211 The Provisional Government and Cuban Stability
sanitation program, the entire public health system must be 
nationalized. On August 26, 1907, citing Kean's reasons almost 
verbatim, Magoon created the Department of Sanitation.73 
Local sanitary officers, in lieu of municipal boards of health, 
under the direction of a national Chief Sanitary Officer, were 
introduced. The national government assumed all costs, but 
the municipalities had to remit 10 per cent of their annual 
income for public health services. At the national level, a 
board of distinguished doctors and public health officers would 
advise the Chief Sanitary Officer.74 
The creation of the Department of Sanitation brought Kean 
and Magoon into conflict over the role of the department in 
political affairs. Part of Kean's motive in advocating nationali­
zation was to get public health out of politics and make it 
responsive to his trusted Cuban associates, Drs. Carlos J. 
Finlay and Juan Guiteras, and to the Cuban medical profes­
sion. Because he realized that to be efficient the department 
would have to employ many (potentially corruptible) public 
health inspectors, he hoped to place it under non-partisan, 
professional control.75 He clearly intended that the depart­
ment should do more than police the yellow fever problem. 
Already Kean had four Army medical officers supervising 
public health work (primarily yellow fever control) and he 
shared their frustration at not having the money or authority 
to tackle the entire infectious disease problem.76 
Magoon agreed that Cuba's good health was related to 
national development, commerce, immigration and foreign 
trade, but the Governor was not so enthusiastic about profes­
sionalizing the Department of Sanitation as was Kean. Magoon 
would not appoint men as sanitary officers solely on their 
professional qualifications as certified by the National Sani­
tary Board. As he told Kean, "everything in this Island is 
political and the political chiefs must be consulted. . . . "77 
Kean's analysis of the Governor's reasoning was that the 
sanitary officers would be ineffective without public sup­
port and this depended on the politicos approval. Although 
Magoon had not appointed unfit men, Kean observed, they 
had been drawn totally from the political factions. Kean 
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believed Magoon was trying to make the politicos dependent 
on him and responsible for their nominees.78 
Magoon kept the Department of Sanitation in politics, 
much to Kean's disgust. In one instance, Kean found that 
Magoon and Steinhart had changed all the public health 
officers of importance in Cienfuegos without consulting him, 
whereupon he suggested to the Governor that the jefe local 
be changed too if the Governor wanted anything accom­
plished.79 In February, 1908, Kean told Magoon that unless 
he approved the National Sanitary Board's nominees quickly 
the Provisional Government would have a yellow fever epi­
demic on its hands.80 He made the appointments and got 
quarantined too. 
The genesis of the Department of Sanitation illustrates how 
closely related the Provisional Government's administrative 
acts were to its policy of restructuring Cuban politics along 
party lines, and how it instead reinforced colonial patterns. 
The creation of the department actually forced the politicos 
to compete for posts at the national level rather than at the 
local level. Clearly, Major Kean's motives for nationalizing 
the public health service were professional from both a mili­
tary and medical standpoint. He hoped that the standards 
of performance he and his fellow officers and physicians 
demanded during the occupation would continue, and that 
Cuba would be able to do more for its people than keep 
itself clean of yellow fever for the United States benefit. He 
underestimated the political imperatives facing Magoon and 
the opportunities the new Department created for the Gov­
ernor's patronage policy. Both men wanted a Department of 
Sanitation to check yellow fever; beyond that their goals 
split. At the time the occupation ended, the Department was 
far from being the non-partisan, public-service agency Kean 
first envisioned. 
During the course of the intervention, the Army officers in 
the Provisional Government carried on two separate argu­
ments with their civil superiors. The first concerned the 
wisdom of trying to establish a stable government for an 
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unstable society; the second hinged on a basic disagreement 
over the cures for Cuban instability itself. The officers, how­
ever disenchanted they were with the United States Cuban 
policy, accepted the fact that Roosevelt would leave Cuba 
in the hands of the politicos and exercise control from afar 
through economic policy and the Platt Amendment. They did, 
nevertheless, within the context of American policy, wish to 
continue the programs of national reconstruction begun under 
Wood and paralleled by themselves and others in the Philip­
pines and Puerto Rico. They considered their qualifications 
for the task superior to most Cubans' and most civilians in 
general. The Army and Navy Journal presented the military 
assessment of the officers' work: 
Under these efficient Army officers, who are again demonstrating the 
wonderful versatility of their profession, Cuba is being given excellent 
government unquestionably superior to what she had during the period 
of the Republic and superior to that of the ordinary state and city 
governments of the United States.81 
The weakness in the officers' ambitious plans to better 
Cuba (a weakness they recognized) was that there was no 
guarantee that the Cubans would continue their work after 
the American withdrawal. Yet only Colonel Crowder offi­
cially advocated increasing American control over Cuban 
domestic affairs so that sweeping legal reforms could be made. 
The officers attempted to preserve their achievements by 
increasing the role of the national government in the areas 
of their responsibility. The various reorganizations that took 
place and many of the new laws published illuminate this 
development: the establishment of the Department of Sani­
tation, the enlarged role of the Department of Public Works, 
the tightened administration of police and charities in the 
Department of Government, the introduction of uniform 
accounting and auditing practices in all departments, and 
the changes in provincial and municipal government made 
by the Advisory Law Commission. The rationale for these 
administrative changes, from the officers' viewpoint, was that 
they would add to the Cuban government's efficiency and 
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work to make the national bureaucracy less political by 
putting it in the hands of a professional-technical elite. 
From Magoon's standpoint this centralization of government 
was acceptable not only because it improved administration, 
but because it also furthered his political goal, the encourage­
ment of responsible parties in Cuba. Magoon was sure that 
a free election would return the politicos to office, and he 
saw no reason to exclude them from a voice in his own 
government. He doubted that the "example" set by the 
American officers would have any lasting impact without 
a continuing, direct American presence in the Cuban govern­
ment. This he knew was an unlikely development. Magoon 
did agree with Crowder that legal reform could leave a last­
ing impact on Cuba, but he differed on the extent of that 
reform. Magoon stopped short of directly altering any insti­
tution other than the government. On this issue, Magoon 
was far more conservative than Crowder, who was, in fact, 
suggesting basic social changes through the medium of 
revising the Hispanic civil and criminal codes. 
Although the officers were correct in believing that Magoon's 
political policies and the holding of elections were a super­
ficial answer to Cuban instability, their own prescription for 
change was at least equally limited. They believed that the 
United States intended to do more for Cuba than it did. 
They realized more slowly than the American political lead­
ership that the days of civilizing backward peoples in the 
missionary manner were at an end. They were interested in 
lasting internal reform in Cuba, but the Roosevelt adminis­
tration was not. 
In the most important area, that of economic reform, the 
officers were as conservative as their civil superiors. That 
they were mindful of the important role an efficient, honest 
Cuban government could play in national development is 
unquestionable, but they had no other answer to Cuba's 
colonial economy than freer trade with the United States. 
This was, as Roosevelt and Root knew, impossible without 
annexation. 
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One factor that cannot be overlooked is that the officers 
saw internal reform in Cuba as a military imperative. They 
believed that a real possibility of future, more violent inter­
ventions existed and that the occupation offered them a 
chance to win the respect (if not the friendship) of the 
Cuban people. Their Philippine experiences and service under 
Wood had taught them the potential military benefits of 
winning popular support in an occupied country. If such a 
political relationship with the people was authoritarian, it 
was at least benignly so, and the officers could argue with 
some justification that Army rule was for the general welfare, 
not that of a privileged native class. The irony was that, con­
fronted with orders to return home, the Army turned over 
the government to just such a privileged elite. Because of the 
American reforms, the governmental apparatus the officers 
built for their successors was a far handier tool for waste 
and oppression than it had been before the intervention. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT





A;T THE BEGINNING of the Second Intervention, .the Provisional Government viewed the im­
portant and delicate task of reorganizing Cuba's armed forces 
as simply a matter of increasing the size of the Rural Guard 
and detailing American officers to it as advisers. Before the 
occupation ended, however, Cuba had both a Rural Guard 
and a regular army, and what had begun as a military and 
administrative reform became a major political issue. 
The controversy over Cuba's military establishment united 
the politicos against the Provisional Government, set Magoon 
against his advisers, and caused a division between the politi­
cal and military leaders in Washington and the officers in 
Cuba. Throughout the negotiations, which culminated with 
the formation of the Permanent Army of Cuba, the American 
officers and Cuban politicians defended their positions with 
skill and persistence. They used military and political justi­
fications interchangeably to advocate either a national con­
stabulary or a regular army. When Magoon attempted to 
mediate the controversy, he found himself allied with the 
Cubans against the Army officers in his administration. His 
own position followed Washington's line. The issue finally 
was decided by Roosevelt and Taft, but their decision 
stemmed from political conditions in Cuba. During the epi­
sode there was never any meaningful public interest in the 
United States concerning the problem of Cuba's armed forces. 
Thus, the question, one of significance in Cuban institutional 
history, was decided by Roosevelt relatively free of domestic 
political pressure. 
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To understand the twisted path that led to the creation of 
the Permanent Army, it is necessary to examine the structure, 
function, and political orientation of the Rural Guard, to 
explore its role in the August Revolution, and to follow its 
regeneration during the Second Intervention. 
The Rural Guard: The Politics of Military Efficiency 
In the social and economic wreckage of 1898, the American 
military governors formed provincial and municipal constab­
ularies, largely recruited from former insurgents, to keep the 
peace. By 1902 fifteen separate forces existed, and while their 
jurisdictions were tangled, their function (police) and loyalty 
(to the Americans) were clear. In Santiago, Leonard Wood, 
on the advice of a Cuban veteran and over popular protest, 
consciously modeled his Rural Guard on Mexican President 
Porfirio Diaz' Guardia Rurale.1 During his service as Military 
Governor, Wood completed the nationalization of Cuba's 
Rural Guard. It was an apolitical national constabulary to 
enforce the laws of the central government and the decisions 
of the national courts. Its jurisdiction extended to all areas 
where there was no urban or municipal police.2 Officers and 
men were selected and appointed by the Military Governor, 
and it can be assumed that while basic soldierly qualities 
were a prime consideration, Wood also sought men who were 
"professional," or apolitical in American military usage. In 
1905 the Rural Guard manned 244 posts throughout the 
island, each post averaging around twelve men. Because the 
Rural Guard devoted its efforts to police work, it lacked the 
training to carry out even company-sized military operations. 
After the departure of its American advisers, the Rural Guard's 
discipline and efficiency deteriorated.3 Only in the sense that 
it was armed was the Rural Guard an army. 
In 1904 the Cuban government enlarged its Artillery Corps 
to six hundred men. Ostensibly, the artillerymen were to 
replace the American garrison of Havana's forts. One Cuban 
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historian suggests that Estrada Palma wanted a palace guard 
which owed its allegiance strictly to him, for he believed the 
Rural Guard was too pro-American or, at least, had little 
loyalty to him personally.4 Whatever Estrada Palma's motives, 
the Artillery Corps was armed and trained as infantry, and in 
1906 was the nation's only military unit capable of immedi­
ately taking offensive action against rebellion.5 
Discredited and demoralized by its political role in the 
elections of 1905 and its military defeats of 1906, the Rural 
Guard badly needed American assistance, just as the Provi­
sional Government needed the Rural Guard if it was to 
follow a Cubans-fight-Cubans policy. The Rural Guard offi­
cers believed they had followed American teachings by sup­
porting the constitutional government, though in doing so 
they antagonized many of their countrymen. Generally loyal 
to Estrada Palma, they had failed him and incurred the 
Liberal's wrath. They were aware that their ineptness con­
tributed to the government's collapse, for the Rural Guard 
had been unable to produce even the hint of effective 
resistance, which Estrada Palma might have turned into 
American support.6 
Taft, Magoon, and their Army advisers believed the Rural 
Guard had acted unwillingly in suppressing the Liberals, 
that it remained true to the principles learned under Wood, 
and that it longed to return to its legitimate functions.7 There­
fore, the Provisional Government immediately went to work 
to restore public confidence in the Rural Guard, to return 
it to its proper duties, and to place it firmly under 
American control. 
The experience of the Rural Guard after the American 
intervention was influenced most by American efforts to pro­
fessionalize it and make it an effective counterguerrilla force. 
Shortly after the intervention Taft publicly announced that 
the Guard repudiated its past political activities; he then 
switched detachments to different posts to reduce local ten­
sions.8 To command the Rural Guard and the Artillery Corps, 
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Taft decided to retain Alejandro Rodriguez and promoted him 
to Major General. Magoon might have replaced him with 
Enrique Loynaz del Castillo, but the volatile Liberal general 
denounced this possibility with flaming oratory: 
Every time I see an American I have contempt for him, and I can­
not bear to look at the Stars and Stripes waving unjustly over Cuba. If 
some day the Cubans have to fight, it will be with the Americans, and 
then only will I accept the chieftancy of the Rural Guard.9 
The Provisional Governor decreed that there would be no 
partisanship within the Guard itself. In General Order No. 
28 (March 11, 1907) General Rodriguez announced that 
participation in political activity would be henceforth a 
court-martial offense: 
The members of the Armed Forces will not discuss, either publicly 
or privately, their political opinions. They are soldiers of the state, and 
as such have no right to mix in politics. Their duty is to serve their 
government and take no part in its construction: their duty is to obey 
its orders. . . . The welfare of the entire force depends upon its being 
free from political combinations.10 
Of course, such an order did not restrain the government 
from using its soldiers to carry out political chores, as the 
Moderate regime had done in 1905. The order might, how­
ever, protect the Rural Guard from public criticism. Profes­
sionalization was not really thorough, for political pressure 
(particularly from the Liberals) still affected the promotion 
or transfer of Guard personnel.11 
To inculcate professionalism in the Rural Guard and to 
improve its readiness, Magoon and Bell detailed an able, 
experienced group of American officers to advise and train 
the Cubans. All but one of the original eight advisers had 
served with the Military Government or in the Philippines. 
Major Herbert J. Slocum, Wood's supervisor of the Rural 
Guard, took up his old post at Guard headquarters. His field 
advisers were Captains Powell Clayton, Jr., James A. Ryan, 
George C. Barnhardt, Andrew J. Dougherty, Charles F. Crain, 
C. I. Crockett, and Edmund Wittenmyer. In the course of the 
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occupation this group changed, but there were never more 
than nine officers in the detail. Though the officers were only 
to train and advise, both Dougherty and Wittenmyer took 
part in bandit chases during their tours.12 
To use the Rural Guard most effectively, the American 
advisers retained the Guard's pre-revolt deployment. This 
return to the scattered post system was based on the assump­
tion that the Army of Cuban Pacification served as a ready 
field force and that the small posts were consistent with the 
Guard's mission. Nonetheless, a reserve force of one hundred 
men was planned for each provincial capital, but for lack of 
troops was not constituted until late in the occupation. The 
three Guard regiments (each with eight mounted and two 
foot companies numbering around 1,700 men) handled a 
two-province area of responsibility. The bulk of the Guard 
was stationed in sugar growing areas.13 The First Regiment 
manned 15 posts in Pinar del Rio and Havana provinces; 
the Second Regiment, 26 in Matanzas and Santa Clara; the 
Third Regiment, 101 posts in Camaguey and Oriente. During 
the winter of 1906-7, training and reorganization progressed 
rapidly enough to allow each regiment to increase its posts. 
By September, 1907, the Rural Guard had more than doubled 
its stations.14 
A sharp drop in non-effectives and discharges by mid-1907 
reflected the Guard's improved morale. Though the pay was 
low, quarters unappealing, and discipline capricious, the 
Guard's losses from desertion, court-martials, and discharges 
for unfitness dropped from 285 in 1906 (including 64 men 
who defected to the Liberals) to almost half that after six 
months of tutelage. The American advisers reported that 
improved morale was due to the Guard officers' increased 
concern for the men's welfare, and the excellent example 
set by the Army of Cuban Pacification.15 
The Guard's readiness was increased by redistributing its 
weapons and improving its communications. To reduce supply 
problems, each regiment received one standard weapon, either 
the Remington-Lee .30 cal. rifle, the Winchester .44 cal. car­
bine, or the Mauser 7mm. rifle. To offset the widespread 
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location of the Guard posts and to allow a quicker concen­
tration of troops if rebellion threatened, Rodriguez and Slocum 
pushed the construction of phone lines to all posts. The com­
munications net was completed by the end of 1907. Magoon's 
road-building program also increased the Guard's coverage. 
The Rural Guard's primary tactic for subduing incipient 
rebellion was active patrolling. Unfortunately its police duties, 
which included serving and executing court orders and investi­
gating the numerous rural fires and accidents, prevented it 
from patrolling as much as its advisers would have liked. 
The Rural Guard, however, used its patrolling procedures to 
increase its reputation for trustworthiness. To insure that a 
patrol completed its mission, a post chief assigned every party 
a specific route. The patrol, as it passed through each property, 
would then have the owner or manager sign a form to verify 
the patrol's presence and good behavior. The goal was to 
increase mutual confidence, and the Americans were satisfied 
that this was attained.16 
The Artillery Corps was also placed under American super­
vision. It was stationed in Havana, received primarily artillery 
instruction, and served the Provisional Government by provid­
ing troops for a show-of-force in the 1906 railway strike. The 
Americans equipped one company with pack howitzers and 
also created a machine gun company armed with ten Colts. 
The Rural Guard, coaxed and cajoled by its American 
advisers, served the Provisional Government well in its con­
stabulary role. In terms of military efficiency, it was vastly 
improved. Some success followed the American attempt to 
professionalize it, for many of its officers were still committed 
to the ideals of the Wood regime; some, indeed, wished for 
the return of the Puritan general.17 In addition, American 
supervision of recruiting and commissioning was close. 
The political sum of the American reform of the Rural 
Guard, however, was to model it on American values: the 
sanctity of person and property, prompt and strict law en­
forcement without regard to personal influence and station, 
and political neutrality. These were the ideals toward which 
the Americans pushed the Rural Guard. If, in fact, its advisers 
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succeeded in Americanizing and increasing the Rural Guard, 
the Guard would stand even more firmly against the person­
alismo of the Liberal politicians and support the interests of 
the alien and conservative sectors. In reality, the reform of 
the Rural Guard marked the beginning of Liberal pressure 
to create a regular army. The subsequent political controversy 
ended with a Liberal victory over Washington, Governor 
Magoon, and the United States Army and the creation of the 
Permanent Army of Cuba. 
The Permanent Army Issue 
Despite all the improvements that were wrought in Cuba's 
armed forces as they existed in 1906, the Provincial Govern­
ment concluded that Cuba needed more armed men to keep 
internal order. The military lesson of the August Revolution 
was clear, as Tomas Estrada Palma pointed out in his letter 
of October 10, 1906: Cuba needed "a competent force to 
suppress insurrection and disperse rebel bands." He had found 
in August that no force existed "to immediately undertake an 
active campaign." 
Roosevelt, Taft, and Magoon clearly recognized that more 
Cuban soldiers were needed if the Americans were to pull 
out; Taft feared that it might be necessary to keep American 
troops in Cuba even after the government was restored.18 
Magoon's first thought was simply to enlarge the Rural Guard 
and Artillery Corps to ten thousand men, thus giving General 
Rodriguez and Major Slocum plenty of provincial reserves. 
"Of course," Magoon reported, "this . . . will cost more. 
Liberals should not object because the Rural Guard will keep 
them in power after election."19 
In October, 1906, General Bell convened a board of officers 
of the General Staff Corps serving in Cuba to study the pos­
sibility of increasing the Rural Guard. The board first con­
sidered the Rural Guard's proposals for a manpower increase. 
The Rodriguez-Slocum plan was simply to increase each 
Guard regiment by two troops of cavalry, add a machine gun 
company, and flesh out the Artillery Corps, in all an increase 
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of a thousand men. There would be no change in the Rural 
Guard's constabulary function.20 
As a result of its own study, the board decided that as long 
as American troops remained in Cuba, it was unnecessary 
to enlarge the Rural Guard, but recommended that after the 
occupation ended, the Rural Guard be enlarged to four cavalry 
regiments and two infantry regiments, organized like United 
States Army units. The Rural Guard's minimum strength 
would be 7,715, capable of expansion to 9,875. In addition, 
the board recommended the creation of field artillery bat­
teries, more coast artillery and service troops, bringing the 
minimum total force to 9,439 men. Neither Rodriguez, Slocum, 
nor the board believed a militia system to be workable.21 
With this organization plan in mind, Magoon met with 
three Liberal military chiefs—Pino Guerra, Carlos Garcia 
Velez, and Jose de Jesus Monteagudo. The three Cubans 
opposed any increase in the present armed forces and said 
that their opposition represented the party's position. Magoon 
stated that reorganization was underway, for, "I appreciate, 
as I think you do, the necessity of having a force that will 
give stability to the Government. The problem is to find out 
how many that is and then make it an agent of the Govern­
ment and not a political body."22 Nevertheless, Magoon then 
promised there would be a chance for public discussion before 
he acted. 
Public reaction there was, but it provided Magoon no 
comfort and little guidance. The more he considered an en­
larged Rural Guard, the more expensive it appeared and the 
more criticism he heard. Liberals and others, he reported 
to Taft, opposed the creation of a large armed body "avail­
able for enforcement of the desires of a single individual." 
Magoon had learned that the people 
. .  . are apprehensive of a recurrence in Cuba of the dangers of 
militarism and consider it as great a peril to Cuba as it has been in 
other islands of the West Indies and in the countries of Central and 
South America. They call attention to the racial characteristics, tradi­
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tions, etc., which they allege make it impossible for an armed force to 
be non-political or to assume the attitude of the soldiers of the United 
States towards political affairs. 
Instead, most of the Cubans would rather accept the military 
weakness of the police rather than have a politically powerful 
army. Even though the Liberals were confident of victory 
in the next election, they opposed an enlarged Rural Guard. 
In all, Magoon concluded, he still favored the General Staff 
board's proposals.23 
Roosevelt, after digesting the problem, directed Magoon 
to begin reorganizing the Rural Guard and other services 
into the ten-thousand-man force recommended by the board, 
Magoon, and General Bell.24 This news brought political up­
roar in Cuba to a new pitch; all the Havana press opposed the 
government, the Moderates being more critical than the Lib­
erals.25 The Spanish La Lucha best presented the conservative 
argument. Although it did not doubt the military wisdom of 
the General Staff officers' plans, La Lucha worried about the 
political factors. First, the September, 1906, law which placed 
the legal size of the Cuban armed forces at ten thousand men 
was an expedient passed by a discredited government in 
panic. The law did not represent the wishes of the Cuban 
people. Rather, there must be more public discussion. A plan 
of reorganization of the Rural Guard in Cuba could be 
dictated not only by military technicism. There were "a great 
many factors which must be taken into consideration. . . . 
The economic, the administrative, and the political aspect 
cannot be disdained in a matter of this kind."26 
While Magoon weighed Cuban criticism, the Liberal 
Committee took the initiative and suggested the creation 
of an entirely new force, a Permanent Army of Cuba. To 
accomplish its goal, it put together arguments blending 
political expediency, fiscal policy, and military theory. The 
Liberals used North America rhetoric to convince Wash­
ington and to outreason the American officers who opposed 
the Permanent Army. Much of their purpose was undoubtedly 
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to reward their followers and strengthen their leadership. 
In all respects they were stunningly successful. 
On February 6, 1907, Zayas, Juan Gualberto Gomez, 
Monteagudo, Garcia Velez, Recio, and Asbert (a majority 
of the Liberal Committee) called on Magoon to present an 
alternative armed forces plan. They first pointed out that 
police work was a civil function, whereas national security 
was a military function. Therefore, the Rural Guard, a con­
stabulary close to the people, could not function as a regular 
army, which should be isolated from the people for training 
and discipline. A militia would not serve because it would 
lack the military training for modern warfare. In addition, 
the army, as the embodiment of the nation's honor, must 
be beyond reproach, and the Rural Guard was associated with 
the repression of the old regime. The Liberals stated they did 
not want the tainted Guard officers involved in forming a 
new army. Moreover, the Liberals said they feared more civil 
oppression by the Guard, which an army might check. Then, 
as the clincher, they pointed out that a mounted Rural Guard 
would be more expensive to maintain than a similar number 
of foot soldiers.27 
Major Slocum defended the Rural Guard with a sharp 
attack on the Liberals' motives. They opposed the Rural 
Guard, Slocum said, because they had failed to subvert it 
with their own cronies, and the commissioning and enlist­
ment laws would continue to protect the Guard. The Perma­
nent Army, Slocum candidly pointed out, was nothing more 
than a giant political payoff.28 
Magoon cabled Washington that the proposal to increase 
the Rural Guard had stirred up a hornet's nest: "Much oppo­
sition from all parties. Every newspaper here opposes plan. 
Liberal papers respectfully, Moderates fiercely." He urged a 
postponement of the reorganization decree to allow him to 
give the problem more consideration. Taft granted the request, 
but wanted "no unreasonable delay."29 
With the proposal of a new regular army now introduced 
into the debate, the battle lines of the controversy underwent 
a rapid shift. Suddenly, Cubans of almost all political per­
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suasions found a regular army attractive. There were many 
reasons, not the least of which was suspicion of the American­
ized Rural Guard. On the other hand, Americans and other 
aliens in Cuba (soldiers and civilians) backed the Rural Guard 
increase and opposed the creation of a regular army. El 
Mundo, speaking for the Liberals, and La Discusion, of the 
conservative press, hailed the Permanent Army as the guar­
antor of stability, adding, with perhaps double meaning, that 
a new army precluded other American interventions.30 In a 
conference with Magoon on February 19, Pino Guerra told 
the governor that Cuba needed a regular army, not more 
Guards. The weak response of the Rural Guard gave his 
guerrillas the illusion of victory, Guerra said, which rallied 
the people to his cause. A determined, trained force would 
have scattered the Constitutional Army in forty-eight hours.31 
The Army and Navy Journal reported that the "ignorant and 
radical classes" wanted only an enlarged Rural Guard; the 
Permanent Army was the Cuban conservatives' idea. General 
Bell further elaborated that conservatives found conscription 
and a universal military liability extremely distasteful.32 In 
the face of such confusing evidence, it is little wonder that 
Roosevelt wanted to go slow on the problem, though Taft 
said the President was more worried about economy than 
militarism.33 
The American opposition to the creation of the Permanent 
Army was focused on three arguments: the Army would be 
a giant swindle economically, it would be worthless militarily, 
and it would be political and social disaster for Cuba. The 
Havana Post believed the army would not only be wasteful, 
but dangerous to Cuba's domestic tranquillity: 
The proposition of an increase to 10,000 of the army of Cuba will 
be as full of peril to Cuba today as it would be to arm the Moros of 
the Philippines with modern firearms. It will mean war and bloody riot. 
It will mean not the survival of the fittest as some contend, but it will 
mean, if it means anything, an empire of arms. If they undertook to 
increase the Army of the United States in proportion it would make 
an army in the United States of 240,000; would the people stand for 
such a thing? Let the Congress try it and see.34 
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The American officers attached to the Rural Guard 
adamantly opposed the creation of a regular army on sound 
political and military grounds. Major Slocum and Captain 
Wittenmyer sent memos of protest to the Provisional Gover­
nor. The most forceful and closely reasoned objections were 
made in an essay by Captain James A. Ryan, who was soon 
to become Magoon's personal aide. Ryan's study, which was 
forwarded to Magoon, pointed out that the Permanent Army 
was primarily a Liberal political device to reward present 
followers and to win new faithfuls. The Liberal attack on 
the Rural Guard stemmed from its loyalty to the constitutional 
government in 1906. Ryan particularly opposed the creation 
of a regular army at that moment because, in essence, such 
an act would produce a force dominated by the former 
insurgents. It would be a political army and "an army domi­
nated by politics is ruined. In proportion to its freedom from 
interference by politicians is proficiency proclaimed. History 
repeats itself from Rome to South America and the use of 
politics has ruined every army, every military force, with 
which it has been connected." 
Switching to more immediate military considerations, Ryan 
stressed that the Platt Amendment already guaranteed Cuba 
against foreign invasion. The only need for an army was to 
keep internal order. For this Cuba needed a loyal, professional 
constabulary. The military requirements of suppressing revolt 
demanded direct contact with the people and an intimate 
knowledge of local society and geography. Only the Rural 
Guard would have this information, and because it was largely 
mounted, it made a more effective counterguerrilla force than 
foot soldiers. Hitting at what he knew was a tender spot in 
Washington's policy, Ryan unequivocally stated that a Cuban 
army offered little security to the sugar business. "Which kind 
of force does Cuba need?" Ryan concluded. "Is it an 
Army? No."35 
Within the staff of the Army of Cuban Pacification, there 
were officers who opposed the Permanent Army, because, in 
view of Cuba's limited resources, they thought it a poor 
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investment on political, economic, and military grounds. Let 
the funds instead be used for road-building, which would 
bring general economic improvement, essential for internal 
peace. Improve Cuba's transportation system and farm pro­
duce would come in from the countryside, thus underwriting 
a rejuvenated freeholding class. As for internal security, an 
enlarged Rural Guard would suffice.36 
A sincere objection to the Permanent Army reached 
Washington from an American planter in Cuba, Mr. H. E. 
Havens. Havens' analysis went more deeply into political 
problems such as economic backwardness and the social 
acceptability of violence in Cuba than did most American 
criticism. In thinking over the proposed plan for a regular 
Cuban army, Havens believed 
. . . that such a measure could do no good and would have in it the 
greatest peril to the people of this Island. The politicians are divided 
into hostile factions of the most bitter and vicious character, all stimu­
lated by a consuming desire for the opportunity to make appropriations 
and operate the various forms of graft peculiar to the Cuban Govern­
ment, and animated by no trace of genuine patriotism. Some one of 
these factions would succeed to the control of the proposed Army upon 
the withdrawal of the United States troops; and that control would 
inevitably be used to protect against their rascalities; and also to control 
elections and maintain themselves in power. 
It now seems probable that those politicians who call themselves the 
Liberal Party will carry the elections and obtain control. Those men are 
not of as high character as those who surrounded Palma and are more 
desperate, reckless and ravenous, and under any conditions would prove 
dangerous to the peace and safety of the people of Cuba. But to place 
Fifteen Thousand armed men under their authority, and then withdraw 
the United States troops would create an alarming condition. 
But if the so-called Liberals fail to obtain control some other faction 
will, and there is not enough difference between them to make any 
material differences as to consequences. 
The maintenance of an appearance of peace by suppressing the peo­
ple with an armed force in the hands of a gang of professional looters 
and grafters is not the sort of peace the United States should wish to be 
responsible for. If the United States is to withdraw from Cuba it would 
be far better to leave the people the remedy of revolution against the 
inevitable abuses of the factions in the ascendency, than to place them 
at the mercy of a corrupt despotism, and call it established peace. 
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In any case the placing of any more guns in the hands of these people 
is a dangerous experiment. It would be far better if every gun and 
machete now in the Island were thrown into the sea.37 
The Liberal Committee, however, did not surrender the 
initiative and promptly came up with a specific reorganization 
plan of their own. They proposed to separate the Rural 
Guard and the new army, the latter to be a mixed brigade 
(infantry, cavalry, and artillery) of four thousand men. Again 
they emphasized the importance of segregating the national 
constabulary from the army and the army from the people. 
They stressed that Cuba need not fear military oppression. 
The August Revolution succeeded not, they argued, because 
the government had been weak but because it was un­
popular: "When the government has the country against it, 
the number of bayonets of which it may dispose matters 
little; the result is always the same, since no people 
worthy of unity fails to throw off the yoke that it deems 
insupportable."38 
During Secretary Taft's April, 1907, visit to Cuba, the 
Permanent Army issue was discussed and the Liberal Com­
mittee restated its regular army plan. While its arguments 
of February and March were repeated, it further elaborated 
on the economic and political benefits (in terms of American 
policy) of its proposal. The Liberal Committee's soldiers 
would cost only $500,000 annually, much less than a like 
number of Rural Guards, for the soldiers would not need 
mounts or expensive police training. The Committee also made 
it clear to Taft that the Provisional Government could not 
expect its full co-operation if Magoon favored the Rural 
Guard, for the Rural Guard menaced the Liberal party. 
Juan Gualberto Gomez, the Negro orator and editor, stated 
that an army was needed to protect the next Cuban govern­
ment from the Rural Guard: 
. .  . In my memorandum I mentioned a gentleman, who was well 
known in France, M. Prud'homme, who had a sword and who said that 
sword would serve as well to destroy the Government as to defend it, 
and the present Rural Guard reminds me very much of the sword of 
M. Prud'homme.39 
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Whatever his inclination to settle the Permanent Army 
question, Taft made no public decision in Havana, for he was 
waiting for what Washington considered a compromise solu­
tion. Although General Bell had approached the General 
Staff board which had mapped the Rural Guard reorganiza­
tion, he found it reluctant to approve the Liberal plan. There­
fore another scheme, drafted by Major Frank Maclntyre of 
the Bureau of Insular Affairs, was submitted. This plan in­
corporated the separation of the army and the Rural Guard, 
as the Liberals desired, while adopting the organizational 
structure advocated by the General Staff board, including a 
seven hundred man increase in the Guard. Again citing the 
Cuban law of September 15, 1906, Maclntyre placed the 
strength of the armed forces at ten thousand.40 General Bell 
approved of this plan. Magoon and Taft were to have dis­
cussed the compromise plan in Havana, but did not because 
the staff papers were mishandled and did not reach the 
Secretary until the end of his trip. 
In the meantime President Roosevelt acted on his own to 
get a reading of public feeling in Cuba on the proposed army. 
He asked William E. Curtis, noted Latin American correspon­
dent of the Chicago Record-Herald and former official of the 
Pan American Union, to sound out opinion during a trip to 
Cuba. Curtis' report could hardly have reassured the President 
of the wisdom of the War Department's compromise. Every­
one he talked to, Curtis said, opposed the Permanent Army, 
except its potential officers. Curtis viewed the army as a 
reward to the insurgents, who told him they had too much 
prestige to work. He told Roosevelt that "if you could see 
the men who will command the proposed army, and the men 
who would compose the rank and file it would not be 
necessary to discuss this subject." In all, Curtis concluded, 
the Cuban army, which would cost $5 million annually, would 
waste money better used on roads and schools.41 
When Magoon again (April 23, 1907) asked to postpone 
announcing any decision on the Permanent Army, the delay 
was promptly approved. Roosevelt and Taft, however, could 
not find any other alternative. Six months later, on October 16, 
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Magoon asked Taft's permission to go ahead with the creation 
of the Permanent Army; two days later Taft told him to act.42 
Although Magoon's specific reasons for proceeding with the 
Cuban army are unclear it is reasonable to assume that from 
the April discussions Washington had accepted the principle of 
a Cuban army and was concerned thereafter only with the 
timing. The other influences on the October request were 
most probably the Liberal's continued insistence on a regular 
army, the emergence of the Conservative party in the summer 
of 1907, the prospect of national elections and American 
withdrawal, and the relative peace following the Masso 
Parra conspiracy. 
The final formal consideration of the Permanent Army plan 
took place in an hour-and-a-half session of the Advisory Law 
Commission. The Army law appeared on the agenda because 
Magoon wanted the Commission's opinion before his trip 
to Washington in February, 1908. Secretary Taft, Magoon 
told the Commission, wanted final action on the matter before 
he went to the Philippines. A subcommittee had already con­
sidered all the plans. Interestingly enough, it categorized as 
"Cuban" the Liberal Committee proposal drafted by Monte­
agudo and as "American" the Rural Guard plan, the General 
Staff board recommendations, and the War Department 
compromise plan. 
The full Commission, considering the subcommittee's 
recommendation that the War Department's plan be accepted, 
realized that the central issue was the creation of a Permanent 
Army separate from the Rural Guard. Still the discussions 
had little originality. Alfredo Zayas presented the Liberal 
arguments una vez mas, emphasizing that the suggested law 
was truly eclectic and represented everyone's best interests 
because it incorporated Washington's structural recommenda­
tions. In the final vote the Commission approved the com­
promise plan, 6-3, with one abstention. The two Americans 
voting (Crowder was in Washington) voted against accep­
tance. The six votes "for" came from four Liberals, a 
Conservative, and an independent.43 
In decrees on April 4, 1908, Magoon published the laws 
establishing the Armed Forces of Cuba, consisting of a 
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Permanent Army, the Rural Guard, and a militia. No missions 
were assigned the different forces, and the militia clause 
meant only that males from 21-45 had some vague military 
obligation. General Rodriguez continued as commander of 
the Rural Guard. The Zayista Liberal and hero of 1906, 
General Pino Guerra, took command of the Permanent Army.44 
In assessing the political impact of the decrees, Magoon 
wrote Taft that the compromise plan had "given general—I 
might say, universal—satisfaction." Rodriguez, his officers and 
advisers, and the conservatives were happy with the strength­
ened Rural Guard, while the Liberals were satisfied with the 
Permanent Army. Public opinion and the press were equally 
pleased. Magoon, looking back over the controversy, believed 
that the need for more troops was obvious from the start and 
that the Rural Guard's partisan taint made it inexpedient to 
continue it as the sole armed force. Magoon was quite opti­
mistic about Guerra's appointment, for Pino had been out of 
politics for a whole year. His appointment had won Liberal 
plaudits and the conservatives recognized his military prowess. 
"This puts an end to insurrections; nobody will want 'Pino* 
to go after them; he would not bring in prisoners—he served 
to [sic] long with Maceo for that"—such were the comments 
Magoon said he heard. In any event, the Provisional Governor 
pointed out, the character of the new armed forces hinged 
on the way the laws were executed.45 
La Discusion, in a representative editorial, extolled the new 
army as a keeper of the peace and the embodiment of 
modernity and patriotism: "What the country demands is a 
military machine, disciplined, scientific, robust, ready at all 
times at the defense of the constituted power." La Discusion 
(whose editor voted against the law in the Advisory Law 
Commission) added, however, that it would be a good idea 
if the army had American advisers, since they had been so 
successful with the Rural Guard.46 
Viewed from the perspective of the Military Information 
Division, the Governor's decrees cast a different shadow. 
Guerra's appointment, Captain Furlong reported, was viewed 
as a Zayista triumph and a stunning setback for the Miguel­
istas. The latter had already stepped up their efforts to 
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subvert the Rural Guard, but if the Guard could remain 
intact, the army would be no political threat.47 
The importance of the settlement to the Provisional 
Government was clearly recognized by the Grupo Cubano de 
Investigaciones Economicas, when, writing some fifty years 
after the fact, they stated: "After having organized the Cuban 
Army under the command of General Pino Guerra, Magoon 
held elections. . . . "48 The Provisional Government had prag­
matically solved the Cuban army "problem" through the time-
tested devices of compromise and public discussion. Cuba now 
had a force adequate to crush insurrection, a force which 
filled the military void of 1906 so annoying to Roosevelt. 
In developments that reached beyond 1909, however, the 
American officers in Cuba more clearly saw the future than 
did Washington. The Cuban army, despite its few American 
advisers, became the fiscally rapacious and politically potent 
institution the American officers predicted. Jose Miguel 
Gomez first removed General Rodriguez from the command 
of the Rural Guard, replacing him with his old crony, Jose 
de Jesus Monteagudo. Gomez then coerced Pino Guerra from 
his post (with the help of a would-be assassin's wounding 
bullet) and merged the Permanent Army with the Rural 
Guard under Monteagudo. Gomez also purged the Rural 
Guard officers he considered politically unreliable. To the 
dismay of his generals, Gomez broke up the Army's camps 
and ordered the troops to garrison Cuba's major cities. Like 
Topsy, the Army continued to grow; it was joined by a navy 
and by a Department of War and Navy. Militarily the Army 
performed well in the Race War of 1912, but it could hardly 
be called apolitical. Despite the efforts of the officers of the 
United States Army, the Cuban armed forces were once 
again Cubanized. 
The reconstruction of the Cuban armed forces created 
another perplexing political morass for the Roosevelt admin­
istration because American policy remained the captive of its 
political assumptions. At a loss as to who represented the 
Cuban people, Washington found itself again dealing almost 
entirely with the Liberal Committee. On the other hand, the 
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administration (including Magoon) chose to override the 
advice of American officers serving with the Provisional Gov­
ernment because it believed that their position was too rooted 
in institutional interest and favored a minority of the Cuban 
people. Certainly the administration did not acquiesce in the 
formation of the Permanent Army because it believed it 
would protect only the economic and social position of the 
alien commercial class. Instead, it approved the Permanent 
Army as a politically acceptable solution to what it believed 
were the basic military requirements for the withdrawal of 
American troops. In its deliberations its concern was to please 
its constituents, the Cuban politicians. To have ignored them, 
to have decided on a strengthened Rural Guard alone, would 
have denied the American way in foreign affairs: that matters 
being negotiated, regardless of the social and economic en­
vironment, may be settled by a peaceful adjustment of power 
between the negotiators. 
In Cuba the Roosevelt administration clearly followed the 
path of least resistance to please those whom it thought spoke 
for Cuba. The Cuban armed forces controversy ended with a 
compromise which was in substance no compromise at all for 
the United States. On the basic issue—the creation of a 
separate regular army—the Liberals were the outright victors. 
However spurious their arguments, however bogus their 
pretensions as spokesmen for the Cuban people, however 
harmful their army in terms of Cuba's future welfare, the 
Liberals were the only popular politicians the United 
States could find. In its futile effort to foster a stable 
party system, the United States served as midwife for an­
other institution with which Cuba's politicians could exploit 
their nation's weaknesses. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
RESTORATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
AiLTHOUGH no date had yet been set for the Jirst round of elections, the Cuban politicos 
were campaigning in earnest by the fall of 1907. Their 
speeches, as analyzed by the Military Information Division, 
had made Havana indifferent, the provincial towns excited, 
the peasants fearful, and the whole situation unpredictable: 
"Politics are becoming more and more complicated every 
day; the pretensions of the politicians are changing from 
hour to hour. The enthusiasm of the populace for the Presi­
dential candidates of today is constantly diminishing, and 
none of them are able to count upon victory."1 The reaction 
of the Havana bankers and merchants to this situation was 
to send a memorial to Roosevelt asking him to postpone all 
but the municipal elections until all the political factions 
requested them.2 
The style and content of Jose Miguel Gomez' campaign 
for the presidency were characteristic. Gomez, accompanied 
by compadres like Loynaz del Castillo and Monia Delgado, 
made speeches for strong government, national unity, and 
patriotism to small crowds around Havana.3 He then shifted 
his base back to Santa Clara where he continued to campaign 
with discretion and moderation. On one occasion, when a 
man shouted "Viva Jose Miguel Gomez, Abajo los americanos," 
Gomez shook his head and said, "No, we need the Americans." 
He then added that he hoped the American Army would 
remain to back the government.4 Gomez stumped around the 
province, banqueting, laying a wreath on the grave of Enrique 
Villuendas in Cienfuegos, and listening to his orators speak 
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for Law, Order, Patriotism, Independence, and Gomez. (They 
also had plenty of unpleasant things to say about the Zayistas.) 
Popular response, however, was luke-warm. The crowds (from 
500 to 3,000) were well-behaved. The only development of 
interest was that Gomez was trying to get Mario Menocal to 
be his running mate.5 
In April, 1908, the Miguelistas found in Oriente that the 
only way to whip up a crowd was to denounce the Americans; 
therefore Gomez allowed Loynaz del Castillo, Enrique Collazo, 
and Orestes Ferrara to berate the United States. Their speeches 
(to American ears) were full of hints of violence, anarchism, 
and demagoguery.6 As the Gomez entourage moved up the 
island, the crowds grew, the speeches became more violent, 
and the choice of speakers varied. Gerardo Machado and 
Nicanor Lopez, representing the Spanish Board of Trade of 
Havana, joined the Gomez partisans, which added another 
insurgent officer and a representative of "commercial or indus­
trial character" to the platform. The oratory continued to run 
heavily to anti-Americanism and threats of violence, but 
Gomez preached that the elections must be peaceful. He 
explained away the inconsistencies to a Marine officer by 
saying that there "must be some pepper in the food."7 The 
Military Information Division believed Gomez was pitching 
his campaign away from the common people to win more 
influential backers. As the August 1 elections approached, 
the single most controversial issue was American policy 
in Cuba.8 
The Zayistas' canvas differed in few respects from the 
Miguelistas' except that they were less cautious in their 
criticism of the United States. The general line of the Zayistas' 
appeal was summarized by Captain John W. Furlong: 
On all sides can be seen the signs of general discontent coming from 
the political and economic condition through which the Island is passing, 
and for which the American government is responsible. 
It has been asserted in private conversation that the United States 
government is exercising a policy very much akin to the one it sawfit to 
apply to California and Texas in days gone by. As a result, Cuba finds 
itself in a disorganized political and social state in order to please 
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American interests that have placed the country where it is now, and 
which makes it feel the lack of government that is responsible for its 
actions.9 
The Conservatives, in the meantime, were having a difficult 
time shaking their image as "men of books and laws who 
wished to deceive the Liberals" and only the Liberal split 
encouraged them to campaign. The Junta Patriotica (old-time 
conservative patriots) and the Independent Party of Color 
were making little headway. Still, despite the talk of violence, 
Magoon was satisfied that the municipal elections would be 
orderly though the vote close.10 
American-Cuban Relations and the Restoration 
In his annual message to Congress on December 7, 1907, 
Theodore Roosevelt expressed his pleasure over the Provisional 
Government's work. He announced that elections were in the 
offing to turn Cuba over to a government "chosen by the 
people." Once more he emphasized what he considered the 
irreducible elements of the United States relations with Cuba: 
Cuba is at our doors. It is not possible that this Nation should permit 
Cuba again to sink into the condition from which we rescued it. All 
that we ask of the Cuban people is that they be prosperous, that they 
govern themselves so as to bring content, order and progress to their 
island . . . and our only interference has been and will be to help them 
achieve these results.11 
To formally begin the restoration of self-government, Roose­
velt set the date of the American withdrawal as no later than 
February 1, 1909.12 
In the wake of Roosevelt's announcement, the British 
Foreign Office attempted to find out just how the United 
States was going to give Cuba both independence and sta­
bility. The charge in Havana, A. C. Grant-Duff, thought that 
the political situation did not promise tranquillity or any 
lessening of antiforeign sentiment in Cuba; he suggested that 
the Foreign Office get concrete guarantees of protection of 
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British property before the Americans withdrew.13 Opinions 
in London were divided; one official observed that the problem 
was entirely in Washington's hands: 
If the U.S. government wants to come back to Cuba, they will create 
disturbances in the island in order to provide a pretext for annexation 
or the American capitalists will do so. 
If, on the other hand, it is to their interest that things should remain 
quiet, they will take steps in that direction and as their troops are to 
remain after political evacuation, they can easily do this.14 
Ambassador Bryce had already been investigating the future 
of Cuban-American relations and found "singularly little in­
terest" in the subject within or without the government. 
Roosevelt seldom mentioned Cuba, and any impulse toward 
extending American control in the Spanish American republics 
seemed to have been "damped down among the people" for 
the time being.15 Bryce had learned, however, through a con­
versation between Robert Bacon and an officer in the British 
embassy, that Roosevelt's latest public statement did not mean 
American troops would be brought home. When the British 
official observed that Cuba would then be like Egypt, Bacon 
agreed.16 After reading Grant-Duffs letter, Bryce observed 
that the Platt Amendment morally bound the United States 
to see that order was maintained. In any event, the size of 
American investment in Cuba and the number of American 
companies doing business there were in themselves guarantees 
of intervention. Troops stationed at Guantanamo Bay would 
quite likely be enough to deter revolt. Bryce did report that 
Roosevelt told him he would probably withdraw all troops 
before his term expired.17 
In late January, Roosevelt, at Root's urging, called Magoon 
and Crowder to Washington to discuss Cuban affairs. The 
purpose of the meeting, so Magoon understood, was "to devise 
[a] plan for exercising [the] power of the United States in 
Cuba after withdrawal in such [aj way as to make it less 
difficult and less expensive to discharge our obligations."18 
The State Department, since Cuba soon would become its 
worry again, wanted to study how this could be accomplished. 
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Steinhart cabled Magoon that if the United States wanted 
to influence Cuban domestic affairs in the future, the gov­
ernment should leave Magoon as minister, create an extra­
territorial enclave near Havana garrisoned by three thousand 
American troops, and detail Army officers to both the Cuban 
army and Rural Guard as "instructors."19 
The Washington conference, however, became involved in 
settling public works problems and the administrative control 
of Cuba's sanitation services. The participants did agree 
that "some sort of potential supervision" should be estab­
lished over the Cuban government, but the talks on details 
proved inconclusive.20 
Again, in April, Roosevelt asked Magoon's views on leaving 
troops in Cuba and on a plan to police the Cuban government 
suggested by the German ambassador and the President's 
friend, Baron Herman Speck von Sternberg. It was time, 
Roosevelt wrote, to plan the kind of Cuban government the 
United States wanted to restore. The President was doubtful 
that leaving troops would be wise. What then did the Gover­
nor think of Speck von Sternberg's proposal: to leave three 
American officers as advisers to the Cuban government? One 
would work to professionalize the Rural Guard, the second 
would insure that the Department of Justice administered 
the law without regard to wealth and influence, and the third 
would protect the Treasury from corruption.21 
Magoon's reply on April 16 was an assessment of American 
policy, an analysis of Cuban politics, and a forthright interpre­
tation of Cuba's national development.22 The Provisional Gov­
ernor reaffirmed the American commitment to an independent 
Cuba, and did not approve of any measure that compromised 
Root's strict interpretation of the Platt Amendment. He be­
lieved that occupation policy since 1906 had been within 
the framework of Cuba's constitution; the Provisional Gov­
ernment had, in fact, improved it with administrative reforms, 
despite the uncertainty about the length of the occupation. 
Magoon believed the legal reforms were fundamental changes, 
for the "Cuban Government was unstable because it lacked 
even the ordinary means and agencies by which stability is 
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secured." The Provisional Government had enacted many 
laws "adapted to the government of a Republic and in 
harmony with modern thought . .  . to give stability to the 
government of the Republic of Cuba, or any other Republic." 
In addition, Cuba now had an armed force, "a reasonable and 
necessary agency for the stability of the Government," ade­
quate for the nation's needs and organized so as to reduce 
"the danger of militarism." Moreover, the government was 
now committed to an ambitious public-works program to offset 
seasonal unemployment, reduce unrest, and assist in economic 
development. Although the governmental reforms were by no 
means completed, the new Cuban administration would start 
off "well equipped with the ordinary means and agencies 
of stability." 
After examining the various proposals to increase American 
supervision over the next Cuban government, Magoon re­
jected most of them. He feared that to leave American 
troops would disturb rather than keep the "moral peace," 
for such a force did not scare the Cubans and the occupation 
would disrupt Cuban-American relations. Speck von Stern-
berg's adviser plan, designed to insure that the government 
performed on American standards, was feasible, but not, in 
Magoon's opinion, likely to be very effective. Nonetheless, 
he agreed that advisers to the armed forces and Department 
of Justice be left behind if they were acceptable to the 
Cuban government. 
Magoon made his own policy recommendations. He believed 
that the Provisional Government should go on with its legal 
reforms, public works, and administrative reorganization. After 
withdrawal, he urged both Cuba and the United States to 
reduce their tariffs for their mutual benefit. His most inter­
esting proposal was that a "high joint commission" of respected 
Cubans and Americans be established to settle "contested 
elections or other controversies involving the relations of an 
administration and any large portion of the population." 
Magoon thought that such a "Tribunal" would be an effective 
substitute for military intervention as the Cubans could take 
their grievances to it rather than rise in revolt. 
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The Provisional Governor readily admitted that, for several 
reasons, neither party politics nor Americanization contributed 
to governmental stability. One reason was "the racial char­
acteristics of the inhabitants of the Island." Magoon described 
the Cubans as "like all other people of Spanish origin . . . 
hot blooded, high strung, nervous, excitable and pessimistic 
. . . suspicious of every one." Cuba's colonial past had "in­
tensified" these characteristics, particularly the war against 
Spain when antisocial behavior was to a large degree the 
key to survival. Magoon wrote: 
We cannot change these racial characteristics by administering their 
Government for two or twenty years, nor would they be changed by a 
military occupation. The changes, if made, will be effected by forces 
and influences of altogether different kind and character. All we can do 
is wait the progress of events, doing what is practicable to keep the 
progress orderly. 
Magoon believed two developments "would make the 
Government of Cuba stable" and change the nature of party 
politics. The first would be the "cessation of the constant, 
senseless and trouble-breeding criticism with which the Gov­
ernment is surrounded as by a circle of perpetual fire." Any 
governmental act was criticized as favoritism, and there was 
no public confidence or desire to participate in "good gov­
ernment." "The second great accomplishment would be to 
induce the property owning and commercial classes to engage 
in active politics, assume and discharge the obligations of 
Cuban citizenship." Magoon was disheartened that the private 
associations and businesses did not "exercise their political 
influence." "With a modicum of interest and organization," 
they "could absolutely control the political situation." He 
realized that the "non-politicos" looked to the United States 
to protect their interests. Yet the participation of the business 
elite was essential: 
The stability of all governments comes from the business element and 
property owners and if those of Cuba would overcome their present 
inertia and go into politics, not to hold office, but establish good gov­
ernment, the question of further guarantees would be solved. How to 
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get them to do it, is a question I have vainly attempted to answer for 
the past year. 
Magoon recognized the dilemma American policy faced: 
the Cuban economy was controlled by people divorced from 
the country's political life. Survival in Cuba thus pitted what 
were two "nations" against each other with the United States 
often protecting the economically privileged. He urged that 
the United States restore some impartiality to its attitude. 
First, it must "make known, in no uncertain way," that it 
supported the next legitimate government. "If abuses exist 
or arise," they must be corrected at the polls under law. If 
foreign lives and property were lost through violence, the 
United States "will call for indemnity from the Cuban Treasury 
instead of taking over the administration. . . .  " Only by with­
drawing the protection of the Platt Amendment would the 
"non-politicos" be assimilated into Cuba's political life. Other­
wise the present "perilous" situation would continue. "The 
authority granted by the Platt Amendment should not be 
perverted into a menace to the object it was intended 
to conserve." 
If Magoon's April 16 letter revealed the Governor's economic 
naivete, it also was a forceful protest against the effect 
of American intervention on Cuba's internal development. 
Although Magoon believed his occupation government had 
made lasting reform, he was clearly worried that the 1906 
occupation had done even more to increase the likelihood 
of future interventions. He wanted Cuba to be free again 
to cope with its internal problems. It was Magoon's views 
which prevailed, at least in the waning days of the 
Roosevelt administration. 
Roosevelt's immediate reaction to Magoon's lengthy analysis 
of Cuba's problems and the United States responsibility for 
assisting Cuba to conquer them was to consider leaving 
Magoon as minister to Cuba and Crowder as military adviser. 
He also accepted the Provisional Governor's advice not to 
leave troops or press beyond requesting that the Provisional 
Government's work be continued.23 Two months later, Roose­
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velt had retreated even further from the Speck von Sternbeng 
plan. In a letter to Elihu Root, he set forth the United 
States demands on Cuba, " . .  . that finances be kept straight, 
that order be maintained; and that fair elections be guar­
anteed." The United States would interfere only if Cuba's 
independence was endangered, the President wrote in an 
effort to restore the Platt Amendment to its original (Root's) 
interpretation. A significant point of Roosevelt's letter, how­
ever, was that advisers would be left behind only if the Cuban 
government requested them, but that it must carry on the 
Provisional Government's programs. As for the Provisional 
Governor, Roosevelt had cooled on his ability to promote 
order in Cuba: "Magoon gets on beautifully with the Cuban; 
he has done his work well, but he is not a man of masterful 
type or, indeed, of great force, and he shrinks from following 
any course to which he thinks any considerable number of 
Cubans would object, whether rightly or wrongly."24 
In late August, Magoon again went to Washington to settle 
the details of the national election and the withdrawal. Upon 
his return to Havana, he wrote Roosevelt on Cuba's economic 
condition.25 His major concern was to secure funds to continue 
the public works projects by floating another loan. He felt 
that only another bond issue was a sure source of money to 
attack the seasonal unemployment problem. The larger ques­
tions of Cuba's economic instability he left unstated, and it 
was just as well, for Roosevelt had accepted his earlier advice 
not to exercise more control over the Cuban government. 
Without the security of American-imposed stability, there 
would have been little inclination in Congress to lower 
the tariff. 
Roosevelt was no longer optimistic about the United States 
ability to influence other nations' development without exploi­
tation and antagonism. As he told editor-diplomat Whitelaw 
Reid, he could see many difficulties in "the control of thickly 
peopled tropical regions by self-governing northern democ­
racies . . . "—not the least of which was that legislatures 
seldom understood the conditions in such lands and the 
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measures necessary to develop them. Then Roosevelt put the 
Cuban occupation in its broad historical and political context: 
We have passed the time when a nation with even an imperfectly 
developed conscience is content simply to exploit for its own benefit a 
country that it has conquered; and the effort to govern such a country 
in its own interest without falling into mawkish sentimentality implies 
some mighty difficult steering.26 
Close to the end of his administration, when his thoughts were 
far from Kettle Hill and his Corollary, Roosevelt, in a con­
versation with his military aide and Cuban veteran Captain 
Archibald Butt, gave his (and his nation's) eulogy to the 
Second Intervention. "I do not think about Cuba now," he 
said. "It is not our fault if things go badly there. . . . "27 
Cuba was still very much on the mind of Leonard Wood's 
friends in the Provisional Government as the end of the 
occupation neared. After Roosevelt ordered elections, Stein-
hart wrote the General that everyone was working with 
restoration in mind; he, for example, was putting Wood's 
friends in the government where possible. Steinhart was 
unhappy with Roosevelt's policy, but reconciled that with­
drawal would come.28 Lieutenant Colonel Bullard was con­
vinced that peaceful elections under American aegis were a 
poor way to test Cuba's capacity for self-government: "The 
question here is one of men and slow change which can come 
only in time and so we may not expect to see any appreciable 
results from an election."29 
The politicos triumph in the national elections further 
discouraged Wood's partisans. As Steinhart wrote McCoy: 
"Within a few weeks the second intervention will be a thing 
of the past and the Lord only knows what the future may 
have in store for this misfortunate island, in which I am 
informed bullfights, cock fights and lotteries are the new 
elements of contentment to be introduced."30 Major Slocum 
hoped the new government would last, but, despite the 
accomplishments of the Provisional Government, feared it 
would not.31 Captain John W. Wright of the Military Infor­
mation Division wrote Wood that the "better classes" of 
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Cubans and his old officers hoped that at the next inter­
vention Wood would return to Cuba and continue his work. 
Wright was sure such an opportunity would arise, and then 
perhaps the Army could get on with its nation-building: 
I see no hope for the new Cuban Government not only on account 
of the character of these people, but because I am afraid our policy was 
a mistaken one from the start. It was unfortunate for Cuba that our 
elections were so near when our policy was dictated. It was the policy 
to avoid trouble at any price and have everybody satisfied—or at least 
quiet—by the time our presidential votes were cast. In other words, our 
policy was directed not by the situation in Cuba, but by the American 
political status. 
I will return here and I hope for the sake of Cuba that you will 
be sent down here and allowed to remain at least ten years to continue 
your old policy, and only then, will this rich little Island come into 
her own.32 
In view of the coming withdrawal, General Bell asked 
Captain John W. Furlong of the Military Information Division 
to study the character of Cuba's political leaders and report 
who were "the best men" or those most suited for "being 
used by Americans."33 Furlong's criteria for a "good" public 
figure were that he be honest and have some resemblance 
to Porfirio Diaz of Mexico. Except for the "rascals" of which 
Alfredo Zayas ("who lived modestly on graft") was the 
archetype, most Cubans, he believed, lacked sufficient aggres­
siveness and self-confidence to be political leaders. 
Furlong's "best men" were a curious group with but one 
common characteristic, the meaninglessness of their party 
affiliation. They were the conservative Manuel Sobrado, acting 
secretary of the Department of Justice; Ernesto Asbert, Liberal 
and next governor of Havana province; the conservative 
Domingo Lecuona, former governor of Matanzas; Tomas 
Recio, Liberal boss in Camaguey; Major Eduardo F. Lores of 
the Rural Guard; Jose Miguel Gomez' henchman Jose de 
Jesus Monteagudo; and Liberal politicos Demetrio Castillo 
Duany and Juan Gualberto Gomez. If there was any common 
denominator in these men's pasts, there was certainly none 
in their political futures except that their loyalties seemed 
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to have been always negotiable. Perhaps they were selected 
as possible collaborators in a future military government, for 
in Army circles it was generally assumed that there would 
be other interventions.34 
Lieutenant Colonel Bullard probably summed up the Army 
position when he observed that Cuba was pacified but not 
changed, that there could be no lasting government or peace 
there. The flaws in the Cuban body politic were so deep 
that the people would have to overthrow the government 
again, for "with the domineering, grandee spirit of Spanish 
blood, no Cuban in power can abstain from squeezing his 
fellows, from making them feel his power and authority. 
. . . The U. S. will have to go back. It is only a question 
of time."35 
Cuban Elections American Style 
Pacified, enumerated, registered and administratively re­
formed, the Cubans went to the polls in August, 1908, to 
begin to elect away the American occupation. Governor 
Magoon cautioned them that on their behavior at the polls 
rested the restoration of their own government and the future 
happiness and stability of their Republic.36 On August 1, 
the Cubans elected provincial governors and councilmen 
and mayors and municipal councilors.37 The elections went 
off with only minor problems as 269,132 of Cuba's 451,677 
registered voters cast ballots. 
The result was a stunning victory for the Conservatives 
over the still split Liberal factions of Gomez and Zayas. 
Conservative governors won in Pinar del Rio, Matanzas, and 
Santa Clara, and the party elected twenty-eight mayors. The 
potential Liberal strength was obvious, however, for the 
factions elected three governors and fifty-three mayors, and 
if their votes had been combined, they would have elected 
all their gubernatorial candidates and sixty-one of eighty-two 
mayors. Of the two factions, the Miguelistas were the 
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stronger. Prominent among the Liberal victors were eight 
generals of the Constitutional Army: Enrique Loynaz del 
Castillo, Ernesto Asbert, Andres Paez, Baldermo Acosta, Jose 
Ruman Montero, Gerardo Machado, Adriano Galano, and 
Eduardo Guzman. 
Elated by the effectiveness of the electoral law and by the 
tranquillity of the elections, Magoon recommended that there 
be no delay of the national elections.38 After his August trip 
to Washington, the Governor set November 14 as their date. 
In the meantime, the politicos were busy repairing their 
alliances. The Liberals, seeing defeat in continued division, 
reunited and nominated Gomez and Zayas, a repeat of the 
slate of 1905; the fusion itself was artfully managed by 
three "Heroes of 1906," Pino Guerra, Julian Betancourt, and 
Loynaz del Castillo.39 The Conservatives nominated Mario 
Menocal and Rafael Montoro. A "third force" movement in 
opposition to the historic parties was almost launched. If 
formed, this coalition would have been most interesting, for 
it spanned in social class, race, and region most of the Cuban 
body politic. The interested parties were Jose Manuel Govin 
(a Nunezista) of the Agrupacion Nacional Independiente, 
Tomas Recio (a Liberal who eventually supported Menocal) 
of the Partido Liberal Camagueyano, Salvador Cisneros 
Betancourt of the Junta Patriotica, Juan Gualberto Gomez 
of the "independent" Liberals, and Evaristo Estenoz of the 
Independent Party of Color.40 
In November, after a noisy campaign, Gomez and Zayas 
won a majority of 70,943 votes and all 107 electors. In addi­
tion, all the newly elected senators were Liberals and, under 
proportional representation, fifty-one of the eighty-three rep­
resentatives. The election was orderly and fair, although 
Menocal thought the United States favored the Liberals.41 
Satisfied by the results, Roosevelt, on December 8, said that 
withdrawal would soon begin. As for the United States, it 
had only one desire, that the Cubans should "govern them­
selves with justice, so that peace and order may be secure." 
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To avoid being governed by others, they must prove their 
ability and desire to govern themselves.42 
Restoration and Withdrawal 
The new year, 1909, found the Army of Cuban Pacification 
packing for home. In a gala round of banquets, the Pro­
visional Government prepared to turn over power to Jose 
Miguel Gomez and his friends. The first American soldiers 
(the Twenty-eighth Infantry) sailed on New Year's Day 
and the Eleventh Infantry and Fifteenth Cavalry followed 
shortly thereafter.43 
While there was still talk of the permanency of a future 
intervention, the Havana correspondent of the Times 
(London) reported that the Americans were satisfied that 
Cuba was better off for the occupation, but that the British 
interests were skeptical.44 One American visitor to Havana, 
editor-publisher Henry Watterson went to the heart of Cuba's 
immediate political future. "The Cubans," he wrote, "are 
presently to be freed from the despotism which has flung 
around their political cradle the spell of a prospering but 
to them an oppressive ministration." The Provisional Govern­
ment had given "benevolence galore without finding the 
least assimilation." The Cubans preferred Spain to the United 
States as a ruler, and the mass of the people resented Amer­
icans. What the future held for Cuban-American relations, 
one could not say: 
The Havanese hate us, but would not fight us. The "rurales" do not 
hate us, but would fight for the republic we promised them. But the 
riff-raff, Lord, the riff-raff; injin, nigger, beggarman, thief—"both mon­
grel, puppy, whelp and hound and cur of low degree." . . . When the 
pie is cut, when the offices are all filled, what of the rejected ones? 
Will each turn conspirator? 45 
As the Army of Cuban Pacification folded its tents and 
packed its haversacks, it received praise from the President 
and the Havana press for its conduct of the occupation. 
Roosevelt sent, "on behalf of the whole American people," his 
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thanks for a job well done.46 The Havana press was equally 
laudatory, though no Cuban journal suggested the Army re­
main. La Discusion complimented the Army on being business­
like and mannerly and for not insulting the people by parading 
about. Considering the Cubans' excitability and the Americans' 
tendency to drink too much, La Discusion marveled at the 
lack of incidents. The civil government had been inferior to 
Wood's regime, it concluded, but the Army was just as 
effective as it had been in the earlier occupation.47 In April, 
as the last soldiers left, El Triunfo echoed the same thought: 
The second intervention . . . has been the object of eulogies and 
censure, which it is not necessary to discuss at this moment; but we 
readily recognize and declare with sincere loyalty that the part of the 
intervention assigned to the American army merits only applause and 
congratulations from the Cubans.48 
Magoon worked hard to order the government's affairs, 
primarily issuing decrees that made Gomez responsible for 
unfinished business in claims and public works. On January 
28, the birthday of Jose Marti, Magoon ceremoniously trans­
ferred the Cuban government to the newly inaugurated Gomez 
on the balcony of the palace. Inside, Magoon, in a formal 
message, asked the new President's assurances that he would 
continue the Provisional Government's programs and uphold 
the Platt Amendment and the laws passed since 1906.49 
Gomez replied that he would, opened the palace doors, and 
shook hands with the crowd until his fingers became swollen. 
Cuba's new president, American readers were told, was a 
man of the people, not a doctor or lawyer, but "a soldierly 
inclined man of the Porfirio Diaz type, beloved by the 
country-people . . . whose mailed fist will command much 
more respect than the rather meek and forebearing patriotism 
of Estrada Palma."50 
That afternoon, Magoon and his aides rode between 
cheering crowds to Caballeria Wharf. There Jose Miguel 
G6mez gave the ex-governor a warm dbrazo, and the Amer­
icans went by launch to the battleship "Maine" and the 
transport "McClellan." The harbor swarmed with lighters 
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and bumboats flying the Cuban colors, and from the city's 
rooftops handkerchiefs waved and whistles shrieked. As the 
United States warships, including the battleship "Mississippi," 
left the harbor, a Cuban military band (at Magoon's request) 
began to play "Bayamo," the national anthem. As one reporter 
described the scene: 
It was a brilliant picture, made more perfect by a God given January 
day, by the tropic sun and the dark smoothness of the sea. At Morro, the 
khaki clad Artillery band struck up the strains of the Cuban hymn. 
Every head was uncovered. The governor could be seen to uncover . . . 
and the din of the whistles redoubled. In a saturnalia of noise, which 
drowned the efforts of the band, the Maine turned her nose north, as 
sedately as an old maid in a lavendar dress walking primly to church 
on an Easter morning. . . . 
From Morro, whose signal tower was a galaxy of the flags of many 
nations . . . the lookout with his telescope followed the gray warships 
far out to sea. It was he who saw the last of the provisional governor 
that was.51 
By mutual agreement, the United States Army stayed on in 
Cuba to insure a peaceful transition. The Army of Cuban 
Pacification headquarters, the Twenty-seventh Infantry, and 
the Engineers occupied Camp Columbia until March 31. On 
that day they turned over the post to the Cuban Army. With 
bands playing the two national anthems, the Republic's 
banner went up the staff. That night the American officers 
were honored by a banquet at the Hotel Miramor with much 
toasting and good cheer. At ten o'clock the next morning, 
the last troops left Havana aboard the transports "Sumner" 
and "McClellan."52 The second American military occupation 
of Cuba was over. 
Although the military occupation of Cuba was little more 
than an annoying necessity to the Roosevelt administration, 
it had a lasting impact on Cuba's political history and a 
negative but important influence on American foreign policy 
in the Caribbean. 
The act of intervention, Manuel Marquez Sterling wrote in 
1906, demonstrated once more that despite the United States 
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great moral and material progress, Roosevelt had not learned 
that partisan politics, "good" and "educating" from a North 
American's point of view, had been in Latin America a 
source of criminality: 
Liberty is invoked in order to establish tyrannies; in its name grafters 
fight one another to divide precious resources; administrative honesty, 
free elections, and true suffrage are promised by those who proceed in 
the opposite manner, and sensitive people have seen with sadness in 
Colombia, in Mexico, in Paraguay or in Cuba, that the triumph of the 
evil ones has not been over the good, but, in most cases, over the poor. 
Politics in our unfortunate lands consists of alternating between two 
different, demoralizing systems, under tyranny or under chaos, under 
the rapacious power of reactionaries or under the anarchistic power of 
equally rapacious demagogues. Politicians, in the step from colony to 
independence, have made reform a deformation of social character.53 
Cuba's war of liberation had placed political power in the 
hands of men who knew how to use violence as a political 
weapon, but who knew little else. They could hardly have 
been less prepared for constitutional government. As one 
Cuban conservative reflected: "When the last soldier of the 
war of independence is dead . . . when there is no longer 
left any soldier or General of the rebellion of . .  . 1906, then 
and not until then, will it be wise for the United States to 
trust us with a second experiment in self-government."54 
Of equal consequence was the fact that free Cuba retained 
its colonial economy. The economic and social destruction of 
the war of 1895-98 sped the trend to sugar monoculture, the 
heart of Cuba's economic instability. For Enrique Jose Varona, 
the lack of domestic capital was a more important problem 
than foreign ownership, and he urged the government to 
assume a positive role in economic development. If the eco­
nomic situation did not change, Varona wrote in 1906, the 
Cuban people would be in an increasingly weak and desperate 
position. "If this is so, the resulting irreconcilable confusion 
of mind will sustain the sordid agitation I see everywhere, 
the budding anarchy becoming evident in so many places, 
the malevolence and mad hostility with which we persecute 
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one another, as if each Cuban was the natural enemy of 
all other Cubans."55 
Varona thought the remedy "for our evils" should be sought 
in "a change in our internal political organization," rather 
than in a "change in the form of our relations with the United 
States " Whatever Roosevelt's good intentions, he could 
not alter the basic facts of Cuban-American relations, for the 
only way to do that "would be to push the island several 
thousand leagues out in the Atlantic and outside the radius 
of the influence of the United States." Varona's interpretation 
of the United States duty under these circumstances reflected 
the characteristic ambivalency of the Cuban-American dia­
logue: Roosevelt must "guarantee in a permanent manner 
. . . peace on the island, and the right to labor undisturbed 
and acquire wealth by all licit means."56 
The intervention, as Enrique Barbarrosa saw it, was to a 
large degree the fault of the United States, whose economic 
policy was to dominate Cuba. In the resulting social disinte­
gration, "the force of circumstances . . . made Uncle Sam 
give the disconsolate virgin of America, full on the face, the 
kiss of intervention." The occupation that followed proved 
but one thing: "One cannot establish a rich and free 
government with a nation of beggars."57 
The thrust of Cuban criticism was well aimed, for it was 
not so critical of the intervention itself as of the occupation 
that followed. Disregarding the annexationists and the xeno­
phobes, the Cuban nationalist interpretation of the occupation 
is best summarized by Herminio Portell Vila. Writing in 
the first period of the Batista dictatorship, Portell Vila 
criticized the Magoon government for ignoring the impact 
of American policy on Cuba's economic growth, while it 
wrongly attributed Cuban apathy toward the nation's prob­
lems to a fundamental lack of national character. Portell Vila 
believed this apathy was a result of American policy which 
had frustrated the Cuban Revolution.58 Magoon's administra­
tion had done nothing to dispel the notion that government 
was the foremost national industry. By dealing sympathetically 
with the politicos, rather than using Cubans who were "able, 
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progressive, and dedicated to service in the cause of national 
regeneration," Magoon paved the way for the politicos final 
conquest of the Republic of Cuba. After 1909, "administrative 
corruption, violence and incapacity" increasingly dominated 
Cuban government and were an insurmountable barrier 
to reform.59 
A perceptive contemporary assessment of the American 
occupation came from Dr. Juan Guiteras in a letter to Major 
Jefferson R. Kean. The United States, Doctor Guiteras wrote, 
had the best intentions and Cuba was grateful to be rescued 
from the violence of 1906. The problem was that American 
policy-makers failed to use their power to provide for the 
long range conditions which would insure the United States 
security and trade and Cuba's development. The expedient 
acts of the occupation brought only temporary improvement: 
A rather remarkable group of well-meaning, intelligent men, with 
a great power behind them, have come down here, and with much tact, 
hard work, self sacrifice and kindness, have managed things very well. 
They have maintained peace and order, and have much improved the 
administration; they have opened up new lines in the way of progress; 
but that they have made us better fit for self-government, I cannot 
believe. 
. .  . In Cuba there are no parties, and the Intervention has done 
nothing towards teaching us to construct and maintain two great po­
litical parties. It has, on the contrary, fostered our natural bent for 
individual or boss following. When this second Intervention came upon 
the scene the people appeared to be divided into two great political 
parties . . . worthy rivals to contend for the control of the future 
Republic. But the conglomerate that made up the so-called parties 
began to disgregate [sic], and the Government proceeded to cultivate 
the several factions into which they divided. The result was a most 
luxurious multiplication of parties, in the shape of three or more inde­
pendent followings in every Province, and perhaps in every municipality. 
This is exactly what was done in the days of the Republic and the 
procedure must likewise lead to revolution so soon as you withdraw the 
big stick of Uncle Sam that makes everything go.60 
Fearing a costly and politically unjustifiable war, the 
Roosevelt administration reluctantly assumed the responsibility 
of governing Cuba in 1906. Caught between its hesitancy to 
incur domestic criticism and its sensitivity to Cuban resistance, 
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the Provincial Government was unable to take advantage of 
the security given it by the Army of Cuban Pacification to 
work basic social and economic changes in Cuba. To a large 
degree, Magoon and his advisers were limited in their policy 
choices by Roosevelt, Taft, and Root who guided policy 
under two basic assumptions: that Cuba should not be an­
nexed and that there was no chance of altering the two 
nations' economic relationship. The Provisional Government's 
mission was to hold elections and withdraw. In order to do 
this, to restore some order in Cuba, it did improve transporta­
tion, government services, and, by its stability and fiscal 
policy, the economy. The laws drafted by the Advisory Law 
Commission and put into effect by Magoon were badly 
needed, but more related to establishing the machinery for 
American withdrawal than to promoting long-term reforms. 
Governments, however, are built on men as well as laws, 
and the political program of the Provisional Governor and 
the administrative reforms initiated by the Army officers on 
his staff contributed to Cuba's problems rather than solved 
them. Magoon, Taft, and Roosevelt believed that political 
parties were an expression of popular will and necessary to 
representative government; their faith in the American ex­
perience was obvious. Beyond their ideological commitment 
to party government, they recognized that parties were essen­
tial to the elections which would return Cuba to its own 
government. Ironically, while the Provisional Government's 
constitutional reforms were in accordance with the Cuban 
conservatives' suggestions for cleansing the government, the 
United States, through elections, turned the whole apparatus 
over to men whose political values did not include belief in 
a division and balance of power, limited government, efficiency, 
honesty, and public interest, as Americans prized them. 
Within the Provisional Government, the greatest impulse 
for change in Cuba came from the officers of the United 
States Army. Their experiences with Leonard Wood and in 
the other insular possessions convinced them that the former 
Spanish colonies needed long periods of tutelage and control 
if they were not to slip into anarchy or absolutism. They saw 
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the native political class as unprincipled exploiters of the 
people, men whose influence must be checked. They blamed 
Cuban antisocial behavior as much on ignorance and the 
Hispanic cultural heritage (which could be overcome) as on 
poverty and biological inferiority, the characteristics that most 
repulsed their civilian contemporaries. They believed some 
important American values (such as justice, fair play, honesty, 
and community co-operation) were transferable and offered 
the only real hope of stability. For the moment, however, 
American political institutions had best be left at home. An 
American military government, on the other hand, the officers 
thought, was an appropriate instrument for inculcating the 
attitudes of a peaceful citizenry. Since the Army would have 
to police the violent societies for which the United States had 
assumed responsibility, the officers were anxious to reshape 
these societies to their own liking. This is what they attempted 
to do, without much satisfaction, in Cuba from 1906 to 1909. 
To a large degree, the Army was responsible for the 
Provisional Government's successes and had little to do with 
its more obvious shortcomings. The Army of Cuban Pacifica­
tion kept the peace and thwarted the annexationists, while 
the officers of the Provisional Government administered the 
government, however restively, under Magoon and his civil 
superiors. But in their more far-reaching developmental plans, 
the officers were disappointed. Colonel Crowder did not get 
the reformed legal codes; Lieutenant Colonel Bullard did 
not get a chance to rebuild the educational system; Lieutenant 
Colonel Black did not get the better roads and waterworks 
he wanted to construct; Lieutenant Colonel Greble did not 
have enough time to purge the incompetents from the Depart­
ment of Government; Major Kean had to leave the epidemic 
disease problem relatively untouched; Major Slocum did not 
get the Rural Guard thoroughly professionalized. Paradox­
ically, the major institutional change sponsored by the Pro­
visional Government, the establishment of the Permanent 
Army of Cuba, was opposed by the officers because of its 
political and economic implications. They were overruled by 
their superiors in Washington and the civil authorities, who 
264 T H E P O L I T I C S OF I N T E R V E N T I O N 
were willing to follow a more expedient course: to give the 
politicos the armed forces they wanted for internal security. 
The officers could see no constructive purpose in stimulating 
party politics and establishing the governmental machinery 
of a working democracy for an undemocratic society, and they 
said so. They did not, however, argue their case outside their 
own circle of Army associates and the official channels of 
the government. To a large degree, they accepted limitations 
on their reforms because they could see few possible political 
allies in either American or Cuban civil society. 
There were other inhibitive influences besides their political 
isolation. The most important was the attitude of the Army 
itself. In 1906 the new colonial possessions, pacified or not, 
presented the United States Army with demanding strategic 
problems it did not have before 1898. Confronted with new 
tasks, the Army rapidly lost its interest in constabulary duties 
and colonial administration. By 1909, it had become thoroughly 
involved in planning and organizing for war with one or 
another of the major world powers. This was its own in­
evitable adjustment to the United States new stature as an 
international force. As the Army redefined its missions and 
professional interests, it placed a lower priority on the skills 
of maintaining internal security and nation-building. The 
officers who had made careers in Cuba and the Philippines 
had to refashion them at the Army War College and on the 
General Staff within a decade. For the Army, as well as for 
the nation, there was little time for unpopular occupations 
in the Caribbean and the reform of Latin republics. 
Throughout the occupation the Army officers consistently 
found themselves thwarted by the central tenet of American 
policy: the Provisional Government's function was to liquidate 
the intervention of September, 1906. While the officers saw 
their tasks as eliminating the causes of insurrection and of 
continuing the Americanizing, reformist work of Wood's 
military government, Roosevelt, Taft, and Root viewed occu­
pation policy only in relation to restoring a Cuban political 
balance which would allow the United States to withdraw. 
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The United States government was more concerned with 
concluding the historical act of military occupation rather 
than changing the conditions which brought it about. 
For both countries, the withdrawal marked a restoration 
of Cuban self-government at the expense of Cuba's political 
development. 
The impact of the Second Intervention on American policy 
in the Caribbean has been underestimated. The occupation of 
Cuba coincided with the development of fiscal supervision in 
the Dominican Republic, and it was the tool of fiscal super­
vision perfected in the latter country which seemed best suited 
and was subsequently most applied to influence the lives of 
the Caribbean republics. In a sense, the Roosevelt adminis­
tration had two experiments underway at the same time, 
and it bequeathed the results of both to Taft and Woodrow 
Wilson. Recognizing the unique circumstances of each of the 
United States Caribbean interventions, the Cuban model, mili­
tary occupation and direct governmental control sanctioned 
by treaty, was not willingly used again elsewhere. The 
Dominican model, financial supervision and indirect control, 
seemed a handier way to bring stability while reducing the 
political risks. 
There were some obvious factors in the increasing reluctance 
to use military occupations elsewhere: no other Caribbean 
island was as strategically and economically important to the 
United States as Cuba, nor did any other hold the same his­
toric and emotional relationship. Armed intervention and out­
right military occupation in Cuba might be rationally and 
emotionally acceptable to the Americans, but these measures 
might not be so easily justifiable in another republic. 
In the broadest sense, the Second Intervention reminded 
American policy-makers that outright control and military 
occupation, as in Cuba, brought the United States govern­
ment face to face with the problem of political and social 
change in the former Spanish colonies. The United States 
government was unwilling to assume the responsibility for 
making any institutional changes which it would have to 
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supervise over a long and indefinite period. Undoubtedly 
this disavowal represented the prevailing sentiments of the 
American people. 
Ironically, the attempts to achieve stability in the Caribbean 
through a variety of indirect controls often became the bloody 
and unproductive military affairs the policy was designed to 
avoid. Again there were military interventions and occupa­
tions, sometimes against native resistance, and the same prob­
lems of institutional change was forced upon the United States. 
William Howard Taft did not forget that intervention was 
a poor remedy for Caribbean instability, a lesson Cuba may 
easily have taught him. As heavy-handed and, in the long run, 
unprofitable as Dollar Diplomacy was, it was Taft's clumsy 
alternative to reformist military occupations. By "substituting 
dollars for bullets," or capital investment and financial super­
vision for Army occupation, and (hopefully) prosperity for 
rebellion, Taft looked for a more politically acceptable answer 
to Caribbean instability than the Army could provide. Dollar 
Diplomacy was the idiom of the bank, not the drill field. 
It reflected the ideals of middle-class, productive, civilian 
America: social peace, profits, progress, and the spread of 
civilization. 
Dollar Diplomacy's political component was also a rejection 
of the Cuban experience, for the support of de jure native 
governments became increasingly preferable to outright Ameri­
can political control. In practice, this diplomatic stance did 
not make the United States reaction to civil war less am­
biguous, nor did it reduce the likelihood of intervention; an 
established government's ability to defend itself (and foreign 
property) continued to be an important criterion for winning 
or losing American support. 
Although Dollar Diplomacy cut the domestic political risks 
of intervention, it was unable to correct the economic condi­
tions which helped insure that the United States would be 
drawn into the Caribbean civil wars of the next thirty years. 
Here the Cuban experience was ignored at two levels. The 
growth of American businesses, as in Cuba, provided perfect 
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political hostages when a faction wanted to coerce the United 
States government. Not to intervene, to allow American lives 
and property to be destroyed, was to risk widespread criticism 
at home and economic collapse in the affected Caribbean 
country. The problem had another dimension. The employ­
ment habits, the marketing risks, and the patterns of wealth 
distribution that characterized the Cuban economy in 1906 
(the result of the increasing dominance of industrialized, cash-
crop agriculture) were in themselves a cause of political insta­
bility. The Provisional Government became increasingly aware 
of this, yet, except for temporary palliatives, it could not 
change Cuba's economic structure. Among the restraints were 
the direct limitations imposed by the United States gov­
ernment and the economic preconceptions of the Americans 
serving in Cuba. The causes of Cuba's economic instability 
were clear enough. Yet this understanding of Cuba's economic 
vulnerability did not prevent the Taft administration from 
encouraging American investors to create similar problems in 
other Caribbean nations by introducing or expanding economic 
institutions similar to Cuba's. If the economic phase of Dollar 
Diplomacy was based on the impact of foreign capital on 
the Cuban political system, it was an unwise precedent to 
follow. The Cuban experience demonstrated that the poli­
tics of violence were part of the cost of a certain form of 
economic development. 
The social and political insecurity of Cuba's type of 
economic growth far outweighed the stabilizing effect brought 
about by a simple increase of the nation's wealth. However 
imperfectly stated, this was the argument the officers of the 
United States Army serving in Cuba wanted to present, that 
stability without reform and institutional change brought no 
peace at all. In retrospect, the authoritarian American gov­
ernment the officers wished to establish for Cuba, in order to 
reshape the Cuban way of life, might have been a humani­
tarian, just, and effective alternative to the indigenous, self-
determined Cuban government created in the image but not 
the spirit of American economic and political liberalism. 
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Archival Material and Manuscripts 
Public Records.—The records of the agencies of the United 
States government involved in the intervention and occupation 
of Cuba held by the National Archives of the United States, 
Washington, D.C., are numerous. Of first importance are the 
Records of the Provisional Government of Cuba (Record 
Group 199), which include the Confidential Correspondence 
of the Provisional Governor of Cuba, public health and fiscal 
reports, and cartographic records. These documents run heav­
ily to reports of political and administrative affairs and eco­
nomic conditions. Additional materials concerning the Provi­
sional Government are located in the case files in the General 
Classified Files, 1898-1945, of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, 
War Department (Record Group 350). The diplomatic corre­
spondence, including private letters, post reports, newspaper 
clippings, and other documents, is part of the Numerical File, 
1906-1910 (1,172 volumes) and consular Dispatches in the 
General Records of the Department of State (Record Group 
59). The military records are voluminous. The most useful 
source is the Records of the War Department General Staff 
(Record Group 165), which include reports from the Army 
of Cuban Pacification in the papers of the Military Informa­
tion Division, and the documents in the Army War College 
Document File, 1903-19, in the records of the Army War 
College Division. Of almost equal value are the Records 
of the Adjutant-General's Office (Record Group 94), for 
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the Adjutant-General was the custodian of the Army's corre­
spondence. Another good source is the Records of the Office 
of the Inspector General (Record Group 159), containing 
"Inspection Reports, Department of Cuba and Cuban Posts, 
1903-1912." The naval records are preserved in the Naval 
Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library 
(Record Group 45), particularly the geographic Area 8 File 
(Caribbean, 1775-1910), and the General Records of the Navy 
Department (Record Group 80). 
In addition, selected documents from the records of the 
British Foreign Office, the Public Record Office, London, 
England, were used. 
Private Papers.—The private correspondence, diaries, and 
manuscripts of American political leaders and Army officers 
are essential for interpreting the Second Intervention. From 
the civil policy-making side, the papers of Theodore Roose­
velt, William Howard Taft, Elihu Root, and Charles J. Bona-
parte, held by the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
are basic; the Taft-Roosevelt Correspondence in the Taft 
Papers is the most significant single group of letters. The 
Library of Congress also holds the papers of American officers 
whose careers were inextricably tied to Cuba. A major source 
is the papers of General Leonard Wood, which contain many 
letters from Cubans and Army officers written in 1906-9. A 
collection of equal interest is the papers of General Robert L. 
Bullard, containing diaries, notebooks, a manuscript autobiog­
raphy, letters, and article manuscripts. Another collection of 
value is the papers of General James Harrison Wilson, a critic 
of American policy; the Wilson Papers include letters from 
Lieutenant Colonel E. St.J. Greble and journalist Albert G. 
Robinson. The papers of Generals Hugh L. Scott, Tasker H. 
Bliss, and Frank R. McCoy have varied Cuban materials, 
and those of Generals Henry T. Allen, James G. Harbord, 
and John J. Pershing shed light on the problems of pacifica­
tion. The Library of Congress holds the papers of Admiral 
William F. Fullam, which include two Cuban subject files 
of great value for the reconstruction of the naval intervention. 
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